Think whatever you like. But in the absence of definitive instructions from Terri, the bias needs to be in favour of life, in particular if there is an open dispute between first line family members as to what exactly she would wish.
Ivan
And shouldn't conflicting evidence be judged in favor of continuing life?
Was Michael the only person who testified about Terri's supposed statements on her views about living on life support?
No, others did as well, and when making the decision in the case, the trial judge took into account all of that testimony and additional evidence. And the Second District Court of Appeals determined: that while a surrogate decision-maker should err on the side of life, the trial judge had sufficiently clear and convincing evidence to determine that Terri would not wish to continue the life-prolonging measures she needs to live. The appellate court explained:
[The Schindlers argue that the testimony, which was conflicting, was insufficient to support the trial court's decision by clear and convincing evidence. We have reviewed that testimony and conclude that the trial court had sufficient evidence to make this decision. The clear and convincing standard of proof, while very high, permits a decision in the face of inconsistent or conflicting evidence. See In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d at 273.
In Browning, we stated:
In making this difficult decision, a surrogate decisionmaker should err on the side of life… In cases of doubt, we must assume that a patient would choose to defend life in exercising his or her right of privacy.
In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So.2d at 273. We reconfirm today that a court's default position must favor life.
The testimony in this case establishes that Theresa was very young and very healthy when this tragedy struck. Like many young people without children, she had not prepared a will, much less a living will. She had been raised in the Catholic faith, but did not regularly attend mass or have a religious advisor who could assist the court in weighing her religious attitudes about life-support methods. Her statements to her friends and family about the dying process were few and they were oral. Nevertheless, those statements, along with other evidence about Theresa, gave the trial court a sufficient basis to make this decision for her.
In the final analysis, the difficult question that faced the trial court was whether Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, not after a few weeks in a coma, but after ten years in a persistent vegetative state that has robbed her of most of her cerebrum and all but the most instinctive of neurological functions, with no hope of a medical cure but with sufficient money and strength of body to live indefinitely, would choose to continue the constant nursing care and the supporting tubes in hopes that a miracle would somehow recreate her missing brain tissue, or whether she would wish to permit a natural death process to take its course and for her family members and loved ones to be free to continue their lives.
After due consideration, we conclude that the trial judge had clear and convincing evidence to answer this question as he did.