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Schiavo 11th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals Decision
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit ^ | 03/23/2005 | U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit

Posted on 03/23/2005 12:21:22 AM PST by peyton randolph

FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

March 23, 2005

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-11556

D. C. Docket No. CV-05-00530-T

THERESA MARIA SCHINDLER SCHIAVO,

incapacitated ex rel, Robert Schindler and

Mary Schindler, her parents and next friends,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

MICHAEL SCHIAVO,

as guardian of the person of

Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo, incapacitated,

JUDGE GEORGE W. GREER,

THE HOSPICE OF THE FLORIDA SUNCOAST, INC.,

Defendants-Appellees.

--------------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Middle District of Florida

--------------------------

(March 23, 2005)

Before CARNES, HULL, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiffs have appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for a

temporary restraining order to require the defendants to transport Theresa Marie

Our dissenting colleague says that “the denial 1 nial of Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction

frustrates Congress’s intent, which is to maintain the status quo.” Dissenting Op. at __. The status

quo is that Mrs. Schiavo is not receiving nutrition and hydration. The plaintiffs do not want the

status quo maintained. They want this Court or the district court to issue an injunction affirmatively

requiring the respondents to change the status quo by bringing about the surgical procedure necessary

to reinsert the feeding tube into Mrs. Schiavo.

2

Schindler Schiavo to a hospital to reestablish nutrition and hydration and for any

medical treatment necessary to sustain her life, and to require the state court judge

defendant to rescind his February 25, 2005 order directing removal of nutrition and

hydration from Schiavo and to restrain him from issuing any further orders that

would discontinue nutrition and hydration.1 After notice and a hearing, the district

court entered a careful order which is attached as an Appendix to this opinion.

Plaintiffs have also petitioned this Court to grant the same injunctive relief under

the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

Although we ordinarily do not have jurisdiction over appeals from orders

granting or denying temporary restraining orders, in circumstances such as these,

“when a grant or denial of a TRO might have a serious, perhaps irreparable,

consequence, and can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal, we may

exercise appellate jurisdiction.” Ingram v. Ault, 50 F.3d 898, 900 (11th Cir. 1995)

(internal citations, marks, and ellipsis omitted); see also United States v. Wood,

295 F.2d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1961). In these circumstances we treat temporary

restraining orders as equivalent to preliminary injunctions or final judgments, either

of which are appealable. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 1292(a)(1).

The district court correctly stated the four factors to be considered in

determining whether temporary restraining or preliminary injunctive relief is to be

The dissent bemoans the fact that the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims will 2 never be litigated

in federal court. The district court’s finding regarding the first-prong injunctive relief factor reflects

that those claims lack merit, or at least that the possibility of any merit is too low to justify

preliminary injunctive relief.

3

granted, which are whether the movant has established: (1) a substantial likelihood

of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief is

not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would

inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public

interest. See Ingram, 50 F.3d at 900; Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th

Cir. 2000) (en banc). Requests for emergency injunctive relief are not uncommon

in federal court and sometimes involve decisions affecting life and death.

Controlling precedent is clear that injunctive relief may not be granted unless the

plaintiff establishes the substantial likelihood of success criterion. See Siegel, 234

F.3d at 1176; see also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,

527 U.S. 308, 339, 119 S. Ct. 1961, 1978 (1999) (“Plaintiffs with questionable

claims would not meet the likelihood of success criterion.”).

Applying those factors, the district court determined that the last three

weighed in favor of granting the temporary restraining order. The court reasoned

that because those three factors were met, plaintiffs only had to show a substantial

case on the merits. After analyzing each of plaintiffs’ claims, the district court

concluded they had failed to show a substantial case on the merits as to any of the

claims.2

While the district court conducted de novo review of plaintiffs’ claims, we

review the district court’s denial of temporary injunctive relief only for an abuse of

Part II of the dissent argues that we 3 should grant an injunction and discusses the four

factors as though this Court were making the decision in the first instance. We are not. We are an

appellate court reviewing the district court’s decision. There is no occasion for us to decide whether

to issue an injunction pending appeal, because the only appeal we have before us is from the district

court’s denial of a temporary restraining order, and we are deciding that appeal now.

4 In arguing that an injunction should be issued, the dissent refers to “a situation where a few

days’ delay” is all that is necessary. That is not this situation. To afford the plaintiffs the pretrial

discovery and full jury trial of all issues they demand would require a delay of many months, if not

longer.

4

discretion. This scope of review will lead to reversal only if the district court

applies an incorrect legal standard, or applies improper procedures, or relies on

clearly erroneous factfinding, or if it reaches a conclusion that is clearly

unreasonable or incorrect. Klay v. United Healthcare, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1096

(11th Cir. 2004); Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304,

1309 (11th Cir. 2001). Short of that, an abuse of discretion standard recognizes

there is a range of choice within which we will not reverse the district court even if

we might have reached a different decision. See McMahon v. Toto, 256 F.3d 1120,

1128 (11th Cir. 2001); Rasbury v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Rasbury), 24 F.3d

159, 168-69 (11th Cir. 1994).3

For the reasons explained in the district court’s opinion, we agree that the

plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a substantial case on the merits of any of their

claims. We also conclude that the district court’s carefully thought-out decision to

deny temporary relief in these circumstances is not an abuse of discretion.4

The principal theme of plaintiffs’ argument against the district court’s denial

of a temporary restraining order is that Pub. L. No. 109-3, which Congress enacted

to enable them to bring this lawsuit, mandates that injunctive relief be granted to

5

enable them to have a full trial on the merits of their claims. Pub. L. No. 109-3 is

an extraordinary piece of legislation, and it does many things. Defendants contend

that the legislation is so extraordinary that it is unconstitutional in several respects.

We need not decide that question. For purposes of determining whether temporary

or preliminary injunctive relief is appropriate, we indulge the usual presumption

that congressional enactments are constitutional. United States v. Morrison, 529

U.S. 598, 607, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2000); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299,

1303 (11th Cir. 2004). It is enough for present purposes that in enacting Pub. L.

No. 109-3 Congress did not alter for purposes of this case the long-standing

general law governing whether temporary restraining orders or preliminary

injunctions should be issued by federal courts.

There is no provision in Pub. L. No. 109-3 addressing whether or under what

conditions the district court should grant temporary or preliminary relief in this

case. There is no more reason in the text of the Act to read in any special rule

about temporary or preliminary relief than there would be to read in a special rule

about deciding the case before trial on Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or summary judgment

grounds. Not only that, but Congress considered and specifically rejected

provisions that would have mandated, or permitted with favorable implications, the

grant of the pretrial stay. There is this enlightening exchange in the legislative

history concerning the Senate bill that was enacted:

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I rise to seek clarification from the

majority leader about one aspect of this bill, the issue of whether

Congress has mandated that a Federal court issue a stay pending

determination of the case.

6

Mr. FRIST. I would be pleased to help clarify this issue.

Mr. LEVIN. Section 5 of the original version of the Martinez bill

conferred jurisdiction on a Federal court to hear a case like this, and

then stated that the Federal court "shall" issue a stay of State court

proceedings pending determination of the Federal case. I was opposed

to that provision because I believe Congress should not mandate that a

Federal judge issue a stay. Under longstanding law and practice, the

decision to issue a stay is a matter of discretion for the Federal judge

based on the facts of the case. The majority leader and the other bill

sponsors accepted my suggestion that the word "shall" in section 5 be

changed to "may."

