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Purpose Principle: Child support is for the care and maintenance of children.

While this may be true in the generic sense, it is not true with respect to child support guidelines statutes under the title IV-D program. The term "child support" is a term of art, used throughout title for to mean payments by absent parents for dependent children. This is not a legal theory. It is a fact supported by the Supreme Court in Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478 (1990). Your problem with this fact really should be taken up with Justice Rehnquist. http://straylight.law.cornell.edu/supct/search/display.html?terms=sullivan%20v.%20stroop&url=/supct/html/89-535.ZO.html

The contention that the purpose of the act was changed by an amendment to extend services to those who were at risk of becoming dependent on the state for their support is unsupported by the proper interpretation of the law. The purpose of an act or the subject class it affects cannot be changed by an amendment.

The "relevant circumstantial information" (your last purpose principle) that defines the subject of the act is ignored in your computation of an "award." The relevant fact creating the liability under this program is need. It is the only interest the government has to justify intervention. The guidelines are simply a special garnishment statute that limits this liability based on an absent parent's ability to pay. It is not the basis for the liability, which I admit is the way it is generally perceived today.

right2parent,

I'm pleased that what I'm saying is "true in the generic sense." That's exactly what I need to provide a scientific solution to the problem.

"Child support is for the care and maintenance of children" deals with need. The concept of the "needs of children" was one worked over pretty good in traditional law ... a key concept.

I do not agree that the principle cannot be applied in IV-D cases. It continues to represent a generic truth even then. You say "child support" is a term used to describe payments by absent parents. The question is how much child support should be ordered. I don't see a problem.

I also understand your objection to the extension of the reach of the welfare program and its rules. But continuing to take shots at the messanger isn't helping anything. I haven't claimed that an amendment to IV-D law does that in theory. It was obviously congressional intent that it would be so, because Congress included specific financial rewards for inclusion of non-welfare cases. What I've been saying however, is that P.O.P.S. v Gardner sanctioned this extension. P.O.P.S. was in fact a group composed of people whose families were not welfare dependent and not in any danger of becoming welfare dependent. The court shut them out, and instead reclassified ordinary family law to "social policy" -- handing it to administrators like a Christmas gift. It ain't theory and it ain't my fault.

If you want to understand the theory I'm presenting, note that both need and ability to pay are important, even in welfare cases. Yes, there's need, then ability to pay being less than what the system deems subsistence level, there is a government subsidy.