Last Of Peacekeeper Missiles Will Be Deactivated By September
(Inside The Air Force, May 27, 2005, Pg. 1)
The last of the U.S. military's Peacekeeper intercontinental ballistic missiles will be dismantled this summer, closing a three-year deactivation process that is part of a larger scaling down of the country's nuclear arsenal.
And let's not get overly cocky at our technological lead either. Even where we assumed it was greatest...our AirForce. The Indians fly basically the same Russian-built Sukhoi-30's as the Chinese...who have a great many more of them. The USAF had a calamitous joint exercise against the Indian. The USAF lost the engagement. And not by a little bit. We need the F-22, and more serious "Blue on Blue" training, instead of the bean-counter-approved "Blue on Red" training. Rumsfeld is making like we can't afford any of them. And get this he is cutting $272 million of training "flying hours" in peace time...effective immediately?! I thought we were at war..
And as for "lead time" we need to be aware of what is happening to our forces, as our industrial base is allowed to implode. We are losing the industry base, which supports the defense base. Both economically, and in skills and hardware availability. The USN Submarine Fleet commander is extremely worried about the failure to sustain rebuild rates to prevent massive attrition in his force that is pending in the next 10 years...
And on the Chinese side, we all need to be FULLY aware we have been surprised badly by the Chinese already...and the same people who screwed up are still in the CIA, rationalizing, denying and backbiting. They most likely are Fifth Columnists like Alger Hiss, hence there will be no self-correcting mechanism. Note the following report:
Analysts missed Chinese buildup
By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, June 9th, 2005, p. 1.
A highly classified intelligence report produced for the new director of national intelligence concludes that U.S. spy agencies failed to recognize several key military developments in China in the past decade, The Washington Times has learned.
The report was created by several current and former intelligence officials and concludes that U.S. agencies missed more than a dozen Chinese military developments, according to officials familiar with the report.
The report blames excessive secrecy on China's part for the failures, but critics say intelligence specialists are to blame for playing down or dismissing evidence of growing Chinese military capabilities.
The report comes as the Bush administration appears to have become more critical of China's military buildup.
Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said in Singapore over the weekend that China has hidden its defense spending and is expanding its missile forces despite facing no threats. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also expressed worries this week about China's expanding military capabilities.
Among the failures highlighted in the study are:
China's development of a new long-range cruise missile.
The deployment of a new warship equipped with a stolen Chinese version of the U.S. Aegis battle management technology.
Deployment of a new attack submarine known as the Yuan class that was missed by U.S. intelligence until photos of the submarine appeared on the Internet.
Development of precision-guided munitions, including new air-to-ground missiles and new, more accurate warheads.
China's development of surface-to-surface missiles for targeting U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups.
The importation of advanced weaponry, including Russian submarines, warships and fighter-bombers.
According to officials familiar with the intelligence report, the word "surprise" is used more than a dozen times to describe U.S. failures to anticipate or discover Chinese arms development.
Many of the missed military developments will be contained in the Pentagon's annual report to Congress on the Chinese military, which was due out March 1 but delayed by interagency disputes over its contents.
Critics of the study say the report unfairly blames intelligence collectors for not gathering solid information on the Chinese military and for failing to plant agents in the communist government.
Instead, these officials said, the report looks like a bid to exonerate analysts within the close-knit fraternity of government China specialists, who for the past 10 years dismissed or played down intelligence showing that Beijing was engaged in a major military buildup.
"This report conceals the efforts of dissenting analysts [in the intelligence community] who argued that China was a threat," one official said, adding that covering up the failure of intelligence analysts on China would prevent a major reorganization of the system.
A former U.S. official said the report should help expose a "self-selected group" of specialists who fooled the U.S. government on China for 10 years.
"This group's desire to have good relations with China has prevented them from highlighting how little they know and suppressing occasional evidence that China views the United States as its main enemy."
The report has been sent to Thomas Fingar, a longtime intelligence analyst on China who was recently appointed by John D. Negroponte, the new director of national intelligence, as his office's top intelligence analyst.
