Bush Nominates Weapons Expert as Envoy to U.N.

WASHINGTON, March 7 - President Bush on Monday named John R. Bolton, a blunt-spoken conservative known for his sharp skepticism of the United Nations and international diplomacy, as the new American ambassador to the world organization.

Administration officials said his appointment would strengthen efforts to hold the United Nations to effective standards. But the nomination brought expressions of concern from many diplomats speaking on the condition that they not be identified by name or country, many of whom noted that Mr. Bolton had been scathing in his criticism of the United Nations.

"He is a tough-minded diplomat, he has a strong record of success and he has a proven track record of effective multilateralism," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said at the State Department in making the announcement. "Through history, some of our best ambassadors have been those with the strongest voices, ambassadors like Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick Moynihan."

Secretary General Kofi Annan of the United Nations, informed of the appointment by Ms. Rice on Monday morning, said through a spokesman that he looked forward to working with Mr. Bolton.

Mr. Bolton, 56, is a lawyer who has worked in federal government, mostly in the State Department, for most of the past 25 years. For the past four, he has served as under secretary of state for arms control and international security affairs. Now, his elevation would put him in perhaps the most visible diplomatic job outside that of Ms. Rice.

As examples of his record on diplomacy, Ms. Rice cited the Treaty of Moscow, which reduces nuclear warheads while permitting an antimissile system; nuclear negotiations with Libya; and the Proliferation Security Initiative, which seeks to interdict the shipment of dangerous arms.

The nomination brought strong praise from many Republicans and conservatives. "He's been our man at the State Department," said David Keene, chairman of the American Conservative Union, adding that he used to joke that Mr. Bolton was in charge of the department's "American desk."

Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee, the majority leader, called Mr. Bolton an "outstanding candidate" for the United Nations job. Senator Chuck Hagel, a Nebraska Republican, expressed caution, however.

"We need alliances, we need friends," he said of the United Nations, adding that while reforming the organization was important, "To go up there and kick the U.N. around doesn't get the job done."

Even within the Bush administration, some said they were surprised that Mr. Bolton, who only last fall angered a room full of diplomats when he spoke disdainfully of the European effort to negotiate with Iran, was picked for such a sensitive job.

While the diplomats and administration insiders who raised questions did so anonymously because of the sensitivity of the nomination, in the Senate, where he will have to be confirmed, Democrats publicly criticized the appointment. Some Republicans predicted that he might have difficulty winning confirmation.

"This is a disappointing choice and one that sends all the wrong signals," said Senator Harry Reid of Nevada, the Democratic leader.

Mr. Bolton, a former protégé of Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, once said that "if the U.N. secretary building in New York lost 10 stories, it wouldn't make a bit of difference" and that "there's no such thing as the United Nations."

An aide to one ambassador at the United Nations Security Council said his boss considered the nomination "a disaster," but he added: "The real question is what is Bolton's mission. Does he come here to attack the institution, or does he really come here to help the U.N.?"

Within the administration, Mr. Bolton was known as the State Department's chief skeptic about efforts to negotiate an end to the twin crises posed by Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs. He has also criticized any effort to work with the International Criminal Court.

During a particularly sensitive moment in talks with North Korea in August 2003, he described Kim Jong Il, the North's leader, as a "tyrannical dictator" of a place where "life is a hellish nightmare." North Korea then labeled him "human scum" that it would refuse to deal with.

One administration official said, however, that even though Mr. Bolton was "confrontational and in your face," he had won the admiration of critics because of his effectiveness, particularly on lining up European and Asian nations to carry out naval and other military exercises to practice interdicting arms and contraband shipped to and from Iran and North Korea.

"He can be very persuasive," said the official. "The question is whether at the U.N. he will stay in his lane. A lot of policies don't necessarily get made in New York."

During Mr. Bush's first term, Mr. Bolton worked closely, though not always easily, with Secretary of State Colin L. Powell. He was closer in his views to Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

A top Republican foreign policy official close to the administration said that it was well understood that Mr. Bolton might alienate Europeans, but that Mr. Cheney had pushed for him for the United Nations job.

