Posted on 02/03/2005 8:03:22 AM PST by Valin
Earlier this week, millions of Iraqis turned out to vote in the country’s first free election in over 50 years. They battled violence and intimidation to cast their ballots, determined to overcome terrorism and create self-government. Despite several terrorist attacks, mostly by suicide bombers, the Iraqis celebrated their freedom with fingers stained purple as proof of having cast a ballot. The incidents, fewer in number than had been feared, could not destroy the feeling of joy among the Iraqi people of being able to have a voice in the election. One man, a Sunni engineer and ex-soldier said of the historical events, “I want to thank the U.S. soldiers for bringing this to Iraq…Without them, we would have to vote for Saddam always." For the Iraqi people, democracy does not just mean the ability to choose a leader, it means freedom from dictators and oppression. As our Sunni friend said, "I think today will show these terrorists lost their chance in this country.”
A few years ago, however, the people of Iraq did not have much cause for celebration. They lived in constant fear of terrorists and violent dictators in a war torn country. In 2003, The American Enterprise published the first national poll of the Iraqi public. Opinions from the poll are a “half-full/half-empty glass,” but the overriding theme was optimism. The results from the poll were published in the December 2003 issue.
What Iraqis Really Think By Karl Zinsmeister
In Iraq, as in all countries, there are extremists, apathetic people, optimists, individuals with conflicted views, and a large body in the middle of most questions. The most basic thing I take from TAE's new poll findings is that Iraq is much less fanatical, more mixed in its views, and more manageable, than we might have imagined.
The three most prominent nightmare scenarios for Iraq are that it will 1) cling to Saddamism, or 2) become a hotbed for al-Qaeda-style jihadism, or 3) follow Iran down the path of mullah-ridden theocracy. I believe this poll shows that none of those three worries are very plausible.
Our question about whether the Baathists should be punished or forgiven gave Iraqis a chance to let bygones be bygones with the previous regime. But a thoroughly disgusted and unforgiving Iraqi public would have none of it, stating emphatically (by 4 to 1) that Saddam's henchmen should be punished. So forget about a Baath Party revival in Iraq.
I believe you can also cross out "bin Laden romance" from the list of potential disasters. Of Iraqis with an opinion, nearly six out of ten have an unfavorable view of Osama bin Laden--with 41 percent of them saying it is a very unfavorable view. (Women are especially down on him.)
There is a bit of a glass half-full/half-empty aspect to this. Upon seeing the significant minority of Iraqis who express sympathy for bin Laden, a friend who is a New York Times reporter suggested it's a serious problem that there is any support for him. I suggested that the right comparison in this case is to places like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan--where bin Laden is a folk hero to many people. And those are our closest regional allies! Keep in mind we're talking about the Middle East here, not exactly the land of moderation and Ameriphilia. I suggest the attitudes expressed by Iraqis are ones we can work with, as we do in other Middle Eastern countries.
When you look closely at the demographic cross-tabulations you see something interesting. The "Very unfavorables" toward bin Laden outrank the "Very favorables" by 2.5:1 in Mosul, by almost 4:1 in Basra, by 6:1 in Kirkuk. Only in Ramadi is the al-Qaeda boss popular--more than two thirds of his "Very favorable" responses come from that single location. I take this as one more aspect of the Sunni triangle/Baathist estrangement from the U.S. (the enemy of my enemy is my friend).
The third mega-worry for Iraq is that it could repeat the Iranian disaster by turning into an Islamic theocracy. So we asked everyday Iraqis whether their country should have an Islamic government. Only a third said yes, a solid 60 percent said no. A vital detail: Shiites (whom Western reporters frequently portray as selfflagellating ayatollah-maniacs-in-waiting) are least receptive to the idea of an Islamic government, saying "No" by 66 to 27 percent. It is only among the minority Sunnis that there is interest in a religious state, and even they are split evenly on the question.
Perhaps the strongest indication that an Islamic government won't be part of Iraq's future: The nation is quite secularized. With fully 43 percent of respondents telling us they "never" attended Islam's Friday prayer over the previous month, you can pretty confidently scratch an Ayatollah Khomeini rerun from the Iraq critics' list of morbid fears.
This is reinforced by the findings when we asked Iraqis to name one country they would most like their nation to model its new government on. The alternatives we offered in our question were chosen carefully: Syria is not only one of Iraq's immediate neighbors but also the Middle East's other Baathist republic. Saudi Arabia is also a neighbor and the leading Islamic monarchy. Iran is an Islamist republic. Egypt is the lodestar of the Arab world. Our fifth choice was the U.S.
It's significant that the U.S. was the most popular model by far. Among Iraqis choosing one of our five possibilities, America was preferred by 37 percent--more than neighboring Syria plus neighboring Iran plus Egypt all put together. Saudi Arabia ended up in second place at 28 percent. Again there were important demographic splits. Younger adults are especially favorable toward the U.S., and Shiites are more admiring than Sunnis. Interestingly, Iraqi Shiites (who are co-religionists with Iranians) do not admire Iran's Islamist government: The U.S. is six times more popular than Iran with them as a model for governance.