Mr. Negroponte has ordered a series of top-to-bottom reviews of U.S. intelligence capabilities in the aftermath of the critical report by the presidential commission headed by Judge Laurence Silberman and former Sen. Charles Robb, Virginia Democrat.
According to the officials, the study was produced by a team of analysts for the intelligence contractor Centra Technologies.
Spokesmen for the CIA and Mr. Negroponte declined to comment.
Its main author is Robert Suettinger, a National Security Council staff member for China during the Clinton administration and the U.S. intelligence community's top China analyst until 1998. Mr. Suettinger is traveling outside the country and could not be reached for comment, a spokesman said.
John Culver, a longtime CIA analyst on Asia, was the co-author.
Among those who took part in the study were former Defense Intelligence Agency analyst Lonnie Henley, who critics say was among those who in the past had dismissed concerns about China's military in the past 10 years.
Also participating in the study was John F. Corbett, a former Army intelligence analyst and attache who was a China policy-maker at the Pentagon during the Clinton administration.
Oh what the heck, here it is:
Save the Submarine Shipyards
Captain James H. Patton, Jr., U.S. Navy (Retired)
Proceedings, June 2005
Keeping a defense industry going in a democracy has never been easybut it has always been important. Without two submarine builders, the United States could find itself in a lot of trouble.
The United States needs the capabilities offered by the two commercial yards building submarinesNorthrop Grumman Newport News (above) and General Dynamics Electric Boat (below)and cannot afford to lose the skills resident in the teams they have put together over the years.
The political-military environment in Washington these days is all aflutter with the congressionally-directed study of military strategy and force structure termed the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the more geographically threatening (for certain locales and constituencies) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. Some of the defense cognoscenti have warned of a gathering storm that could reach tsunami proportions in which budgetary pressures, a stretched military, and a poisonous political atmosphere combine to wreak havoc on the nation's armed forces as they fight an ongoing war on terrorism and try to hedge against longer-term, emerging threats.
Of course, our military has survived such policy onslaughts in the past, and it is probable that these two deliberative processes will wind up doing more good than harm in preparing the armed forces for an uncertain future. But caveats applyparticularly because some of the very tough choices facing defense decision-makers have been deferred over the last few years. Defense budget analysts argue that there simply is not room for all the fighters, all the ships, all the future combat vehicles and, yes, all the submarines embraced in existing service programs. This top-down review might result in cuts that scrape the bottom.
For a number of reasons, the nation's nuclear submarine force and, particularly the Virginia (SSN-774)-class submarines and the industrial base that supports them, have been seen as a potential bill-payer for other prioritiesor, at least, an area where near-term savings can be achieved by moving the planned program to the right, or by diminishing the industrial base. Neither of those proposed policy paths would take us in the right direction. And each involves added cost and risk.
Building Nuclear Submarines
Historically, submarine construction has been a difficult, inefficient, and very expensive proposition. It has often been identified as analogous to building a ship in a bottle, since much of the equipment and piping systems were installed after the pressure hull was essentially completed, bringing bits and pieces through 25-inch hatches to then assemble in place. For instanceand more art than sciencea given segment of piping fabricated off-hull to match a heavy wire template would then be bent to shape on the ship to go above, behind, or around other already installed pipes, pumps, and paraphernalia. To allow for unavoidable inaccuracies, the ends of the pipes would have an extra few inches which would then be "dressed" (ground off) by an onboard pipefitter for a custom fit before being welded up by a different tradesman and artisanwho, incidentally, might have had to literally stand on his head to make the joint.
As a result, even within a given class of ship sequentially built at the same shipyard, no two submarines were alike regarding plumbing, wire runs, and other system layoutsmuch like automobiles before Henry Ford came along. A notable exception to this generalization was within the primary (reactor-associated) propulsion plant, where Admiral Rickover demanded a "non-deviation from plans" approach. Otherwise, with just a bit of exaggeration, building plans only helped assure that submarines of the same class were about the same width, height, and length.
