ISLAMABAD: Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao told reporters on Wednesday that Pakistani authorities had obtained valuable information about Al Qaeda by interrogating Abu Faraj Al-Libbi.
Sherpao said the Al Qaeda leader had masterminded the suicide attack on Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in 2004 and the information garnered during questioning would soon be shared with the media.
Libbi, Al Qaeda’s No 3, was recently arrested in Mardan by security agencies. The Pakistan government has not yet decided to hand him over to the United States. The interior minister said Libbi was also involved in the two assassination attempts on President General Pervez Musharraf. shahzad raza
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_12-5-2005_pg7_8
ISLAMABAD: American and Pakistani intelligence agents are exploiting a growing rift between Al Qaeda’s Arab members and their Central Asian allies, a spilt that’s destroying the militants’ network as they compete for scarce hideouts, weapons and financial resources, said Congressional Research Service’s Kenneth Katzman terrorism expert.
Four Pakistani intelligence agents, asking not to be named, said the rivalry may have contributed to the arrest of Osama Bin Laden’s top lieutenant and Al Qaeda’s No 3 Abu Farraj al-Libbi, known to have had differences with Uzbeks. They said that captured Uzbek, Chechen and Tajik suspects had been giving information about the movements of Arab Al Qaeda militants, which had lead to the series of successful raids and arrests.
“When push comes to shove, the Uzbeks are going to stick together and the Arabs are going to stick together,” said Katzman, “I think the Uzbek guerrillas have had no home and some of this could be a battle for survival.”
United States’ officials declined to comment on the schism. However, a US official noted that Al Qaeda and its allies “don’t always function as a cohesive unit.” Another cautioned, “There may be a division but you haven’t won anyone over to your side.”
Libyan Al-Libbi was captured in Mardan after a fierce gun battle on May 2. Now in Pakistani custody, he’s accused of planning two assassination attempts on President General Pervez Musharraf.
Al-Libbi used Pakistanis, not Central Asians, to carry out the December 2003 attacks on Musharraf, said authorities, “A sign of whom he trusted.” They added that al-Libbi sent a Pakistani suicide bomber to try to kill Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in 2004.
An Inter-Services Intelligence agent said, on condition of anonymity, that tensions with Central Asians began building in late 2001, when hundreds of Arab Al Qaeda militants, poured across the Afghan border into South and North Waziristan. Hundreds of Central Asians who had fought alongside the Taliban also fled across the border joining countrymen who had settled in Waziristan in the 1980s Afghan war against the Soviets.
The official said many new arrivals took up residence in rambling mud-brick compounds run by the Al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The Arabs settled in different towns in Waziristan, setting up training facilities in Shakai where they trained Pakistani recruits.
Many Central Asians had been living in the region for years without incident. But the flood of Arab Al Qaeda suspects brought unwanted attention and problems. At the same time, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan was left rudderless. Its commander and co-founder Juma Namangani was reportedly killed in a US bombing campaign in late 2001.
Kazman said that the person who replaced him, Tahir Yuldash, was known as a political philosopher rather than a military leader. “They didn’t have a strong figure any more to articulate their interests,” said Katzman, “They had to rely more on the Arab leaders of Al Qaeda.”
The heat began to rise amid a Pakistani military crackdown in 2003 and 2004 flushed many militants out of the region. The Uzbeks and other Central Asians found themselves competing with Al Qaeda’s Arab members for hideouts and resources with Arabs having the political and economic advantage, said Katzman. A Pakistani Interior Ministry official adds that lack of trust by senior Al Qaeda leaders in Central Asian fighters added to the tensions.
Another Pakistani security agent said the Central Asians “were Al Qaeda’s foot soldiers, but they were never promoted and started feeling ignored.” The two sides began operating independently, often competing for the same money, weapons and areas of influence among Pakistani tribesmen. Captured Uzbek, Chechen and Tajik fighters felt far more loyalty to Yuldash than to the Arab Al Qaeda men.
The Pakistani intelligence official said it was difficult to get captured Uzbeks to talk about Yuldash, “but it was a lot easier to grill them for clues about the Arabs and their possible hideouts. They felt far less loyalty.”
Information from captive Uzbeks and Chechens, as well as paid informants working with Pakistani and US intelligence, helped authorities carry out a devastating raid on Al Qaeda’s training camp in Shakai in June 2004, said Pakistani officials. That raid was a turning point, driving Al Qaeda militants from their hideouts and making them easier to find.
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_12-5-2005_pg7_16
"Interior Minister Aftab Ahmed Khan Sherpao told reporters on Wednesday that Pakistani authorities had obtained valuable information about Al Qaeda by interrogating Abu Faraj Al-Libbi."
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OPINION: Well great.
If Al-Libbi is singing all the right tunes; then we should see some really great arrests coming very soon.