Another Republican foreign policy official said the administration was also ignoring the warnings of Senator Richard G. Lugar, the Indiana Republican who is chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. This official said Mr. Lugar had told the administration that Mr. Bolton could not be confirmed for a job that he had been discussed for earlier, deputy secretary of state.

Mr. Lugar did not issue a statement, and an aide said he had assured Ms. Rice that the nomination would be considered swiftly and fairly. But with the Foreign Relations Committee balanced between 10 Republicans and 8 Democrats, it was not clear whether his nomination might be blocked.

Supporters of Mr. Bolton said he would be able to convince the Senate and public that he was committed to a reformed United Nations working effectively. Ms. Rice noted that he had been an assistant secretary of state for international organizations 15 years ago, serving as a liaison with the United Nations and helping to press for repeal of the resolution that equated Zionism and racism.

"John Bolton is personally committed to the future success of the United Nations," Ms. Rice said, "and he will be a strong voice for reform at a time when the United Nations has begun to reform itself to help meet the challenging agenda before the international community."

David D. Kirkpatrick contributed reporting from Washington for this article, and Warren Hoge from the United Nations.

I THOUGHT Bolton was the same guy (and I found out I was right after a Google search) who basically told the UN to take a hike when it came to their desire to talk about small arms reduction around the world on THEIR terms - by lumping illicit and LEGAL small arms trade and ownership together. Just like our home-grown anti-gun goons, the UN wants to ban all of them from private ownership and use. I did a Google search on "Bolton UN small arms", and came up with the article and statement below that shows the world-wide anti-gun hand-wringers are extremely frustrated with Mr. Bolton and our President. God bless America, our President, and Ambassador Bolton...

United States Weakens Outcome of UN Small Arms and Light Weapons Conference

From July 9 to 21, the United Nations served as the battleground for the first global meeting on the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. Countries came together in New York to develop an international action plan to deal with this issue, but the United States and an army of unlikely bedfellows did all they could to derail the conference’s efforts. Although the meeting managed to produce a program of action, the plan that was formulated is inadequate to deal with the myriad problems caused by small arms, and many countries and observers left the conference disappointed.

The conference was the culmination of many years of UN small arms initiatives, which started with then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1995 “Agenda for Peace” and resulted in meetings of experts in 1997 and 1999. In line with the latter meeting’s recommendations, the United Nations voted in December 1999 to hold the small arms conference, and preparatory meetings were held in February 2000 and this past January and March.

Many governments hoped that the conference would serve as the launching point for processes that would result in agreements on marking and tracing weapons, regulation of arms brokers, and strict export criteria for small arms. They also wanted the conference to address the humanitarian consequences of unregulated small arms proliferation and to establish a framework for action on small arms at the national, regional, and global levels.

But the United States’ dramatic and controversial position at the conference quashed most of these hopes. John Bolton, undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, set the tone for U.S. participation with his July 9 opening statement, which other participants described as “undiplomatic” and “un-UN-like.” In his remarks, Bolton laid out the U.S. position with stark clarity, emphasizing that the conference should tackle only the illicit transfer of military-style weapons and should not discuss firearms and non-military rifles—the very weapons that are responsible for the most death and devastation caused each year by small arms.

Bolton further outlined “redline” issues that Washington viewed as unacceptable for inclusion in the conference’s program of action. These included restricting civilian ownership of weapons, limiting the legal trade and manufacture of small arms, restricting small arms sales to nongovernmental entities, committing to begin discussions on legally binding agreements, holding a mandatory review conference, and promoting international advocacy by nongovernmental and international organizations.

During the preparatory process, a significant number of countries had urged including many of these issues in the action program. With the majority of U.S. allies strongly supporting action on these items, the United States was isolated and forced to take the floor more often than it otherwise would have to voice its opposition. Bolton’s speech went far beyond what had been previously enunciated by Washington (despite assertions to the contrary by many U.S. officials throughout the conference) and put the U.S. delegation on the defensive, forcing it to take a reactive, rather than proactive, position.

The U.S. stance was based on three underlying principles. First, Washington did not want the conference’s recommendations to be more restrictive than those made by the UN experts’ 1999 report or than the policies of the Clinton administration.