During the period between 1963 and 1978, the author had the experience of both building and conducting refueling overhauls at each of the two shipyards presently involved in producing Virginia-class attack submarines. Each had its own personality at the time, and different internal techniques and procedures. The products from each yard, however, were uniformly good in spite of these different non-nuclear approaches to the task.
The author also saw, but was not directly involved with, the difficulties that originally plagued the Los Angeles (SSN-688)-class nuclear-powered submarines in the late 1970s and early 1980s when Electric Boat, traditionally the lead design agent for submarines, was building ships to Newport News plans and specifications. This forced marriage resulted in each yard essentially accusing the other of either producing blueprints that didn't match with realities or with an inability to read them correctly. One of the results of this dichotomy was that, for a period, the failure to deliver submarines resulted in the Groton, Connecticut, and Newport News, Virginia, shipyards each having one of the largest four or five nuclear submarine forces in the world. Similar, though less traumatic, problems occurred during the Seawolf design, where "the front end" was designed in Newport News and the propulsion plant in Groton, and there were real or imagined cases where "interfaces" between each shipyard's efforts didn't properly mate up.
For the most part, however, all this changed with the construction of the Seawolf class, and the advanced construction techniques pioneered in that program were further refined in the Virginia class. On 23 October 2004, USS Virginia became the first U.S. nuclear-powered submarine commissioned in seven years. Testifying to this improvement in production is the fact that this "first-of-a-class" ship was delivered within four months of a schedule written six years earlier, and was constructed with more than a 25% savings in labor costs when compared with Seawolf.1 To thoroughly appreciate the impact of these revolutionary changes in the manner by which submarines are built, consider the findings of the U.S. Navy In Service (INSURV) board. This organization inspects all new and, periodically, already commissioned, ships for their compliance with specifications, safety, and other standards. It is common for newly constructed, particularly first-of-a-class ships, to have far more deficiencies than a ship that has been operating for some period of time. The Virginia, however, had fewer deficiencies than any other operating ship that had been inspected during the previous twelve months. If any further proof is needed that the design and construction of Virginia heralded a true revolution in shipbuilding, it is generally accepted that its techniques and procedures were the reason why the 104-foot USS Jimmy Carter (SSN-23) "Multi-Mission Platform" insert could be conceived, constructed, and rolled into a Seawolf hull as quickly as it was. This second success story bodes well for generating future versions of Virginia to include those to replace current nuclear-powered guided-missile submarines (SSGNs) and strategic missile submarines (SSBNs).
Targeting Nuclear Submarines
Why, then, is the future of a vibrant and busier-than-ever submarine force, supported by efficiently produced and operationally capable platforms of the Virginia class, threatened by stretched-out production schedules and a weakened industrial base? The reason, as is so often the case, is moneyand short-range solutions to near-term fiscal shortfalls are now seriously undermining the nation's long-term capability to build and sustain a dominant undersea force. U.S. submarine roles and missions, alternative force levels, and the various options on how to reach and maintain them were the focus of a recent Congressional Research Service report.2 In that study, the present methodwhere the General Dynamics Electric Boat shipyard in Groton and the Northrop Grumman Newport News shipyard co-produce Virginia hulls then alternate final assembly, test, and deliverywas compared to alternate schemes. The present arrangement was deemed optimum for what was to be initially a one ship per year buy, but planned to increase to two ships per year (one for each yard) construction rate as early as 2002.
Budgetary pressures, however, have caused planners to keep shifting the transition to the higher rate almost continually to the right. Unless current plans are changed, the earliest fiscal year in which two submarines could be authorized is 2012. A decision to build only one ship per year would result in the present force level of about 54 SSNs (down from 98 in 1990) steadily diminishing to a low of 28 before leveling out at 33the expected life of a Virginia. This is far below the numbers of submarines that even the most optimistic of Navy and DoD studies show will be required in the future.