The version of the bill we are now considering strikes section 5

altogether. Although nothing in the text of the new bill mandates a

stay, the omission of this section, which in the earlier Senate-passed

bill made a stay permissive, might be read to mean that Congress

intends to mandate a stay. I believe that reading is incorrect. The

absence of any state [sic] provision in the new bill simply means that

Congress relies on current law. Under current law, a judge may decide

whether or not a stay is appropriate.

Does the majority leader share my understanding of the bill?

Mr. FRIST. I share the understanding of the Senator from Michigan,

as does the junior Senator from Florida who is the chief sponsor of this

bill. Nothing in the current bill or its legislative history mandates a

stay. I would assume, however, the Federal court would grant a stay

based on the facts of this case because Mrs. Schiavo would need to be

alive in order for the court to make its determination. Nevertheless,

this bill does not change current law under which a stay is

discretionary.

Mr. LEVIN. In light of that assurance, I do not object to the

unanimous consent agreement under which the bill will be considered

by the Senate. I do not make the same assumption as the majority

leader makes about what a Federal court will do. Because the

discretion of the Federal court is left unrestricted in this bill, I will not

exercise my right to block its consideration.

151 Cong. Rec. S3099-100 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2005) (colloquy between Sens.

Levin & Frist).

Contrary to the dissent’s assertion, we do not believe that the text 5 t of the Act limits or

eliminates a court’s power to grant temporary or preliminary relief. Exactly the contrary. Our

position is that the Act, which does not mention that subject, and which was amended to remove a

provision that would have changed the law, does not affect it at all. The district court applied settled

law and so do we.

7

This enlightening exchange does not contradict the plain meaning of Pub. L.

No. 109-3, but instead reinforces it. Plainly, Congress knew how to change the law

to favor these plaintiffs to the extent that it collectively wished to do so. That is

what the changes it did make, including those to standing law, the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine, and abstention, demonstrate. When Congress explicitly modifies some

pre-existing rules of law applicable to a subject but says nothing about other rules

of law, the only reasonable reading is that Congress meant no change in the rules it

did not mention. The dissent characterizes the language of the Act as clear. It is on

this point: the language of the Act clearly does not purport to change the law

concerning issuance of temporary or preliminary relief.5

To interpret Pub. L. No. 109-3 as requiring that temporary or preliminary

relief be entered regardless of whether it is warranted under pre-existing law would

go beyond reading into the Act a provision that is not there. It would require us to

read into the Act a provision that Congress deliberately removed in order to clarify

that pre-existing law did govern this issue.

Nor do we find convincing plaintiffs’ argument that in reaching its decision

to deny the motion for a temporary restraining order the district court violated Pub.

L. No. 109-3 by considering the procedural history of extensive state court

litigation. The plaintiffs’ complaint and other filings in the district court asserted

8

that they had not been afforded procedural due process by the state courts. Their

pleadings and brief in the district court and this Court are replete with citations to

and discussion about the state court proceedings and decisions. In deciding

whether the plaintiffs had shown a substantial case on the merits of their federal

procedural due process claims, the district court had to consider the prior

proceedings in state court. There is no way to consider a claim that the state court

proceedings violated the Due Process Clause without examining what those

proceedings were. In obedience to Pub. L. No. 109-3 the district court considered

the federal constitutional claims de novo and made its own independent evaluation

of them.

Plaintiffs have also moved this Court under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651(a), for emergency injunctive relief pending appeal, asking us to order the

same temporary or preliminary relief that we have concluded the district court did

not abuse its discretion in denying. They are supported in that motion by a

Statement of Interest filed by the United States’ Department of Justice.

The All Writs Act provides: “The Supreme Court and all courts established

by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their

respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” Id. The

purpose of the power codified in that statute is to allow courts “to protect the

jurisdiction they already have, derived from some other source.” Klay, 376 F.3d at

1099. It gives a “residual source of authority to issue writs that are not otherwise

covered by statute” and is an “extraordinary remedy that . . . is essentially equitable

9

and, as such, not generally available to provide alternatives to other, adequate

remedies at law.” Id. at 1100 (internal quotes and citations omitted).

Our decisions make clear that where the relief sought is in essence a

preliminary injunction, the All Writs Act is not available because other, adequate

remedies at law exist, namely Fed.R.Civ.P. 65, which provides for temporary

restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. See Fla. Med. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t

of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 601 F.2d 199, 202-03 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing the

district court’s grant of injunction under the All Writs Act because “Rule 65

provides sufficient protection for the jurisdiction of the district court”); Klay, 376

F.3d at 1101 n.13.

In Klay, we explained that the injunction sought in Florida Medical

Association was a “textbook” example of a preliminary injunction because “[i]t

was issued to preserve the status quo and prevent allegedly irreparable injury until

the court had the opportunity to decide whether to issue a permanent injunction.”

Klay, 376 F.3d at 1101 n.13. The injunction being sought by the plaintiffs is

another textbook example of an effort to use the All Writs Act in order to

circumvent the requirements for preliminary injunctive relief. Granting the

injunctive relief would “confer[] the same legal rights upon plaintiffs and impose[]

the same legal duties upon defendants as would a preliminary injunction.” Fla.

Med. Ass’n, 601 F.2d at 202; id. (the All Writs Act “does not authorize a district

court to promulgate an ad hoc procedural code”). Under our circuit law, the All

Writs Act cannot be used to evade the requirements for preliminary injunctions.

A petition for rehearing or suggestion for rehearing en banc 6 is not, of course, required

before a petition for certiorari may be filed in the United States Supreme Court. If, however, a

petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc is to be filed, it must be filed by 10:00 a.m. ET, March

23, 2005. See Fed.R.App.P. 35(c) & Fed.R.App.P. 40(a)(1).

10

Klay, 376 F.3d at 1101 n.13.

There is no denying the absolute tragedy that has befallen Mrs. Schiavo. We

all have our own family, our own loved ones, and our own children. However, we

are called upon to make a collective, objective decision concerning a question of

law. In the end, and no matter how much we wish Mrs. Schiavo had never suffered

such a horrible accident, we are a nation of laws, and if we are to continue to be so,

the pre-existing and well-established federal law governing injunctions as well as

Pub. L. No. 109-3 must be applied to her case. While the position of our dissenting

colleague has emotional appeal, we as judges must decide this case on the law.

AFFIRMED; PETITION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF DENIED.6

11

WILSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I strongly dissent from the majority’s decision to deny the request for an

injunction pursuant to the All Writs Act and the request for a preliminary

injunction. First, Plaintiffs have demonstrated their entitlement to a preliminary

injunction. Second, the denial of Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction frustrates

Congress’s intent, which is to maintain the status quo by keeping Theresa Schiavo

alive until the federal courts have a new and adequate opportunity to consider the

constitutional issues raised by Plaintiffs. The entire purpose for the statute was to

give the federal courts an opportunity to consider the merits of Plaintiffs’

constitutional claims with a fresh set of eyes. Denial of Plaintiffs’ petition cuts

sharply against that intent, which is evident to me from the language of the statute,

as well as the swift and unprecedented manner of its enactment. Theresa Schiavo’s

death, which is imminent, effectively ends the litigation without a fair opportunity

to fully consider the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.

