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India May Agree to Phased Evacuation from Siachin Glacier War Zone





By Arun Rajnath

NEW DELHI, May 25: India may consider demilitarization of the Siachin Zone in a phased manner, a top official of the Indian Ministry of Defense told the South Asia Tribune on the eve of India-Pakistan talks beginning in Islamabad today.

As the Indian defense delegation headed for Islamabad for the talks, Defense Ministry sources in Delhi said India is not averse to the idea of the complete and total demilitarization of the region, but it could be done in a phased manner. The talks that are going to take place in Islamabad is an initial phase, and nothing could be finally said about it.

“The final decision would be arrived at after talking to the army personnel of India who strategically know better about the problem. But one thing should be clear that India will not compromise with the security of the region and whatever will be done, will be done accordingly,” sources added.

(According to Reuters, Niaz Naik, a retired Pakistani diplomat involved in the back-door diplomacy, said there are hopeful signs of progress.

Pakistan Defense Secretary Lt. Gen. Tariq Wasim Ghazi will lead the Pakistani side and Indian civil service officer Defense Secretary Ajai Vikram Singh will lead the Indian team. The talks will focus on Siachin on May 26-27. On May 28-29 they will address a dispute over the Sir Creek estuary, a marshland in the Rann of Kutch, between India’s western state of Gujarat and Pakistan’s southern Sindh province.)

Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson Jalil Abbas Jilani said recently that Pakistan wants implementation of the Indo-Pak agreement of 1989 on Siachin underlining total withdrawal of troops by the two countries from the ‘no man’s land’ region to the pre-Simla Accord of 1972, signed by the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pak Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

The agreement of 1989 was arrived at during talks between Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto. After Defense Secretary level talks a joint statement was also issued which read as follows:

“There was an agreement by both sides to work towards the comprehensive settlement based on re-deployment of forces to reduce the chances of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and the determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform with the Simla Agreement. The army authorities will determine these positions.”

Siachin zone is one of the most inhospitable and dangerous regions of the world. The Siachin glacier is about 76 kilometers long and 2-8 kilometers wide. It receives 6 to 7 meters of snow in winter alone. Blizzards can reach speeds of up to 150 knots (nearly 300 km per hour). The temperature routinely drops to 40 degrees Celsius below zero and even lower with the wind chill factor. For these reasons, the Siachin Glacier has been called the "Third Pole".

According to the Lt. Gen (retd). BS Malik the Base camp for Indian forces is 12,000 feet above sea level. The altitude of some Indian forward bases on the Saltoro Ridge ranges from Kumar (16,000 feet) and Bila Top (18,600 feet) to Pahalwan (20,000 feet) and Indira Col (22,000 feet). The area is also prone to avalanches. These adverse conditions have direct consequences, as only three per cent of the Indian casualties are by enemy fire while remaining 97 percent fall to the altitude, weather and terrain.

Gen. Malik told the South Asia Tribune Pakistan too is not in the advantageous position as their positions are usually at altitudes lower than the Indian ones, ranging between 9,000 and 15,000 feet, although some, such as Conway Saddle (17,200 feet), which controls ingress to the glacier, are much higher. On the other hand, glaciers at the Pakistani frontline begin at 9,440 feet and Pakistani troops are stationed on steep slopes, exposed to harsh weather.

Malik said: “It is necessary for the two countries to de-militarize the whole zone because no country wants to lose its men and money. The tension must be assuaged in the region.”

According to the Hindi official magazine of the Indian Defense Ministry, ‘Sainik Samachar’, the conflict began when in 1984 Pakistan permitted mountaineering expeditions in the area claiming it as its territory. Later, in 1987, Pakistan troops established an advance post, namely Quaid Post on the altitude of 6452 meters on the Saltoro ridge overlooking the Bilafond Pass.

The magazine claims that the Pakistani side initiated the first skirmish on April 18, 1987 after which the eviction of Pakistani troops became essential for India. Later on May 29, 1987 2nd Lt. Rajeev Pandey fell to the bullets from the Quaid Post. Then on June 24, 1987, code-named Operation Rajiv in the honor of 2nd Lt. Rajeev Pandey was launched.

Later, the Indian Army captured the Quaid Post and it was re-named as Bana Post in the memory of Naib Subedar Bana Singh who showed tremendous courage and valor and was awarded the ‘Param Chakra’, India’s highest medal for valor.

Malik says: “Time has come to move forward. President Gen. Pervez Musharraf has already given a proposal for the Siachin and I am happy that Indians have taken it seriously.”