Second, the Bush team wanted to placate the U.S. gun lobby, which has close ties to the administration and used the conference as a major fundraising and mobilizing event. For example, the U.S. delegation adamantly argued against a proposal on creating norms and legal standards for civilian gun ownership even though the proposal was less restrictive than existing U.S. law. In fact, the U.S. delegation offered language explicitly recognizing the legitimate civilian uses of small arms.

Third, the administration wanted to avoid the perception that the United Nations and other countries could influence U.S. policies and laws on weapons possession and transfers. It did not want the action program to include language that could be used to call for changes in U.S. policy or law, even though the program of action being negotiated was only a voluntary, non-legally binding agreement.

While deliberating on the most divisive small arms issues—restricting sales to non-state actors, limiting civilian possession of weapons, enhancing transparency on small arms transfers, establishing export criteria, and following up on the conference’s action program—some delegations made hard-line statements but later modified their positions. The United States, however, never backed off from the positions outlined in Bolton’s speech. Its only concession was on the issue of holding a review conference. Even then, the U.S. delegation only accepted a review conference process that was weaker than most others wanted.

In fact, the United States came close to blocking agreement on the action program by refusing to allow the document to mention restrictions on civilian weapons possession and sales to non-state actors, a topic of great importance to several African states. At the last moment, however, the Africans backed down to allow agreement on and conclusion of the document. In doing so, they put the importance of the UN process, and progress on small arms issues in general, over their own deeply held belief of what items should be included in the action program.

The other conference participants found the U.S. position particularly frustrating because, ironically, the United States already has some of the world’s best laws and regulations on controlling small arms. Beyond the 20,000 laws on ownership and possession constantly referred to by the National Rifle Association, the United States has taken the lead internationally in setting standards on arms exports, end-use monitoring, and arms brokering. Furthermore, Washington is already involved, unilaterally and bilaterally, in destruction and technical and financial assistance programs to reduce the number of illicit and legal weapons in global circulation. At the UN conference, the United States refused to push for higher international standards in an area where its own laws far exceed the international norm.

U.S. posturing also allowed other countries to hide behind the U.S. stance and remain quiet in their opposition to many issues. In fact, the United States ended up becoming silent partners with China, Cuba, and other “rogue” states, rather than working with its closest allies.

But the United States was not the only country to subordinate the conference’s goals to domestic concerns. China, for example, blocked a mandate to develop a regime to mark and trace weapons, in a bid to avoid changing its unique marking system and disclosing the recipients of its small arms exports. Furthermore, many Arab states used the conference as a venue to push issues outside the conference’s realm, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Arab states also said that they did not want to develop a system for enhancing transparency on small arms holdings and transfers until an effective mechanism for increasing transparency on the possession and transfer of weapons of mass destruction had been created.

As a result of being forced to cater to the lowest common denominator, the conference produced a weak action program that lacked important items included in earlier drafts and proposals. For example, the document has no provisions to launch processes that could eventually result in legally binding agreements on brokering and marking and tracing weapons. It also fails to encourage states to adopt legal measures to control small arms possession domestically or to enhance international transparency mechanisms on transfers and holdings.

Nevertheless, although the conference did not go as far as it could have to develop a comprehensive framework for international action on small arms, reaching consensus on an action program was still an important step forward. The program of action fosters future national, regional, and global work on small arms by providing a framework for donor states and countries adversely impacted by small arms to allocate resources and efforts.

The document also encourages enhancing programs on disarmament, demobilizing soldiers into civilians, and reintegrating soldiers into civil society. Furthermore, it advocates greater weapons stockpile security and organized destruction of surplus and illicit weapons. If implemented, such steps would help countries to rebuild political, social, and economic infrastructures damaged by the uncontrolled spread of small arms.

Additionally, the program of action refers to the cost of small arms on children and development, recognizing the grave humanitarian consequences caused by small arms proliferation and expanding the dialogue on small arms outside the disarmament realm.

On the follow-up issue, the conference ensured continued international action on small arms proliferation by agreeing to convene another conference by 2006 and to hold biennial conferences to gauge progress on implementing the action program. (The program of action is vague on how the two conference tracks relate to one another.) The action program also provides a framework for continued future collaboration among like-minded states and nongovernmental organizations.