We should, at minimum, grant Plaintiffs’ All Writs Petition for emergency

injunctive relief. First, I note that there is no precedent that prohibits our granting

of this petition. Second, mindful of equitable principles, the extraordinary

circumstances presented by this appeal require that we grant the petition to

preserve federal jurisdiction and permit the opportunity to give Plaintiffs’ claims

the full and meaningful review they deserve.

In considering this extraordinary case, I am mindful that “[t]he essence of

equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould

In Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we 1 adopted as

binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to October 1, 1981.

12

each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity

has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made equity the

instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and

private needs as well as between competing private claims.” Swann v. Charlotte-

Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (citations omitted). Keeping

those principles firmly in mind, “mercy and practicality” compel us to grant the

relief requested.

I. All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651

The All Writs Act provides: “The Supreme Court and all courts established

by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their

respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28

U.S.C. § 1651. Federal courts have “both the inherent power and the constitutional

obligation to protect their jurisdiction . . . to carry out Article III functions.”

Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (emphasis

added). Toward that end, the All Writs Act permits federal courts to protect their

jurisdiction with regards to “not only ongoing proceedings, but potential future

proceedings.” Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir.

2004) (internal citations omitted); ITT Comm. Devel. Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d

1351, 1359 n.19 (5th Cir. 1978)1 (“When potential jurisdiction exists, a federal

court may issue status quo orders to ensure that once its jurisdiction is shown to

exist, the court will be in a position to exercise it.”). Although the Act does not

13

create any substantive federal jurisdiction, it empowers federal courts “to issue

writs in aid of jurisdiction previously acquired on some other independent ground,”

see Brittingham v. Comm’r, 451 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1971), and codifies the

“federal courts’ traditional, inherent power to protect the jurisdiction they already

have.” Klay, 376 F.3d at 1099.

An injunction under the All Writs Act is an extraordinary remedy, one that

“invests a court with a power that is essentially equitable, and as such, not

generally available.” Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 537, 119 S. Ct 1538,

1543 (1999). A federal court’s power under the Act, while limited, is broad

enough that “[a] court may grant a writ under this act whenever it is ‘calculated [in

the court’s] sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it.” Klay,

376 F.3d at 1100 (citing Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 273, 63 S. Ct. 236,

239 (1942)).

I am careful to stress that equitable relief under the All Writs Act is not to be

confused with a traditional injunction, which is “predicated upon some cause of

action.” Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100. An injunction entered pursuant to the All Writs

Act is not a substitute for traditional injunctive relief. The All Writs Act injunction

is distinguished from a traditional injunction not by its effect, but by its purpose.

To obtain relief under the All Writs Act, Plaintiffs need not satisfy the traditional

four-part test associated with traditional injunctions “because a court’s traditional

power to protect its jurisdiction, codified by the act, is grounded in entirely

separate concerns.” Id. However, Plaintiffs must show that “some ongoing

The majority opinion holds that the All Writs Act is not appropriate in this case becaus2 e

“where the relief sought is in essence a preliminary injunction, the All Writs Act is not available

because other, adequate remedies at law exist, namely Fed.R.Civ.P. 65, which provides for

temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions” Maj. Opn. at * 7-8. I do not argue with

that point. However, in this case, the relief Plaintiffs seek is not a preliminary injunction by another

name. Rather, the purpose for which Plaintiffs ask that we reinsert Theresa Schiavo’s feeding tube

is to permit a federal court to have time within which to exercise its jurisdiction and fully entertain

Plaintiffs’ claims. Thus, the purpose of entering an injunction in this case is limited to the narrow

goal of aiding the exercise of federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ claim is precisely the one and only type

of situation in which an All Writs Act injunction is appropriate and for which there is no other

adequate remedy at law.

14

proceeding . . . is being threatened by someone else’s action or behavior.” Id.

Relief pursuant to the All Writs Act should only be granted in extraordinary

circumstances where inaction would prevent a federal court from exercising its

proper Article III jurisdiction.2

As an appellate court, we may grant All Writs Act relief to preserve our

“potential jurisdiction . . . where an appeal is not then pending but may be later

perfected.” F.T.C. v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603, 86 S. Ct. 1738, 1742

(1966). In Dean Foods, the Supreme Court sustained the entry of a preliminary

injunction that prevented the consummation of a merger of two corporations. The

Supreme Court held that the use of an All Writs Act injunction was particularly

appropriate in a situation where “an effective remedial order . . . would otherwise

be virtually impossible.” Id. at 605. That is precisely the case here.

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the issuance of an injunction is essential to

preserve the federal courts’ ability to “bring the litigation to a natural conclusion.”

Klay, 376 F.3d at 1102. By failing to issue an injunction requiring the reinsertion

of Theresa Schiavo’s feeding tube, we virtually guarantee that the merits of

Plaintiffs’ claims will never be litigated in federal court. That outcome would not

15

only result in manifest injustice, but it would thwart Congress’s clearly expressed

command that Plaintiffs’ claims be given de novo review by a federal court.

Given the extraordinary circumstances of this case, we are fully within our

power to issue an injunction “in aid of [our] jurisdiction” pursuant to the All Writs

Act. Under the Act, “[a] court may enjoin almost any conduct ‘which, left

unchecked, would have . . . the practical effect of diminishing the court’s power to

bring the litigation to a natural conclusion.” Klay, 376 F.3d at 1102 (citing Barton,

569 F.2d at 1359). Federal courts may “compel acts necessary to promote the

resolution of issues in a case properly before it” including “issu[ing] orders to aid

in conducting factual inquiries.” Id. (citations and internal quotation omitted).

The issuance of an All Writs Act injunction is, as mentioned earlier, an

extraordinary remedy. However, this case is clearly extraordinary. Furthermore,

entry of an All Writs Act injunction is necessary to preserve federal jurisdiction to

hear Plaintiffs’ claims. My research has not revealed any precedent which clearly

prohibits the entry of an All Writs Act injunction in a situation where a few days’

delay is “necessary or appropriate in aid of” federal court jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.

1651. In contrast, refusing to grant the equitable relief would, through Theresa

Schiavo’s death, moot the case and eliminate federal jurisdiction.

This deprivation would directly contravene Congress’s recent enactment

granting jurisdiction in this case. An Act for the relief of the parents of Theresa

Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3 § 2 (Mar. 21, 2005). The first step in statutory

interpretation requires that courts apply the plain meaning of the statutory language

16

unless it is ambiguous. Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.

Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992); United States v. Fisher, 289 F.3d 1329, 1337-38 (11th Cir.

2002). Only when we find ambiguity in the statute's text should we apply canons

of statutory interpretation, such as the canon of constitutional avoidance. Dep't of

Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 134, 122 S. Ct. 1230, 1235 (2002).