One of the tempting short-term options for reducing unit cost of the Virginia-class SSN is to eliminate the present two-shipyard approach to one-ship-per-year construction, assuming that the two-shipyard option would always be available in the future when additional fiscal resources were available or when geopolitical realities made it urgent. This would be a strategic mistake of the first order, with a multitude of unintended consequences. First, to even conceive of a myth that a two-shipyard submarine industrial base could be resurrected in the future, the production line terminated would have to be the Northrop-Grumman Newport News shipyard (presuming the yard could survive on carrier business), since ending the line at General Dynamics Electric Boat would be tantamount to shutting the yard down. If the Newport News submarine production were terminated, however, there would be an inevitable impact on the shipyard's ability to support the two-a-decade nuclear-powered aircraft carrier program, since the steady submarine effort justifies their world-class Apprentice School and maintains nuclear skills between carrier construction.
In this regard, remember that the United kingdom, the world's third largest builder of nuclear submarines, allowed its nuclear shipbuilding skills to atrophy and was obliged to request intervention from U.S. shipyards to get the new Astute-class SSN program back on track. Also, although support of the present two-shipyard concept acknowledges room to fine-tune procedures and practices to gain further savings, those steps pale in comparison to what some say would be as much as $1 billion in "disentanglement costs" associated with breaking the present teaming agreement.
Moreover, the administrative and engineering differences that plagued two-shipyard construction are a thing of the past. Because of the efforts in establishing an entirely digital on-line-data/blueprint base from which both shipyards operate and can exchange engineering changes in real time, there is virtually no difference between the yards in processes, procedures, or product. For the first time in U.S. shipbuilding history, two geographically remote shipyards are producing identical products. As previously touched upon, this achievement will pay significant dividends in the mid- and long-term future as the techniques and procedures created in and for the design and production of the basic Virginia hull (particularly the propulsion plant) support the development of follow-on SSNs, SSGNs, and SSBNs (perhaps all functions being performed by a common hull, serially and identically produced in both shipyards).
Finally, the argument for two separate yards supporting this key element of US strategic dominance must be bolstered by the realities of the threat of terrorism. TOPOFF 3, the largest Homeland Security drill ever conducted, was held recently around the New London, Connecticut, area, which includes Groton. Although this particular simulated terrorist attack was of a chemical and conventional explosive nature, it is clear that a very real terrorist threat exists, particularly in and about seaports, involving nuclear devices or radiological dirty bombs. As a side benefit, nuclear-capable shipyards and naval personnel from nearby nuclear-powered ships might serve as an invaluable "first responder" and subsequent clean-up source. But in the worst imaginable case, with two shipyards forming the industrial base, the resources of one area might compensate for the incapacitation of the other.
Saving Nuclear Submarines
Indisputably, there is a delicate balance to be achieved between cost, a continuing design and industrial base, and a militarily necessary force level. The extraordinary present capabilities and room for growth of the Virginia are not to be treated lightly. Just as the late-1950s Skipjack was really the prototype for about 100 subsequent SSNs and SSBNs in the 20th century, essential elements of the Virginia will be with us for the better part of the 21st century in SSN, SSBN, and SSGN variants. The present two-shipyard approach evolving to a two-per-year submarine build rate is the proper means by which to both populate and maintain a minimum force level while maintaining the "cocked" gun industrial surge capability to four or even six a year if a rapid restocking of the nation's military portfolio with these crown jewels (or their evolved relatives) becomes a mandate. The relatively high present unit cost is an unfortunate artificiality caused by a draw-back from the planned build rate, but should be tolerated as the price of admiralty for a nation that hopes to continue to dominate the maritime commonsand to dominate from them.
For a good description of the highly innovative practices and procedures improved, devised, and implemented in support of these newest attack submarines, see RAdm. John D. Butler, USN, "Building Submarines for Tomorrow," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2004, pp. 51-54.
Ronald O'Rourke, "Navy Attack Submarine Force-Level Goal and Procurement Rate: Background and Issues for Congress," updated January 18, 2005, Order Code RL32418.
