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right2parent,

I'm pleased that what I'm saying is "true in the generic sense." That's exactly what I need to provide a scientific solution to the problem.

"Child support is for the care and maintenance of children" deals with need. The concept of the "needs of children" was one worked over pretty good in traditional law ... a key concept.

I do not agree that the principle cannot be applied in IV-D cases. It continues to represent a generic truth even then. You say "child support" is a term used to describe payments by absent parents. The question is how much child support should be ordered. I don't see a problem.

I also understand your objection to the extension of the reach of the welfare program and its rules. But continuing to take shots at the messanger isn't helping anything. I haven't claimed that an amendment to IV-D law does that in theory. It was obviously congressional intent that it would be so, because Congress included specific financial rewards for inclusion of non-welfare cases. What I've been saying however, is that P.O.P.S. v Gardner sanctioned this extension. P.O.P.S. was in fact a group composed of people whose families were not welfare dependent and not in any danger of becoming welfare dependent. The court shut them out, and instead reclassified ordinary family law to "social policy" -- handing it to administrators like a Christmas gift. It ain't theory and it ain't my fault.

If you want to understand the theory I'm presenting, note that both need and ability to pay are important, even in welfare cases. Yes, there's need, then ability to pay being less than what the system deems subsistence level, there is a government subsidy.

The question is how much child support should be ordered. I don't see a problem.

No, the first question is who is an absent parent. Most beleive Congress extended the class by amendment to include those who are not on welfare. While this is true, it is also true that the extention did not go beyond those who were at risk of going on welfare. If the act is not interpreted with that restriction, it is unconstitutional under South Dakota v. Dole.

This was not argued in POPS. Rather their due process and equal protection claims failed because it did not substantially affect family relationships and the class they contended were adversely affected were not those outside the legitimate reach of the program, but other children within the non-custodial household. These were simply bad arguments that the court did not buy. The court did not establish a new rule of law, or "reclassify" family law to social policy. They suggested the social policy justifying the state law was legitimate because nobody objected to it on that basis. The question was not raised for them to decide.