Because the language of the statute is clear, the majority’s reliance on

legislative history is unwarranted and incorrect. As originally proposed, the Act

mandated a stay of proceedings while the district court considered Plaintiffs’

claims. A later version changed the language from “shall” (mandating a stay) to

“may” (authorizing a stay). See 151 Cong. Rec. 3099, 3100 (daily ed. Mar. 20,

2005) (statement of Sen. Levin). Although the final version of the Act did not

contain any stay provision, we should not read this to mean that Congress intended

to deny this Court the power to issue a stay. The reason that Congress deleted the

stay provision is that “this bill does not change current law under which a stay is

discretionary.” Id. (statement of Sen. Frist). In short, the legislation did not need

an explicit stay provision because, given the already-existing discretionary power

of federal courts to issue injunctions in aid of jurisdiction, it would have been

redundant and unnecessary. Therefore, the majority’s assertion that the text of the

statute limits or eliminates our power to enter an injunction is misplaced.

Here, we have Congress’s clear mandate requiring the federal courts to

consider the actual merits of Plaintiff’s claims. Congress intended for this case to

be reviewed with a fresh set of eyes. We are not called upon to consider the

17

wisdom of this legislation. In granting this injunction we would merely effectuate

Congress’s intent.

If Congress had intended that federal review of the issues raised by Plaintiffs

be given customary and ordinary treatment, that review would be confined to

consideration of the denial of the motion for a writ of habeas corpus in Case No.

05-11517. There, consideration of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims would be

limited by the substantial deference that is afford to previous state court

determinations. Yet, Congress went to great lengths to remove many of those

limitations. First, the legislation eliminates any “standing” barriers to the

commencement of an action by Plaintiffs. Secondly, the legislation gives the

Middle District of Florida entirely new consideration over any claim of a violation

of Theresa Schiavo’s constitutional rights, without respect to “any prior state court

determination and regardless of whether such a claim has previously been raised,

considered, or decided in state court proceedings.” The legislation goes even

further to eliminate any exhaustion requirements. Congress obviously intended

that this case be considered by federal courts without the customary limitations.

Today, we are not called upon to second-guess the wisdom of Congress, but to

apply the law it has passed.

II. Preliminary Injunction

At first glance, Plaintiffs’ request for an injunction does not appear as strong

as their claim pursuant to the All Writs Act. However, I believe that an injunction

is appropriate and, at the very least, we should issue an injunction to permit the

18

district court to review to review Plaintiffs’ claims on the merits.

To prevail on their request for injunctive relief, Plaintiffs must demonstrate

the following: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable

injury if the injunction is not issued; (3) threatened injury to the movant outweighs

the potential damage that the proposed injunction may cause the defendants; and

(4) the injunction will not be adverse to the public interest. See All Care Nursing

Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989)

(citation omitted). The issuance of an injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and

the moving party “bears the burden to clearly establish the four prerequisites.”

Café 207, Inc. v. St. Johns County, 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir. 1993).

It is clear from our cases that proof of a substantial likelihood of success on

the merits is an indispensable prerequisite to a preliminary injunction. All Care

Nursing Serv., 887 F.2d at 1537. However, the movant must demonstrate a

“substantial likelihood,” not a substantial certainty. To require more undermines

the purpose of even considering the other three prerequisites. Thus, instead, “the

movant need only present a substantial case on the merits when a serious legal

question is involved and show that the balance of the equities weighs heavily in

favor of granting the [preliminary injunction].” Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 565

(5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see Gonzalez v. Reno, No. 00-11424-D, 2000 WL

381901 at *1 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2000); United States v. Hamilton, 963 F.2d 322,

323 (11th Cir. 1992) (quoting ); Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th

Cir. 1986). The review “require[s] a delicate balancing of the probabilities of

19

ultimate success at final hearing with the consequences of immediate irreparable

injury which could possibly flow from the denial of preliminary relief.” Siegel v.

Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1178 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

As we stated in Gonzalez, “where the balance of the equities weighs heavily

in favor of granting the [injunction], the movant need only show a substantial case

on the merits.” Gonzalez, 2000 WL 381901 at *1 (internal citations omitted)

(alteration in original). In this case, the balance of the equities weighs heavily in

favor of granting the injunction. We determine the balance of the equities by

examining the three final factors required to grant a preliminary injunction.

Garcia-Mir, 781 F.2d at1453.

“A showing of irreparable harm is the sine qua non of injunctive relief.”

Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of

Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation and internal quotation

omitted). Here, the immediate irreparable injury is not only possible, it is

imminent. I am aware of no injury more irreparable than death. Clearly, the

threatened injury of death outweighs any harm the proposed injunction may cause,

i.e. reinserting the feeding tube. In fact, I fail to see any harm in reinstating the

feeding tube. On the other hand, a denial of the request for injunction will result in

the death of Theresa Schiavo. Finally, an injunction in this case clearly would not

be adverse to public interest, thus satisfying the fourth and final criteria necessary

to grant a preliminary injunction. Upon reviewing these three factors, it is obvious

that the equities weigh heavily in favor of granting the injunction.

20

I now consider the first prong, whether Plaintiffs presented a substantial case

on the merits. In the complaint, Plaintiffs claim that Theresa Schiavo’s Fourteenth

Amendment due process rights were violated in that she was not provided a fair

and impartial trial, she was not given adequate procedural due process, and she was

not afforded equal protection of the laws. Further, Plaintiffs contend that Theresa

Schiavo’s First Amendment freedom to exercise her religion has been burdened by

the state court’s order to remove the feeding tube. Plaintiffs also allege a violation

of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000cc-1(a).

The establishment of a “substantial likelihood for success on the merits” is a

heavy burden, but not an insurmountable one. A movant need not establish that he

can hit a home run, only that he can get on base, with a possibility of scoring later.

In fact, our circuit jurisprudence establishes that the movant need not establish a

“probability” of success, taking all things into consideration. The merits of

Plaintiffs’ substantial claims warrant a more complete review. I do not mean to

suggest that Plaintiffs will definitely prevail on the merits, but merely that she has

presented a sufficient case on the merits. She raises legal issues necessitating the

grant of the preliminary injunction and should be afforded an opportunity to defend

the merits of her claims. Adjudication on the merits is impossible if we do not

grant the injunction.

Finally, I note that awarding an injunction is an equitable decision. We have

broad powers to fashion a remedy in equity. We are required to balance the

21

equities, and when we do, we should find that the gravity of the irreparable injury

Theresa Schiavo would suffer could not weigh more heavily in Plaintiffs’ favor. In

contrast, there is little or no harm to be found in granting this motion for a

temporary injunction and deciding the full merits of the dispute.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

Page 22

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

22

THERESA MARIE SCHINDLER SCHIAVO, Incapacitated ex rel., ROBERT

SCHINDLER and MARY SCHINDLER, her Parents and Next Friends, Plaintiffs,

vs. MICHAEL SCHIAVO, JUDGE GEORGE W. GREER and THE HOSPICE

OF THE FLORIDA SUNCOAST, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 8:05-CV-530-T-27TBM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF

FLORIDA, TAMPA DIVISION

2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4265

March 22, 2005, Decided

COUNSEL: [*1] For Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo,

incapacitated ex rel, Robert Schindler and Mary Schindler,

her parents and next friends, Plaintiff: David C. Gibbs, III,

Gibbs Law Firm, Seminole, FL; George E. Tragos, Law

Office of George E. Tragos, Clearwater, FL; Robert A.

Destro, Columbus School Of Law, Washington, DC.

