Posted on 04/26/2005 5:20:20 AM PDT by mark502inf
A long-awaited strategic guidance document was issued to US military commanders in Iraq earlier this month, outlining specific milestones in the handover of the security mission to Iraqi security forces.
The strategic guidance shifts the main effort of coalition forces in Iraq from combat operations to partnering with Iraqi security forces.
The strategy states that the Iraqi Army, along with security forces from the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, are to assume the internal defence mission in Iraq by December this year.
Critics of previous versions of the US' Iraq strategy pointed to a lack of specific guidance as to the timing of the long-anticipated handover from US forces to the newly formed Iraqi Army.
The strategy has been welcomed by US unit commanders for providing more specific guidance than previous iterations of the Iraq strategy.
Under the new strategy US forces will begin to shift to a supporting role throughout 2005, paving the way for a draw-down of US forces at the end of 2005 as more Iraqi Army formations are stood up.
Issued by the Commanding General Multi-National Force - Iraq US Army General George Casey, the strategic guidance presents an ambitious plan for recruiting, training and equipping Iraqi Army units to assume the internal defence mission that for the past two years has fallen on primarily US and UK units. It contains a three-phase timetable for training and preparing the Iraqi Army to assume the main effort in counter-insurgency operations.
Phase 1, which began on 15 April and is to be completed no later than August, focuses on manning, training and equipping Iraqi Army units at the individual and platoon level. Specific focus will be made on the full manning of Iraqi units and "consistent attendance of assigned Iraqi Army troops". The goal of this phase is for Iraqi units to be capable of conducting independent platoon operations with "minimal US supervision". US commanders contend that the most difficult aspect of Phase 1 will be transitioning the support mission of equipping and paying the Iraqi Army to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, which is to assume that function. Currently, the US armed forces provide all logistical support to the Iraqi Army.
During Phase 2, each Iraqi Army battalion will be partnered with two US Army company-sized units. The end state of Phase 2 is that Iraqi Army battalions be capable of conducting independent company size operations. Phase 2 ends in October.
Phase 3 involves Iraqi Army battalions being certified by their partnered US advisers as being capable of battalion-sized operations and being assigned specific battle space currently occupied by US units. During this phase, US military units will provide a company-sized unit as a Quick Response Force to each Iraqi Army battalion. Phase 3 is to end by December when the Iraqi Army is expected to be able to conduct operations without US military support.
Accomplishing the task of training the Iraqi Army and certifying their combat capability will fall primarily on US Advisory Support Teams and Military Transition Teams. At least one Military Transition Team is to be collocated with every Iraqi Army battalion by the end of April 2005.
The Military Transition Team is a 61-strong US Army unit, led by either a Major or senior Captain, who will serve as the Iraqi Army battalion commander's adviser. US advisers from the Military Transition Teams will also operate at the company and platoon levels with a high percentage of senior NCOs.
I wonder where "publishing your military strategy" fits on the list of "10 Dumbest Things to Do"???
But the morons in the MSM will keep saying, what's the exit strategy?
Exit strategy to a fixed timetable is dumb. But a results based exit strategy is OK. These dates are very broad. The bad guys know we'll be gone, except for a brigade or two or three, in 2 years anyway. It's having some bozo like Kerry say, we will be out on Sept 5th, at 9:15AM that is dumb.
Agreed.
I think it is OK to publicize your strategy if one of the components is, "IF things don't go as planned, revise strategy".
That way, you can't (honestly) get blamed for having a failed strategy.
Keep in mind, the Dems will criticize it no matter what happens.
True, since we don't set the enemy's timetable. However, a timetable for the manning, equipping, and training of allied forces is certainly doable and appropriate. The tricky part is at the end--are they really ready to carry the load against the enemy? The test isn't when Iraqi battlions march out the gate with all their people and gear after having completed the training program--its when they take on the insurgents in sustained combat operations.
We offer the only hope for stabilization of the friendlies and destabilization of the unfriendlies.
Many Iraqi units of Shiites and Kurds are already combat proficient. 36th Commando out of Najaf did a first class job in Falluja and was the only unit allowed forward of our Marines.
The problem is that we are organizing the Iraq army along ethnic/religious/tribal lines for unit cohesiveness. This means that matching up the unit to the area of operations is very tricky. Mixed units will have to wait until most of the fighting subsides, that's when we can disengage our role.
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