Posted on 05/30/2005 2:40:47 PM PDT by Alex Marko
French voters delivered a potentially fatal blow to the EU's hopes for a new constitution, rejecting the treaty by a wide margin in a referendum on May 29th. With the Dutch likely to reach the same verdict when the Netherlands holds its own vote on June 1st, the constitution will almost certainly have to be shelved, at least for the next couple of years. Fears of resulting institutional paralysis are wide of the mark, but France’s “No” does mean that the process of EU integration driven by political elites has reached its limits. Indeed, it is difficult to see how anything as ambitious as the constitutional treaty could be proposed again even in the medium term.
The first response of European leaders will be to show that they have taken on board the message that France’s voters have delivered. This will not be easy. By portraying the treaty as a “liberal” attack on the French social model, the treaty’s opponents took aim at the very foundations of the EU: the single market and shared competency in trade, competition, state aid and a host of other policies. Not only have the naysayers slammed the brakes on the Union’s development, their campaign suggests a desire to put the integration process into reverse. Coming from a country that traditionally acted as the motor of European integration, the “No” vote calls into question the political health of the Union.
Picking up the pieces
Thus the EU is heading for a long period of reflection, as politicians try to distill from the debates of recent weeks what the vote means for the future of European integration. That process will begin when European leaders gather at a summit in June to decide on the way forward. The first question they must address will be whether other member states should continue with their own efforts to ratify the constitution—several are planning referendums of their own. There will be calls for these to go ahead, on the basis that it is important that all countries have their say. Political realities suggest that this is unlikely. Opinion is finely balanced in Denmark and the Czech Republic, among others, while a “No” vote in the UK would be a near certainty. There will be little appetite in these countries to stage costly and politically bruising campaigns for a treaty that is already perceived to be dead in the water.
This could change if France were to hold a second vote, though this seems unlikely. When Denmark and Ireland voted twice over the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Nice, respectively, specific assurances were given that justified another attempt. It is difficult to see how these could be given in the case of the constitutional treaty, which is primarily concerned with institutional rules of engagement rather than an expansion of the EU’s competence into new policy areas. Neither does it seem plausible that the treaty could be amended to meet French concerns. The French president, Jacques Chirac, may try to use a rejection of what some "No" campaigners have portrayed as an "Anglo-Saxon" blueprint of the EU, to fight for greater integration in the field of social rights and tax, but such efforts would be doomed to fail. Any change to place more emphasis on an EU social model would be rejected by the UK and others, probably including Germany’s centre-right opposition parties, which are the overwhelming favourites to win Germany’s general election later this year.
So if "No" really does mean no, the EU will be left to muddle along under the provisions of existing treaties, including the Nice treaty, which was agreed in 2000 to prepare the EU institutions for last year’s enlargement to 25 member states. Some European politicians regard this as a recipe for institutional paralysis. Not only do the current voting weights give excessive power to smaller member states, they also favour the formation of blocking minorities. One of the principal tasks of the proposed constitution was to reduce the potential for a small group to stand in the way of the majority, thereby making it easier to persuade all 25 member states to integrate at the same pace into new areas such as justice and home affairs, foreign and economic policy.
So far, however, the enlarged EU has been functioning surprisingly well. While the agreement at Nice was a messy one, it achieved enough to enable the EU to function, as will become clear once the dust settles. It is also worth remembering that many of the constitution’s provisions were not even due to take effect until 2009. If serious difficulties emerge that need to be addressed, EU leaders could try to salvage aspects of the constitution, such as changes in countries’ voting weights, or the establishment of a European foreign minister or "permanent" president of the European Council. But demonstrable need—rather than grand political vision—is likely to become the driving force of change, since any attempt to simply bypass a rejection by French (or Dutch) voters would be fraught with risks.
Of course, with the Nice treaty remaining in force, it will be possible for the more integrationist-minded member states to invoke procedures for “enhanced co-operation”, or seek to increase co-operation outside the scope of the EU treaties. The formation of an avant-garde group of countries should be possible in areas such as justice and home affairs, for example. However, this approach will inevitably have its limits. No attempt to develop the EU's foreign and defence identity will have credibility without the UK's active participation. And while there is pressure to combat “social dumping” through greater tax harmonisation—from France, in particular—few other member states are likely to want to sign up to the idea of high-tax, low-growth European core.
Enlargement at risk
What might be the impact on some of the EU’s other long-term projects, such as further enlargement or the expansion of economic and monetary union? The constitution itself has no major implications for economic policy. Member states will continue to co-ordinate fiscal policy under the (now weakened) framework of the Stability and Growth Pact. Monetary policy for the euro area will continue to be set by the European Central Bank. And new member states will still be obliged to adopt the euro—there do not seem to be any obvious reasons why current euro area members will seek to block this.
In the medium to long term, the biggest impact of a "No" vote is likely to be on the enlargement process. Given that one of the motivations of "No" voters was opposition to Turkish membership, rejection is clearly a blow to Turkey's aspirations. Moreover, it has weakened Mr Chirac, who has supported Turkey’s accession bid, and increased the chances of his being defeated in the 2007 presidential election race by his former ally, Nicholas Sarkozy, who opposes Turkish accession. Although Turkey’s entry is still a long way off—it’s been made clear that the earliest possible date is 2015—Turkey will be concerned that the final destination of the talks might shift away from full membership towards the privileged partnership favoured by many in France’s ruling UMP party and Germany’s Christian democrats.
Provided Turkey is seen to have continued with its reforms, it is likely that negotiations for accession will be opened as planned in October 2005. But there is a risk that the uncertainty over the EU’s future direction could influence the timetable of the talks. It could also distract EU leaders from making progress with other important issues, including talks over the 2007-13 EU budget, efforts to revive the services directive, and the ongoing Doha trade round, particularly if Mr Chirac responds to the defeat of the constitution by hardening his opposition to further market liberalisation. If France’s “No” obviates the need for the UK to hold its own referendum, at least that might make it politically easier for the UK to concede ground in the budget negotiations by giving up the British rebate. One thing EU leaders cannot afford to do is spend the next 12 months squabbling over the budget, which would make the whole EU project look even more battered than it currently does.
One of the principal tasks of the proposed constitution was to reduce the potential for a small group to stand in the way of the majority
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