For Michael Schiavo, as guardian of the person of Theresa

Marie Schindler Schiavo, incapacitated, Defendant: George

J. Felos, Felos & Felos, P.A., Dunedin, FL; Iris Bennett,

Jenner & Block LLC, Washington, DC; Randall C.

Marshall, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of

Florida, Inc., Miami, FL; Rebecca H. Steele, ACLU

Foundation of Florida, Inc., West Central Florida Office,

Tampa, FL; Robert M. Portman, Jenner & Block,

Washington, DC; Thomas J. Perrelli, Jenner & Block,

Washington, DC.

Page 23

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

23

For The Hospice of the Florida Suncoast, Inc., Defendant:

Gail Golman Holtzman, Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLC,

Tampa, FL; John W. Campbell, Constangy, Brooks &

Smith, LLC, Tampa, FL; Robin G. Midulla, Robin Greiwe

Midulla, P.A., Tampa, FL.

For Liberty Counsel, Inc., Amicus: Erik W. Stanley,

Liberty Counsel, Longwood, FL.

For United States, Interested Party: Paul I. Perez, [*2]

U.S. Attorney's Office, Middle District of Florida, Orlando,

FL; Warren A. Zimmerman, U.S. Attorney's Office, Middle

District of Florida, Tampa, FL.

For Morton Plant Hospital Association, Inc., Victor E.

Gambone, M.D., Morton Plant Mease Primary Care, Inc.,

Stanton P. Tripodis, M.D., Interested Parties: James

Addison Martin, Jr., Macfarlane Ferguson & McMullen,

Clearwater, FL; Jeffrey W. Gibson, MacFarlane Ferguson

& McMullen, Clearwater, FL.

Gordon Wayne Watts, Interested Party, Pro se, Lakeland,

FL.

JUDGES: JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, United States

District Judge.

OPINIONBY: JAMES D. WHITTEMORE

OPINION:

ORDER

BEFORE THE COURT is Plaintiffs' Motion for

Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 2). In their motion,

Plaintiffs seek an order directing Defendants to Schiavo

and Hospice to transport Theresa Schiavo to Morton Plant

Hospital for any necessary medical treatment to sustain her

life and to reestablish her nutrition and hydration. This

action and Plaintiffs' motion were filed in response to an

order of Pinellas County Probate Judge George W. Greer

directing Defendant Schiavo, Theresa Schiavo's husband

and plenary guardian, to discontinue her nutrition and

hydration.

The court [*3] conducted a hearing on Plaintiffs'

motion after notice to Defendants. Upon consideration,

Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is

denied.

Plaintiffs, the parents of Theresa Marie Schindler

Schiavo, brought this action pursuant to a Congressional

Act signed into law by the President during the early

morning hours of March 21, 2005. n1 The Act, entitled "An

Act for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo,"

provides that the:

United States District Court for the Middle

District of Florida shall have jurisdiction to

hear, determine, and render judgment on a

suit or claim by or on behalf of Theresa

Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of

Page 24

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

24

any right of Theresa Marie Schiavo under

the Constitution or laws of the United States

relating to the withholding or withdrawal of

food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary

to sustain life.

n1 Pub. L. No. 109-3 (March 21, 2005).

Jurisdiction and Standing

The federal district courts are courts of limited

jurisdiction, "empowered [*4] to hear only those cases . .

. which have been entrusted to them by a jurisdictional

grant authorized by Congress." University of S. Ala. v.

American Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409 (11th Cir.

1999) (quoting Taylor v. Appleton, 30 F.3d 1365, 1367

(11th Cir. 1994)). The plain language of the Act establishes

jurisdiction in this court to determine de novo "any claim of

a violation of any right of Theresa Schiavo within the scope

of this Act." The Act expressly confers standing to

Plaintiffs as her parents to bring any such claims. There can

be no substantial question, therefore, that Plaintiffs may

bring an action against a party to the state court

proceedings in this court for claimed constitutional

deprivations or violations of federal law occasioned on

their daughter relating to the withholding or withdrawal of

food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to sustain her

life. Whether the Plaintiffs may bring claims in federal

court is not the issue confronting the court today, however.

The issue confronting the court is whether temporary

injunctive relief is warranted.

Applicable Standards

While there may be substantial issues concerning [*5]

the constitutionality of the Act, for purposes of considering

temporary injunctive relief, the Act is presumed to be

constitutional. Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1303

(11th Cir. 2004).

The purpose of a temporary restraining order, like a

preliminary injunction, is to protect against irreparable

injury and preserve the status quo until the district court

renders a meaningful decision on the merits. Canal Auth. of

State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir.

1974). A district court may grant a preliminary injunction

only if the moving party shows that:

(1) it has a substantial likelihood of success

on the merits;

(2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless

the injunction issues;

(3) the threatened injury to the movant

outweighs whatever damage the proposed

injunction may cause the opposing party;

and

(4) if issued, the injunction would not be

adverse to the public interest.

Page 25

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

25

Klay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1097

(11th Cir. 2004); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,

268 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2001). A preliminary

injunction is "an extraordinary [*6] and drastic remedy"

and is "not to be granted unless the movant 'clearly

established the burden of persuasion' as to the four

prerequisites." United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d

1511, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Canal Auth. of State

of Florida, 489 F.2d at 573). n2

n2 The Act does not address the traditional

requirements for temporary injunctive relief.

Accordingly, these standards control whether

temporary injunctive relief is warranted,

notwithstanding Congress' intent that the federal

courts determine de novo the merits of Theresa

Schiavo's claimed constitutional deprivations.

It is apparent that Theresa Schiavo will die unless

temporary injunctive relief is granted. This circumstance

satisfies the requirement of irreparable injury. Moreover,

that threatened injury outweighs any harm the proposed

injunction would cause. To the extent Defendants urge that

Theresa Schiavo would be harmed by the invasive

procedure reinserting the feeding tube, this court finds [*7]

that death outweighs any such harm. Finally, the court is

satisfied that an injunction would not be adverse to the

public interest. Notwithstanding these findings, it is

essential that Plaintiffs establish a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits, which the court finds they have not

done.

The first of the four prerequisites to temporary

injunctive relief is generally the most important. Gonzalez

v. Reno, No. 00-11424-D, 2000 WL 381901 at *1 (11th Cir.

April 19, 2000). The necessary level or degree of

possibility of success on the merits will vary according to

the court's assessment of the other factors. Ruiz v. Estelle,

650 F.2d 555, 565 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing with auth.

Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm 'n v. Holiday

Tours, Inc., 182 U.S. App. D.C. 220, 559 F.2d 841, 843

(D.C. Cir. 1977)).

A substantial likelihood of success on the merits

requires a showing of only likely or probable, rather than

certain, success. Home Oil Company, Inc. v. Sam's East,

Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1249 (M.D. Ala. 2002)

(emphasis in original); see also Ruiz, 650 F.2d at 565.

"Where the 'balance [*8] of the equities weighs heavily in

favor of granting the [injunction],' the movant need only

show a 'substantial case on the merits.'" Garcia-Mir v.

Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Ruiz,

650 F.2d at 565).

This court has carefully considered the Act and is

mindful of Congress' intent that Plaintiffs have an

opportunity to litigate any deprivation of Theresa Schiavo's

federal rights. The Court is likewise mindful of Congress'

directive that a de novo determination be made

"notwithstanding any prior State court determination." In

Page 26

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

26

resolving Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining

Order, however, the court is limited to a consideration of

the constitutional and statutory deprivations alleged by

Plaintiffs in their Complaint and motion. Because Plaintiffs

urge due process violations are premised primarily on the

procedures followed and orders entered by Judge Greer in

his official capacity as the presiding judge in the dispute

between Michael Schiavo and Plaintiffs, their Complaint

necessarily requires a consideration of the procedural

history of the state court case to determine whether there is

a showing of any due process [*9] violations. On the face

of these pleadings, Plaintiffs have asserted five

constitutional and statutory claims. To obtain temporary

injunctive relief, they must show a substantial likelihood of

success on at least one claim. n3

n3 Plaintiffs have submitted affidavits of health

care professionals regarding Theresa's medical

status, treatment techniques and therapies which are

available and their opinions regarding how and

whether these treatments might improve Theresa's

condition. Plaintiffs have not, however, discussed

these affidavits in their papers and how they relate

to the claimed constitutional deprivations.

A. Count I - Violation of Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process Right to a Fair and Impartial Trial

Plaintiffs allege in Count I that Theresa Schiavo's

Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial

was violated, contending that the presiding judge "became

Terri's health care surrogate" and "also purported to act as

an impartial trial judge in the same proceeding." (Dkt. 1,

PP 47-48). They [*10] allege that once he "became an

advocate for Terri's death, it became impossible for Judge

Greer to maintain his role as an impartial judge in order to

review his own decision that Terri would want to die."

(Dkt. 1, P 49). Finally, they allege that "Judge Greer's dual

and simultaneous role as judge and health-care surrogate

denied Terri a fair and impartial trial." (Dkt. 1, P 50).

These contentions are without merit.

Florida's statutory scheme, set forth in Chapter 765,

contemplates a process for designation of a proxy in the

absence of an executed advance directive and provides for

judicial resolution of disputes arising concerning decisions

made by the proxy. See Fla. Stat. § 765.401(1). Where a

decision by the proxy is challenged by the patient's other

family members, it is appropriate for the parties to seek

"expedited judicial intervention." Fla. Slat. § 765.105.

Applying this statutory scheme, the state court appointed

Michael Schiavo, Theresa Schiavo's husband, as plenary

guardian and proxy for Theresa. Thereafter, a dispute arose

between Michael Schiavo and Plaintiffs concerning

whether to continue Theresa on artificial life support, and

Judge Greer, the presiding [*11] judge, was called upon to

resolve that dispute.

Florida's statutory scheme contemplates a judicial

resolution of these competing contentions. See In re

Page 27

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

27

Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990).

As the Florida Second District Court of Appeal explained,

where two "suitable surrogate decision-maker[s] . . .could

not agree on the proper decision, ..." the guardian may

invoke "the trial court's jurisdiction to allow the trial court

to serve as the surrogate decision-maker." In re

Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 178 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 2001) ("Schiavo I"). Pursuant to Florida law,

therefore, Judge Greer, as the presiding judge, had a

statutory obligation to resolve the competing contentions

between Michael Schiavo and Plaintiffs. Fla. Stat. §

765.105.

Plaintiffs offer no authority for their contention that

Judge Greer compromised the fairness of the proceeding or

the impartiality of the court by following Florida law and

fulfilling his statutory responsibilities under Chapter 765 as

presiding judge and decision-maker. n4 Plaintiffs' argument

is that Judge Greer could not fulfill his judicial duties

impartially while at [*12] the same time fulfilling his

statutory duty to resolve the competing contentions of the

parties as surrogate or proxy "to make decisions about lifeprolonging

procedures." In re Guardianship of Schiavo,

No. 2D05-968, 2005 WL 600377 at *4 (Fl. Ct. App. March

16, 2005) ("Schiavo VI").

n4 During argument, Plaintiffs' counsel

explained their criticism of Judge Greer's official

actions as Judge Greer having exceeded his lawful

authority by acting as a guardian contrary to Fla.

Stat. § 744.309(1)(b). Contrary to Plaintiffs'

argument, § 744.309 merely prohibits a judge from

acting as a guardian except under certain specified

familial circumstances.

Plaintiffs' argument effectively ignores the role of the

presiding judge as judicial fact-finder and decision-maker

under the Florida statutory scheme. By fulfilling his

statutory judicial responsibilities, the judge was not

transformed into an advocate merely because his rulings are

unfavorable to a litigant. Plaintiffs' contention that the

statutory [*13] scheme followed by Judge Greer deprived

Theresa Schiavo of an impartial trial is accordingly without

merit. Defendant is correct that no federal constitutional

right is implicated when a judge merely grants relief to a

litigant in accordance with the law he is sworn to uphold

and follow. This Court concludes that Plaintiffs cannot

establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of

Count I.

B. Count II - Violation of Fourteenth Amendment

Procedural Due Process Rights

In Count II, Plaintiffs contend that Theresa Schiavo's

Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights were

violated by Judge Greer's (1) failure to appoint a guardian

ad litem (Dkt. 1, P 53), (2) failure to appoint an

independent attorney to represent Theresa Schiavo's legal

rights (Dkt. 1, P 54) and (3) denial of what Plaintiffs

describe as "access to court" by his "failure to ever meet

Terri personally" and failure to "personally assess Terri's

Page 28

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

28

level of cognition and her responsiveness" (Dkt. 1, P 55).

Initially, the Court finds no authority recognizing as a

matter of federal constitutional or statutory right that a state

trial judge is required to "personally assess" a ward's "level

of cognition [*14] and ...responsiveness." Fla. Stat. §

744.3725, on which Plaintiffs rely, is applicable to an

action seeking to commit the ward to a facility and other

circumstances not relevant to this case. Plaintiffs'

conclusory allegation that Judge Greer denied Theresa

Schiavo access to court by not requiring her presence is

without merit.

With respect to Plaintiffs' contention that Judge Greer

violated Theresa Schiavo's procedural due process rights by

failing to appoint a guardian ad litem, the record belies this

contention. In June, 1998, Judge Rives sua sponte

appointed Richard L. Pearse, Jr., Esq. as guardian ad litem

"for the purpose of reviewing the request for termination of

life support on behalf of the wards [sic]." In re

Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Pinellas

Cty. Circ. Ct., June 11, 1998). The record reflects that

attorney Pearse "fully complied with his June 11, 1998

Court Order of appointment" and was accordingly

discharged on June 16, 1999 by Judge Boyer of the Pinellas

County Circuit Court. Pearse served as guardian ad litem

for one year and ultimately testified as a witness in the trial

before Judge Greer. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, [*15]

No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Pinellas Cty. Circ. Ct., Feb. 28,

2000). n5 Accordingly, assuming Fourteenth Amendment

procedural due process requires the appointment of a

guardian ad litem, there would be no constitutional

deprivation here because three guardians ad litem were

appointed to represent Theresa Schiavo's interests over the

course of the litigation.

n5 The record also reveals that attorney John

H. Pecarek was appointed as guardian ad litem

early in the proceedings. In re Guardianship of

Schiavo, No. 90-2908-GD-003 (Pinellas Cty. Circ.