Although international work on small arms will continue, even with a weaker program of action than was originally hoped for, the arrogant attitude the United States projected during the conference may be harder to overcome. The United States’ domestic political pandering and unwillingness to compromise left many governments and observers discouraged with Washington. Of particular concern was the United States’ go-it-alone attitude, exemplified by repeated U.S. assertions that, regardless of the program of action produced, it would work unilaterally and bilaterally on small arms issues where it deemed appropriate.

The small arms conference concluded the same week the United States refused to participate in the Kyoto environmental agreement, rejected a draft accord to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, and solidified its position on withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, distancing itself from its allies. How this disconnect between the positions of the United States and its allies will affect U.S. work in the United Nations and future multilateral discussions remains to be seen. But the United States could have and should have been a leader at the UN conference. Instead, the conference served to solidify the Bush administration’s perceived arrogance and penchant for exceptionalism on all things international.

Author(s): Rachel Stohl

Mr. Bolton's statement to the UN conference at the time...

John R. Bolton Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs Statement to the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects July 9, 2001

USUN PRESS RELEASE # 104 (01) July 9, 2001

AS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY

Statement by John R. Bolton, United States Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, to the Plenary Session of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects, July 9, 2001

Excellencies and distinguished colleagues, it is my honor and privilege to present United States views at this United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.

The abstract goals and objectives of this Conference are laudable. Attacking the global illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SA/LW) is an important initiative which the international community should, indeed must, address because of its wide ranging effects. The illicit trade in SA/LW can be used to exacerbate conflict, threaten civilian populations in regions of conflict, endanger the work of peacekeeping forces and humanitarian aid workers, and greatly complicate the hard work of economically and politically rebuilding war-torn societies. Alleviating these problems is in all of our interest.

Small arms and light weapons, in our understanding, are the strictly military arms -- automatic rifles, machine guns, shoulder-fired missile and rocket systems, light mortars -- that are contributing to continued violence and suffering in regions of conflict around the world. We separate these military arms from firearms such as hunting rifles and pistols, which are commonly owned and used by citizens in many countries. As U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft has said, "just as the First and Fourth Amendments secure individual rights of speech and security respectively, the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms." The United States believes that the responsible use of firearms is a legitimate aspect of national life. Like many countries, the United States has a cultural tradition of hunting and sport shooting. We, therefore, do not begin with the presumption that all small arms and light weapons are the same or that they are all problematic. It is the illicit trade in military small arms and light weapons that we are gathered here to address and that should properly concern us.

The United States goes to great lengths to ensure that small arms and light weapons transferred under our jurisdiction are done so with the utmost responsibility. The transfer of all military articles of U.S. origin are subject to extremely rigorous procedures under the U.S. Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations. All U.S. exports of defense articles and services, including small arms and light weapons, must be approved by the Department of State. Assurances must be given by the importing country that arms will be used in a manner consistent with our criteria for arms exports: they must not contribute to regional instability, arms races, terrorism, proliferation, or violations of human rights. Arms of U.S. origin cannot be retransferred without approval by the United States. To ensure that arms are delivered to legitimate end-users, our government rigorously monitors arms transfers, investigating suspicious activity and acting quickly to curtail exports to those recipients who do not meet our strict criteria for responsible use. In the past five years, the United States has conducted thousands of end-use checks, interdicted thousands of illicit arms shipments at U.S. ports of exit, and cut-off exports entirely to five countries due to their failure to properly manage U.S. origin defense articles.

All commercial exporters of arms in the United States must be registered as brokers and submit each transaction for government licensing approval. Our brokering law is comprehensive, extending over citizens and foreign nationals in the United States, and also U.S. citizens operating abroad.

Believing that it is in our interest to stem the illicit trade in military arms, the United States has avidly promoted and supported such international activities as the Wassenaar Arrangement and the UN Register of Conventional Arms. Bilaterally, we offer our financial and technical assistance all over the world to mitigate the illicit trade in SA/LW. We have worked with countries to develop national legislation to regulate exports and imports of arms, and to better enforce their laws. We have provided training, technical assistance, and funds to improve border security and curb arms smuggling in many areas of the world where this problem is rampant. And in the past year, we have instituted a program to assist countries in conflict-prone regions to secure or destroy excess and illicit stocks of small arms and light weapons.