Iraqi opinions on democracy are another half-full/half-empty glass. Many residents are nervous about democracy, with five out of ten suggesting democracy may not work in Iraq, one out of ten saying they aren't sure, and four out of ten saying democracy can work for their nation. Given that democracy is something brand new to the region, something no Iraqis have any local experience with, I find this not unexpected or especially troubling. Self government is a concept the people of Iraq will have to work their way into. I wouldn't look for world-leading freedom right away, but if Iraq can develop just a rough democracy of the sort that we have helped set up in the Balkans, that will be a great improvement, and the foundation for future improvements.
There already seems to be enough abstract confidence in democracy among Iraqis to get that process started. And here again there were interesting demographic divergences beneath the surface. Sunnis were negative on democracy by more than 2:1, but, critically, the majority Shiites were as likely to say democracy would work for Iraqis as not. People age 18-29 are much more rosy about democracy than older Iraqis, and women are significantly more positive than men.
My final reason for being reasonably optimistic about Iraq's future is that most Iraqis themselves are. Seven out of ten say they expect both their country and their personal lives will be better five years hence. To American ears, that may not seem so exceptional. But keep in mind that nothing in Iraq's past justifies any optimism about the future. Per capita income in the country last year was one tenth the level of when Saddam first took power two decades earlier. This is a country that has been on a horrible downward slide for a long time. If so many Iraqis are currently expressing hope, that is a sign that they believe the regime change America has launched is fundamentally a good thing.
None of this is to suggest the task ahead will be simple. Inchoate anxiety toward the U.S. showed up when we asked Iraqis whether they thought America would help or hurt Iraq in the future, with significantly more choosing hurt than help. This is fairly understandable: Iraqis have just lived through a war where Americans were (necessarily) flinging most of the ammunition.
That may explain why Iraqi women (who are more anti-military in all cultures) show up in our data as especially wary of the U.S. right now. Though U.S. forces made heroic efforts to spare innocents in this war (as I illustrate with many first-hand examples in my just-published book about the battles), war is never pleasant.
Perhaps the ultimate indication of how comfortable Iraqis are with America's aims in their region came when we asked how long they would like to see American and British forces remain in their country. The fact that two thirds of Iraqis questioned urged that the coalition troops should stick around for at least another year indicates that the radicals trying to drive us out immediately do not represent the views of average residents.
It's those ordinary Iraqis we need to remember as we work to establish an island of decency in the Middle East, not the extremists who are so good at catching the ears and cameras of Western reporters.
Editor in chief Karl Zinsmeister is J. B. Fuqua Fellow at AEI, and author of Boots on the Ground: A Month with the 82nd Airborne in the Battle for Iraq, just published.
Sailing on the Right Course By Thomas Donnelly
Is it possible to "transform" the politics of Iraq--and the greater Middle East--to make them more democratic? President Bush has long believed it is.His January 2002 State of the Union address is best remembered for the "Axis of Evil," but it also defined the "greater objective" of the global war on terror as recognition of liberty and justice throughout a region where these have long been dismissed. "No nation is exempt" from these "true and unchanging" principles, the President declared.
The Bush Doctrine and the President's speeches were never premised entirely, or even primarily, on the dangers posed by Osama bin Laden or Saddam Hussein, though these were very real. The fullest expression of President Bush's vision of democratic transformation came in his speech to the American Enterprise Institute on February 28. "There was a time," he said, "when many said that the cultures of Japan and Germany were incapable of sustaining democratic values. Some say the same of Iraq today. They are mistaken."
Even today, both the Left and Right critiques of the President's Iraq policy are imbued with the idea that this greater objective is unattainable, even hubristic. The Left's critique stresses the arrogance of American power: No military action is legitimate without the blessing of the United Nations. The Right's critique stresses the arrogance of American principles: Liberty is an unalienable right here, but beyond our shores it can be dangerously destabilizing.
The TAE poll, as well as the Gallup poll that followed it in September, strongly suggests that President Bush is right and his critics are wrong. Iraqis are naturally nervous about the uncertainty that comes with their newfound freedom, but they also believe that their lives will be better in the future. They seem to understand, as Churchill did, that democracy is the worst system of government, except for all the others.
The poll also indicates that the transformation of Iraqi politics, though possible, is far from inevitable. Iraqis understand that the shift will take time, and that the United States must stay engaged in order to achieve it. That a majority of Iraqis hope Americans will stay in their country for at least another year is far more significant than any desire to immediately reclaim their sovereignty. Iraqis naturally want both liberty and full sovereignty--but it's the "liberty" part that is new and most valuable.