Ct., Feb. 17, 1994). Late in the litigation, at the

request of Florida Governor Jeb Bush, Pinellas

County Chief Judge David Demers also appointed

attorney Jay Wolfson, M.D. as guardian ad litem.

Schiavo VI, 2005 WL 600377 at *1, n. 2.

Plaintiffs' last contention is that Theresa Schiavo's

procedural due process rights were violated by Judge

Greer's refusal to appoint an independent attorney to

represent her interests. The due process clause is [*16]

implicated when there is a "deprivation of life, liberty or

property at the hands of the government." Grayden v.

Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). If one or

more of these constitutionally protected interests is at stake,

as they undoubtedly are in this case, the due process clause

requires notice and the opportunity to be heard. Id. "It is .

. . fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity to

be heard must be granted at a meaningful time and in a

meaningful manner." Fuentes v. Cortes, 407 U.S. 67, 80

(1972). Unquestionably, in some circumstances, a

Page 29

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

29

meaningful opportunity to be heard includes the right to be

represented by counsel. However, "due process is a flexible

concept that varies with the particular circumstances of

each case, and to determine the requirements of due process

in a particular situation we must apply the balancing test

articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed.

2d 18 (1976)." Grayden, 345 F.3d at 1232-33.

The Mathews balancing test requires consideration of

three distinct factors: "First, the private interest that will be

affected by the official [*17] action; second, the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the

procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of

additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,

the Government's interest, including the function involved

and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional

or substitute procedural requirement would entail."

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

The first factor weighs the interest at stake. Plaintiffs

urge that Theresa Schiavo's life is at stake, while Defendant

argues that her liberty to exercise her right to refuse

medical treatment is the interest being adjudicated. In either

case, a fundamental and important interest is implicated in

the court proceedings determining the removal of artificial

life support.

The second Mathews factor requires consideration of

the risk of erroneous deprivation under the procedures used

and the probable value of the additional protections urged

by the Plaintiffs. Theresa Schiavo's case has been

exhaustively litigated, including an extensive trial, followed

by another "extensive hearing at which many highly

qualified physicians testified" to reconfirm that no

meaningful treatment [*18] was available, and six appeals.

As the Florida Second District Court of Appeal stated,

"few, if any, similar cases have ever been afforded this

heightened level of process." Schiavo VI, 2005 WL 600377

at *3.

Throughout the proceedings, the parties, represented

by able counsel, advanced what they believed to be Theresa

Schiavo's intentions concerning artificial life support. In

Florida, counsel for Michael Schiavo as Theresa Schiavo's

guardian owed a duty of care to Theresa Schiavo in his

representation. Op. Atty. Gen. 96-94 (November 20, 1996).

Finally, with respect to presenting the opposing perspective

on Theresa Schiavo's wishes, the Court cannot envision

more effective advocates than her parents and their able

counsel. Plaintiffs have not shown how an additional

lawyer appointed by the court could have reduced the risk

of erroneous rulings.

With regard to the third factor, without question the

state of Florida has an interest in the welfare of its citizens

and in the legal process for adjudicating disputed claims

such as were presented to Judge Greer in this case, as

evidenced by Florida's well defined statutory scheme. The

court's inherent authority to appoint [*19] a guardian ad

litem, consult independent experts or appoint an attorney if

warranted protects the state's interest.

Balancing the three factors, this court concludes that

Theresa Schiavo's life and liberty interests were adequately

Page 30

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

30

protected by the extensive process provided in the state

courts. Defendant Michael Schiavo and Plaintiffs, assisted

by counsel, thoroughly advocated their competing

perspectives on Theresa Schiavo's wishes. Another lawyer

appointed by the court could not have offered more

protection of Theresa Schiavo's interests. Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have not established a substantial likelihood of

success on the merits on Count II.

C. Count Three - Violation of Fourteenth

Amendment Right to Equal Protection of the Law

For the same reasons relief under Count I was not

appropriate, the relief sought in Count III via the equal

protection clause is without merit. Plaintiff has not

established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits

of the claims set forth in Count III. See Cruzan v. Missouri

Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 287 n.12, 111 L. Ed. 2d 224

(1990) ("The differences between the choice made by a

competent person to refuse [*20] medical treatment, and

the choice made for an incompetent person by someone

else to refuse medical treatment, are so obviously different

that the State is warranted in establishing rigorous

procedures for the latter class of cases which do not apply

to the former class.") (emphasis in original).

D. Counts IV and V - Violation of Religious Land

Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and

Violation of First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion

Clause

Plaintiffs bring Counts IV and V alleging that Theresa

Schiavo's right to exercise her religion has been burdened

by the state court's order to remove the feeding tube. With

respect to Count IV of the Complaint, Plaintiffs allege a

claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized

Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1), claiming that her

rights to free exercise of her religion have been burdened

by the state court's order authorizing removal of her feeding

tube in that removal of the feeding tube "imposes a

substantial burden on Terry's religious free exercise." That

statute expressly requires, however, that "no government

shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise

of [*21] a person . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (emphasis

added).

In Count V, Plaintiffs make a similar contention under

the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the free exercise clause, alleging

that "Terry's religious beliefs are burdened" by execution of

order "in that Terry is being forced to engage in an activity

contrary to the tenets of her Roman Catholic faith . . . ."

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have a constitutional duty

to accommodate "Terry's sincerely-held religious beliefs."

Undoubtedly, Terry Schiavo enjoys, by virtue of 42

U.S.C. § 2000-cc(a), a statutorily protected right not to

have substantial burdens placed on her religious exercise by

the government. The plain language of the statute prohibits

government from imposing a substantial burden on the

religious exercise of an individual such as Theresa Schiavo.

Similarly, the Free Exercise Clause contained in the First

Amendment of the Constitution expressly protects the

exercise of religion. In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege

Page 31

APPENDIX TO THE MAJORITY OPINION

31

that the state court's order imposes a substantial burden on

Theresa Schiavo's free exercise of religion. (Complaint, P

67).

In order [*22] to succeed on either claim, however,

Plaintiffs must establish that the Defendants were state

actors. Plaintiffs' claims fail because neither Defendant

Schiavo nor Defendant Hospice are state actors. Moreover,

the fact that the claims were adjudicated by a state court

judge does not provide the requisite state action for

purposes of the statute or the Fourteenth Amendment. See

Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1133-34 (11th Cir.

1992)("Use of the courts by private parties does not

constitute an act under color of state law."); Torres v. First

State Bank of Sierra County, 588 F.2d 1322, 1326-27 (10th

Cir. 1978)("We do not think that the 'color of law' reference

in § 1983 was intended to encompass a case such as this

one, where the only infirmities are the excesses of the court

order itself, . . . subject to the normal processes of

appeal."); see also Dahl v. Akin, 630 F.2d 277, 281 (5th

Cir. 1980).

This court appreciates the gravity of the consequences

of denying injunctive relief. Even under these difficult and

time strained circumstances, however, and notwithstanding

Congress' expressed interest in the welfare of Theresa

Schiavo, [*23] this court is constrained to apply the law to

the issues before it. As Plaintiffs have not established a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits, Plaintiffs'

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 2) must be

DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in chambers this 22nd day

of March, 2005.