We are proud of our record, and would hope that the Program of Action would encourage all nations to adopt similar practices. Our practical experience with these problems reflects our view of how best to prevent the illicit trade in SA/LW. Our focus is on addressing the problem where it is most acute and the risks are highest: regions of conflict and instability. We strongly support measures in the draft Program of Action calling for effective export and import controls, restraint in trade to regions of conflict, observance and enforcement of UNSC embargoes, strict regulation of arms brokers, transparency in exports, and improving security of arms stockpiles and destruction of excess. These measures, taken together, form the core of a regime that, if accepted by all countries, would greatly mitigate the problems we all have gathered here to address.

There are, however, aspects of the draft Program of Action that we cannot support. Some activities inscribed in the Program are beyond the scope of what is appropriate for international action and should remain issues for national lawmakers in member states. Other proposals divert our attention from practical, effective measures to attack the problem of the illicit trade in SA/LW where it is most needed. This diffusion of focus is, indeed, the Program's chief defect, mixing together as it does legitimate areas for international cooperation and action and areas that are properly left to decisions made through the exercise of popular sovereignty by participating governments:

We do not support measures that would constrain legal trade and legal manufacturing of small arms and light weapons. The vast majority of arms transfers in the world are routine and not problematic. Each member state of the United Nations has the right to manufacture and export arms for purposes of national defense. Diversions of the legal arms trade that become "illicit" are best dealt with through effective export controls. To label all manufacturing and trade as "part of the problem" is inaccurate and counterproductive. Accordingly, we would ask that language in Section II, paragraph 4 be changed to establish the principle of legitimacy of the legal trade, manufacturing and possession of small arms and light weapons, and acknowledge countries that already have in place adequate laws, regulations and procedures over the manufacture, stockpiling, transfer and possession of small arms and light weapons.

We do not support the promotion of international advocacy activity by international or non-governmental organizations, particularly when those political or policy views advocated are not consistent with the views of all member states. What individual governments do in this regard is for them to decide, but we do not regard the international governmental support of particular political viewpoints to be consistent with democratic principles. Accordingly, the provisions of the draft Program that contemplate such activity should be modified or eliminated.

We do not support measures that prohibit civilian possession of small arms. This is outside the mandate for this Conference set forth in UNGA Resolution 54/54V. We agree with the recommendation of the 1999 UN Panel of Governmental Experts that laws and procedures governing the possession of small arms by civilians are properly left to individual member states. The United States will not join consensus on a final document that contains measures abrogating the Constitutional right to bear arms. We request that Section II, para 20, which refers to restrictions on the civilian possession of arms to be eliminated from the Program of Action, and that other provisions which purport to require national regulation of the lawful possession of firearms such as Section II, paras 7 and 10 be modified to confine their reach to illicit international activities.

We do not support measures limiting trade in SA/LW solely to governments. This proposal, we believe, is both conceptually and practically flawed. It is so broad that in the absence of a clear definition of small arms and light weapons, it could be construed as outlawing legitimate international trade in all firearms. Violent non-state groups at whom this proposal is presumably aimed are unlikely to obtain arms through authorized channels. Many of them continue to receive arms despite being subject to legally-binding UNSC embargoes. Perhaps most important, this proposal would preclude assistance to an oppressed non-state group defending itself from a genocidal government. Distinctions between governments and non-governments are irrelevant in determining responsible and irresponsible end-users of arms.

The United States also will not support a mandatory Review Conference, as outlined in Section IV, which serves only to institutionalize and bureaucratize this process. We would prefer that meetings to review progress on the implementation of the Program of Action be decided by member states as needed, responding not to an arbitrary timetable, but specific problems faced in addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Neither will we, at this time, commit to begin negotiations and reach agreement on any legally binding instruments, the feasibility and necessity of which may be in question and in need of review over time.

Through its national practices, laws, and assistance programs, through its diplomatic engagement in all regions of the world, the United States has demonstrated its commitment to countering the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. During the next two weeks, we will work cooperatively with all member states to develop a final document which is legitimate, practical, effective, and which can be accepted by all nations. As we work toward this goal over the next two weeks, we must keep in mind those suffering in the regions of the world where help is most desperately needed and for whom the success of this Conference is most crucial.

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