That is all, oh so banally, correct. And you might notice that my behavior is dissipated and tempered accordingly. In scenario 1 I might actually take physical action of some kind. In scenario 2 - the scenario you're whining to me about my "interjecting" - I'm writing words on a freaking discussion board.
What is the problem?
My point is that you do not have any basis, other than the emotional climate that has been created over this subject Court case, to pass the judgment that you have.
What judgment have I passed and specifically why does it lack basis?
You don't know. Do you?
Simply pointing to my relative distance and ignorance from the case at hand (compared with, say, Judge Greer) does not constitute proof that whatever judgment I have made about him lacks basis, if that judgment is sufficiently generalized and based in solid foundational moral concepts rather than some fine technical-legal point.
For example, I don't actually know very much about the details of the actions and orders made and given by Saddam Hussein during his reign as dictator of Iraq. Nevertheless, I know enough to call him a mass murderer. The judgment I am making is general (that he is a mass murderer, which I know), not specific (that he ordered subordinate so-and-so to raze village such-and-such in the month of Whatever, 198x, which I don't quite know, and indeed, he might not have). (It might have been 198X+1.)
Similarly, I don't know know enough to dispute, say, some technical point about whether Judge Greer ought to have admitted into evidence such and such tape, scan, affidavit, document, doctor's testimony, etc in 199x. And I am not. That is not the judgment I am passing on him. As far as I know, the vast majority technical-legal decisions of Judge Greer were, indeed, correct.
The judgment I am passing on him - more precisely, on the state and federal government (all branches of which share responsibility to some extent) - is more general: That the court has ordered the death of a woman who is alive because her husband asked it to. The woman is alive. She is innocent, convicted of no crime, let alone accused. And she will become dead if and when the court's orders are carried out in full. The primary basis for those orders is the say-so of the husband. That much I know, and that much you cannot dispute.
And that is sufficient for me to form the opinion I have formed. Given the aforementioned undisputed facts about this case, there are no conceivable additional 'essential facts' that could alter my opinion about this case, any more than learning the number of home runs that Joe Charboneau hit in his career could alter my opinion about this case, so my ignorance of whatever 'essential facts' you have in mind is irrelevant. But by all means, tell me where I err: why is it not right to protect an innocent life?
It is right. And when there is a dispute, such as there is, within the poor woman's family, as to how to do that, it goes to a Court, and the Court acts according to the Law in the jurisdiction. Your error is in trying to to inject matters that are irrelevant--as a matter of law--into that case. Such a matter is your effort to discredit the husband. The Court has weighed the credibility of the witnesses--that is a very basic part of its function as a trier of fact, in such a case.
Surely, you would not argue that an innocent life should be kept in limbo, artificially kept half alive, if there is not sufficient evidence to establish a legal basis for doing so? Frankly, I would think that if there is no recovery possible--no real recovery--and the husband now accepts that--that playing games with what is left of this unfortunate woman, is no longer of any benefit to anyone, least of all what remains of the life that was once hers.
We all progressively move through life to death. There comes a point when artificial means to prolong any life become a denigration not a vindication of the sanctity of life. I do not know, of my own knowledge, whether that is the case here. But I have heard nothing, so far, in this hoopla, which would incline me to believe that the Judge has not fairly weighed the evidence. And that he has come to believe those who have testified that the situation is hopeless, rather than those who claim otherwise, appears to be well within the scope of what a Judge must decide in such a case.
William Flax