Captain Patton served on five nuclear-powered attack submarines, two ballistic-missile submarines, and commanded the USS Pargo (SSN-650). A frequent Proceedings contributor, he was the technical consultant to Paramount Pictures for the film version of The Hunt for Red October, which was based on a book first published by the Naval Institute Press in 1984now in its 39th printing.
This point may not be valid much longer. I would recommend reading up on the impending naval threat by reviewing Richard Fisher's articles.
Keep in mind under GWB/Rumsfeld's current production downscaling plans...the USN likely will collapse to only 28 SSNs by 2015. Likely even lower if they implement the "Blue-Gold" crew rotational plan to try and sustain at-sea deployments...which "use up" the subs five years faster than planned operational life expectancy. You may want to take a gander at this, this SinoDefense site .
Here is the latest revised text from "Sino-Defense" the China Defense site regarding their submarine plans:
25 June 2005
Chinas maritime strategy relies heavily on submarines to patrol the coastal waters, blockade the Taiwan Strait, and deter foreign interventions. The submarine force has always been one of the priorities in the PLAs military modernisation programme. Although the PLA Navy (PLAN)s current submarine force is widely regarded as obsolete by Western standards, it is acquiring new submarines with upgraded systems and more sophisticated weaponry in the next few years. In together with the existing submarine, these new equipment will help make the PLANs submarine fleet a formidable prospective undersea opponent in the East Asia Littoral.
In addition to about 40 Type 035 Ming class and older Type 033 Romeo class diesel submarines, the PLAN currently also operates 4 Russian-made Kilo class and 5 indigenous Type 039 Song class diesel submarines. These are fairly modernised designs which could pose serious threats to surface and underwater targets. The nuclear submarine fleet is composed of 5 Type 091 Han class nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and a Type 092 Xia class nuclear missile submarine (SSBN), which can carry 12 JL-1A submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).
While one may think the PLANs current underwater power as modest at best, a number of shipbuilding programmes are taking place both domestically and abroad, which will completely change the shape of the PLAN submarine force in the coming years. Russian shipyards in St. Petersburg are currently building eight Kilo class Project 636 diesel-electric submarines, one of the quietest and advanced conventional submarines in the world, for the PLAN. These submarines were ordered in a US$1.6 billion deal in 2003 and will be delivered by 2007. At least another 5 indigenously developed Type 039 Song class are under construction at Wuhan and Jiangnan Shipyard. At the same time, the latest Yuan class was just revealed at Wuhan Shipyard in 2004.
On the nuclear submarine front, the first successor to its noisy and unreliable first-generation Type 091 Han class SSN, known as the Type 093, is reported to have been undergoing sea trials since late 2002. The design of the submarine was assisted by Russia.
Artist impression of the Type 093 SSN
Artist impression of the Type 093 SSN
The first new generation SSBN Type 094 was reportedly launched in August 2004. The submarine will carry as many as sixteen newly developed JL-2 SLBM each with 3~6 multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) warheads. The missile has an extended range of 8,000km, which will enable the submarine to attack the west coast of the United States from west Pacific near Chinese coast.
Chinas submarine acquisitions are accompanied by a number of breakthrough in advanced submarine technology. China successfully equipped its Song class with the submarine-launched version of the YJ-8 (C-801) series anti-ship sea-skimming missile in the 1990s. The eight Kilo class submarines, which China expect to receive in the near future, will incorporates upgraded weapon systems including the versatile and potent Klub missile system. China has also made significant progress in developing air independent propulsion (AIP) system, which would allow its conventional submarines remain submerged for weeks at a time without snorkelling.
By 2010 the PLAN will be deploying 12 Kilo class, 10~15 Song class, and 2~5 Yuan class diesel-electric submarines, as well as 2~4 Type 093 SSN and 1~2 Type 094 SSBN. This will augment the existing conventional and nuclear submarine fleets to form a considerable undersea power which could make a serious challenge to any naval force in the region.