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE

United States District Judge

32


TOPICS: Crime/Corruption; Culture/Society; News/Current Events; US: Florida
KEYWORDS: 11thcircuit; death; dredscott; euthanasia; liberaljudges; prayers; schiavo; terri; terrischiavo; uselesseaters
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To: thoughtomator; churchillbuff

Thanks.
I should have added Bush (41).


21 posted on 03/23/2005 12:37:43 AM PST by onyx (Robert Frost "Good fences make good neighbors." Build the fence, Mr. President and Congress.)
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To: peyton randolph

I don't fault the federal legislative or executive branches.

This still requires wise and decent human beings to be found in the judicial branch.

Thus far this search has been unsuccessful.


22 posted on 03/23/2005 12:39:02 AM PST by D-fendr
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To: thoughtomator

I don't know if any us will ever be able to make sense out of this.


23 posted on 03/23/2005 12:39:05 AM PST by happinesswithoutpeace
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To: MKM1960


Oh, excellent link.
Thanks.


24 posted on 03/23/2005 12:39:08 AM PST by onyx (Robert Frost "Good fences make good neighbors." Build the fence, Mr. President and Congress.)
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To: Aussie Dasher
How quickly can Congress get back to DC?

Won't happen. Easter break now. Many congressmen are taking vacations or taxpayer-funded fact-finding trips to other parts of the world (i.e. vacations paid for by us). Terri will be dead before they return.

25 posted on 03/23/2005 12:40:27 AM PST by peyton randolph (Warning! It is illegal to fatwah a camel in all 50 states)
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To: peyton randolph

I think the first question and only question should be is Terri a PVS case?(persistent vegetative state ).If she is not than this is murder.

I think the problem with the Liberals go to the separation of powers clause .And also this might hurt there argument about abortion, imagine saving someones life. And finally because Republicans are for it than the liberalsknee jerk reaction is to be against it.
Again the liberals don't know the difference between right and wrong.


26 posted on 03/23/2005 12:40:58 AM PST by mal
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To: onyx

It can be deceptive going just by who appointed the judge, since there is often some horse trading going on. For ex., Prez appoints the friend of a senator from the opposing party, in ex. for that senator's support on a piece of legislation.


27 posted on 03/23/2005 12:41:50 AM PST by ambrose (....)
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To: ambrose

Good point, considering some of the rulings that come down.


28 posted on 03/23/2005 12:42:33 AM PST by happinesswithoutpeace
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To: Aussie Dasher
How quickly can Congress get back to DC?

Good question. About 10 years ago I was talking with my Congressman and noted that, with the Internet, closed circuit sattelite, and such, there was no need for the antiquated notion of our representatives trotting off to Washington.

They could stay in their hometowns, and actually hear from hometown people after they had voted. Maybe in line at the grocery store.

My Congressman was not amused at that.

There is absolutely no reason anymore for Congress to gather in Washington, but for tradition and the need to keep a safe distance from their constituents.

29 posted on 03/23/2005 12:43:45 AM PST by JennysCool (Boycott Pinellas County!)
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To: peyton randolph
Accordingly, these standards control whether temporary injunctive relief is warranted, notwithstanding Congress' intent that the federal courts determine de novo the merits of Theresa Schiavo's claimed constitutional deprivations. It is apparent that Theresa Schiavo will die unless temporary injunctive relief is granted. This circumstance satisfies the requirement of irreparable injury

Notwithstanding these findings, it is essential that Plaintiffs establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, which the court finds they have not done.

Idiots. They admit Congress' intent is for the case to reheard from scratch, yet they say the likelihood for Theresa's "victory" is low. How can they say that? The intent is that the case has not been heard. They forgot the Constitutional mandate of the fifth Amendment --- nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Due process has not been met until the case has been reheard at the federal level.

30 posted on 03/23/2005 12:44:05 AM PST by AndrewC (All these moments are tossed in lime, like trains in the rear.)
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To: onyx
The GOP had better do something or they will be exposed as powerless.

I find it unbeleievable that some demented lawyers in a black dress are more powerful than the POTUS and Congress.

31 posted on 03/23/2005 12:44:28 AM PST by Rome2000 (Peace is not an option)
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To: ambrose
Oh how I long for statesmen instead of politicians.

Nam Vet

32 posted on 03/23/2005 12:45:18 AM PST by Nam Vet (MSM reporters think the MOIST dream they had the night before is a "reliable source".)
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To: ambrose

Absolutely right.
It's the behind the scene stuff.


33 posted on 03/23/2005 12:46:09 AM PST by onyx (Robert Frost "Good fences make good neighbors." Build the fence, Mr. President and Congress.)
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To: All

My email just sent to President Bush: president@whitehouse.gov

Hello President Bush,

Here are a couple ideas to save Terri Schaivo.

1) I wonder what would happen if you went to visit Terri with the Secret Service in tow and decided to take her to a safe haven aboard Air Force One. I don't think any Florida law enforcement personnel (God Bless Them) would stand in your way. This may be the only remaining hope.

2) The Vatican has come out pretty strongly in opposition to her execution. I wonder if anyone over there has considered naming Terri a diplomat or special envoy. That might well kick the authority to order the reattachment of her feeding tube to the State Department.

thanks,

Tony in Boulder, Colorado


34 posted on 03/23/2005 12:46:27 AM PST by ajolympian2004
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To: peyton randolph

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE

Appointed to the federal bench May 27, 2000 by President Bill Clinton.


35 posted on 03/23/2005 12:46:45 AM PST by Lancey Howard
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To: Nam Vet

Andrew "Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it." Jackson is dead.


36 posted on 03/23/2005 12:47:55 AM PST by UnbelievingScumOnTheOtherSide (Give Them Liberty Or Give Them Death! - Islam Delenda Est! - Rumble thee forth...)
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To: peyton randolph

P I N G


37 posted on 03/23/2005 12:48:03 AM PST by AnimalLover ( ((Are there special rules and regulations for the big guys?)))
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To: Rome2000
I find it unbeleievable that some demented lawyers in a black dress are more powerful than the POTUS and Congress.

Supposedly the judiciary makes rulings based on laws passed by the legislative branch and signed by the executive.

It falls apart when the judiciary can't, or refuses to, read and understand the clear meaning of the legislation.

38 posted on 03/23/2005 12:48:51 AM PST by D-fendr
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To: peyton randolph; lainie; Petronski; Salamander; Libertina; Liz; Baynative; CyberCowboy777; ...
Hold them guilty, O God; By their own devices let them fall! In the multitude of their transgressions thrust them out, For they are rebellious against You. -- Psalm 5:10

"A quick-tempered man acts foolishly, And a man of evil devices is hated." -- Proverbs 14:17

"Behold, I have found only this, that God made men upright, but they have sought out many devices." -- Ecclesiastes 7:29

39 posted on 03/23/2005 12:49:00 AM PST by The Spirit Of Allegiance (ATTN. MARXIST RED MSM: I RESENT your "RED STATE" switcheroo using our ELECTORAL MAP as PROPAGANDA!)
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To: expatguy
None of this is FOR Terri. It is FOR those who want her dead.

They will walk away from a mountain of legal documents and say they did everything they possibly could to save Terri. When all they really had to do was feed her.

Wow. You say so damn much in so few words.

Great post.

40 posted on 03/23/2005 12:49:14 AM PST by AHerald ("Do not fear, only believe" - Mark 5.36)
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