Gen. Malik has been a course mate of Gen. Musharraf when both of them were Brigadiers in their respective armies and went for advanced course to London. (See previous story) He said at that time that the Indian government should consider seriously the proposal made by General Musharraf.

“Today only some Indian bureaucrats are going to Islamabad to hold talks. There should be military-to-military dialogue for the solution of the Siachin dispute as only the Indian Army can talk in military terms with the Pakistani officials. Pakistan Defense Secretary himself is an Army official,” he added.

Gen. Malik says that the demilitarization should be in phases to avoid escalation of tensions. Immediate pull out would cause problems. First peace should be established in the Siachin area. The situation should be reviewed by both sides and then the demilitarization may take place in a phased manner and on the basis of some give and take.”

“There should be a foolproof system that would ensure that no activities could be carried out in this area. The experience tells us that the whole problem started when one country began asserting that a particular area belonged to it and started allowing activities like, permitting foreign mountaineering expeditions. So it should be ensured that none of the side should go for such activities," he added.

When asked by the South Asia Tribune about the give and take, Gen. Malik replied: “You should remember that none of the sides is going to give up what it has already got. It should be done through military-to-military. There are greater chances for agreement through the military-to-military negotiations. Both the armies already have an understanding and this would be an extension to this understanding.”

Gen. Malik says that India should trust Pakistan in this matter and there is less possibility of redeployment of forces by Pakistan after demilitarization because India can keep vigil on the region through satellites and other surveillance equipment. “There must be a kind of a joint monitoring activity to ensure none of two countries is transgressing after withdrawal of forces.”

12 posted on 05/24/2005 6:54:23 PM PDT by Gucho
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To: MEG33; No Blue States; mystery-ak; boxerblues; Allegra; Eagle Eye; sdpatriot; Dog; DollyCali; ...
Inspector says Saddam wanted to bluff Iran on arms

25 May 2005 01:17:00 GMT

Source: Reuters

By Evelyn Leopold

UNITED NATIONS, May 24 (Reuters) - Saddam Hussein probably lied about his weapons of mass destruction because of pride and to protect himself from perceived Iranian attacks, a former U.S. and U.N. weapons inspector said on Tuesday.

Charles Duelfer, head of the CIA's Iraq survey group that hunted weapons after the 2003 Gulf War, said the threat from Iran was very real to Saddam, who wanted to create an impression he had more armaments than he really had.

"There was a greater concern than we could appreciate sitting here in Washington of the threat posed by Iran," Duelfer told the Council on Foreign Relations.

"Our gut feeling was not the same as the gut feeling one would have sitting in Baghdad."

Iraq and Iran fought a bloody war from 1980 to 1988 and kept up a low-level conflict after that. Suspicions were rife that Iran was developing weapons of mass destruction.

"Saddam was certainly aware of the WMD assessments of Iran and he created a certain ambiguity about what his capabilities were," Duelfer said.

Duelfer reported last October that Saddam did not have weapons of mass destruction for more than a decade before the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. But he said Saddam hoped in the future to reconstitute his unconventional arms programs and refused to let skilled scientists leave the country.

In a rare on-the-record talk, Duelfer said narcissism and pride played a large role in Saddam's obfuscation of his weapons, since he wanted to be a leader in science and technology, which meant nuclear capabilities.

Duelfer was the deputy executive chairman of UNSCOM, the U.N. Special Commission, which fielded inspectors in Iraq from 1991 to 1998. Iraq denied it had any unconventional weapons programs but shown proof to the contrary, Saddam's government allowed many to be destroyed but refused to account in detail what happened to all the armaments.

While President George W. Bush used Iraq's alleged weapons to justify the 2003 invasion, Duelfer said Saddam also had a "key intelligence failure" by not understanding that the United States would follow through on its threats after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on New York and Washington.

Saddam in 1991 established as a priority to get U.N. sanctions lifted, imposed after the 1990 Gulf War when his troops invaded Kuwait.

He tried to hide his arms programs, particularly biological and chemical weapons materials that are easier to conceal than nuclear facilities or missiles. Duelfer said Iraq resented inspectors prowling around, actions that immediately created mistrust between Iraqis and the U.N. teams.

But in 1998, Iraq decided that "no matter what they did the United States in particular as not going to climb off on resolving the sanctions issue" and so Baghdad cut off cooperation with inspectors, Duelfer recalled. Saddam then tried to erode the sanctions by exploiting splits among the major powers and bribing politicians around the world.

14 posted on 05/24/2005 7:08:39 PM PDT by TexKat (Just because you did not see it or read it, that does not mean it did or did not happen.)
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