War From the Top Down

NY Times ^ | June 2, 2005 | JAMES S. CORUM

[neverdem]

Op-Ed Contributor (Guest)

MOST Americans, including many of those making military decisions in Washington, have been surprised by the intensity of the Iraqi insurgency since the January elections. How, despite their failure to coalesce into a united front and their lack of a coherent political program, have the armed factions shown such staying power? History suggests an answer and, more important, provides a model for putting the insurgency down.

Once started, rebellions develop their own internal logic and momentum. People who take up arms are normally reluctant to put them down again, even if the chance of ultimate success is minimal. The unsuccessful communist insurgency in Malaya after World War II lasted 12 years. The Huk insurgency in the Philippines lasted a decade. The rebellion in El Salvador that began in 1980 continued for 12 years. In many cases, the rebel cadres simply fought until attrition made them irrelevant.

Another common element was that the rebels flourished in an environment of disorder. Many insurgencies erupted in the messy aftermath of the world wars as factions took advantage of postwar power vacuums. Likewise, when Saddam Hussein's regime fell, there were too few American and allied troops to establish control; this gave Iraqi factions a perfect opportunity to arm and scramble for power. In the aftermath, the American military has lurched from one quick fix to another. At first we tolerated factional militias - until they threatened the Coalition Authority. Then we recruited large numbers of police officers and briefly trained them. They performed as well as poorly trained forces usually do: badly.

Our current goal - to bring enough stability to the country that we can bring the American troops home - depends on our giving the Iraqis enough expertise to win their own war. Again, history provides clues.

[neverdem]

Say what you want, the Brits won in Malaya.

[2banana]

12 years seems to be the magic number!

[God luvs America]

bump for later

[AFPhys]

"At first we tolerated ... Then we recruited large numbers of police officers and briefly trained them. They performed as well as poorly trained forces usually do: badly."

Correction to the whole sense of this section. If you go back through the press conferences, you will discover that there have ALWAYS been plans to recruit large numbers of police and militia and train them well, and we have been working on that right from the start in Iraq. The NYSlimes wants us to wave a magic wand and "poof" - in half an hour we have a competant and large and effective Iraqi security force.

It only would take a half hour on their favorite TV show, so why would the US military need more time than that?

[SouthernBoyupNorth]

These "insurgents" are no such thing. Of all the suicide bombers that have blown themselves up and all the "insurgents" who have been arrested... A grand total of 9 of the suicide bombers where Iraqi and less than 25% of the "insurgents" who have been arrested are Iraqi. Since when have foreign invasion of terrorists who infiltrate a country with the sole intent of keeping it destabilize been the definition of insurgency? This article like most published by this birdcage liner is pure bull.

[68skylark]

Counterinsurgency is not rocket science - which is unfortunate because America would be good at it if it were.

Funny quote!

Overall this article is thought-provoking, but the author seems to be way too heavily fixated on just one idea (sending future Iraqi military leaders to the U.S. for extended training) based on just one historical example (the British in Malayan).

Hundreds of insurgencies have been defeated in the last few centuries, and he doesn't make a good case for why we need to build our strategy in Iraq around just one example.

[68skylark]

After the fall of Baghdad, American officials had little understanding of just how politicized and corrupt the Iraqi police and military forces had been under Saddam Hussein.

This sentence may be true, but it's only part of the problem. Even if the Iraqi military had not become politicized and corrupt under Saddam, it would still not be much of an effective force compared to Western militaries like the US and UK. Middle Eastern culture, in general, is simply not well-suited for the demands of first-class soldiering.