Finally, these poll data provide some confirmation that the administration's strategy to win the counterinsurgency war and Iraqi hearts and minds is probably working. With the sustainment of the American military presence and the acceleration of reconstruction, reflected in the President's recent request for $87 billion in supplemental spending, the chances of realizing the Iraqis' hopes for the future have increased.
In sum, the course set by President Bush seems a true one. Now is the time to make more sail.
Tom Donnelly is an AEI fellow in defense and national security studies.
The Iraqis Our Elites Don't Know By Danielle Pletka
Inundated as we are by non-stop negative coverage, it's hard to believe there is a positive story to tell in Iraq. Our papers and screens are filled with roadside bombs, slain soldiers, and occasional swarthy, gesticulating Iraqis. Those huddled masses of Iraqis yearning to breathe free (or did they like Saddam?) might as well not exist.
The TAE poll is, for most Americans, a first glimpse into the silent world of the average Iraqi. Oddly, he is nothing like the Iraqi painted by our elites. By 4 to 1, the ordinary Iraqi thinks his country is better off without Saddam. By almost 7 to 1, he is more hopeful for his own future absent Saddam. By almost 2 to 1, he doesn't want an Islamic government.
This glimpse can be rounded out with a scan of the stories we didn't read in this month's papers. For example, 300,000 mourners at the funeral of murdered Shia spiritual leader Baqir Al-Hakim did not massacre, or call for the massacre of, Sunnis. Nor did they whip up an anti-American frenzy. The troubles in Basra have been followed by calm. Kurds and Arabs are not killing each other in Mosul and Kirkuk. The story that isn't written, more often than not, is the most telling about post-Saddam Iraq.
But how to exploit this good news? Sadly, the U.S. government has been, for the most part, uninterested in the average Iraqi revealed by this poll. Rather, the quasi-colonial Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has institutionalized all that was wrong with Saddam's Iraq. Saddam honed the divisions within his country, pitting Shia against Sunni and Sunni against Kurd, tribal leaders against urban masses and Islamist against secularist. The CPA has cemented those fractious contingents in the ethnically and religiously gerrymandered Iraqi Governing Council.
The CPA should have fostered the growth of political parties that would shatter Saddam's old social divisions. That can still happen, but time is running out. The nation's organized extremists, Islamists and Baathists, are occupying the political space, and those huddled Iraqi masses have no organization, no spokesman, no voice.
More embarrassing than Washington's lack of commitment to genuine representative democracy is its dismissal of the Iraqi people's potential to govern themselves. A recent Washington Post article was liberally sprinkled with derisive comments from U.S. officials about the Governing Council. Visitors to Iraq, including several members of Congress, have returned with tales of official American condescension and contempt for Iraqis.
The most frustrating evidence of U.S. contempt for Iraqi potential lies in Washington's failure even to try to educate average Iraqis about their new government, about democracy, about the ongoing constitutional process, or about civil society. Is it any wonder that 50 percent of Iraqis polled believe Western democracy can never work in Iraq (versus a hopeful 38 percent)?
The Iraqi people deserve a genuine liberation, but they can't get one from American diplomats walled up in a compound in Baghdad, contemptuous of those swarthy, gesticulating folk on the outside.
Danielle Pletka is vice president, foreign and defense policy studies, at AEI.
Second Thoughts on Success By Lawrence Kaplan
Appearing on NBC's "Meet the Press" on September 14, Vice President Cheney applauded the TAE poll for having revealed "very positive news…with respect to [Iraqi] attitudes of what Americans have done." It is not at all clear from which of the survey's findings Cheney managed to glean "very positive news." True, more Iraqis choose the United States as a model than, say, Saudi Arabia or Egypt. True, Iraq's Shiites seem fairly optimistic about the prospects for democracy in a land that for decades has known only dictatorship. And, true, most Iraqis have no use for an Islamic theocracy. On the most important questions of the day, however, I believe the poll yields something other than very positive news.
To begin with, half of all respondents say Western democracy will not work in Iraq, versus 38 percent who believe it will. More respondents than not believe the United States will hurt Iraq over the long run, while a clear majority would prefer that Washington and London play no role in reconstituting Iraq's government. In a similar vein, 66 percent of Iraqis believe that U.S. and British forces should stay in Iraq for one more year or less. And while it is true that more Iraqis would choose the United States as a model when set against Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt, or Iran separately, it is also true that most Iraqis prefer a government modeled after one or the other of those Arab states.
During the run-up to the war in Iraq, many commentators, including the Vice President, various administration spokesmen, and this reporter, blithely predicted that the Iraqi people would greet their American liberators with bread and salt. Hence, during the early days of the occupation, U.S. authorities took a decidedly libertarian approach to the management of Iraq's affairs, rather than wielding the heavy hand that circumstances clearly required. I believe this was a costly mistake, for instead of gratitude, too many Iraqis have greeted us with sullen expressions, complaints, and improvised explosive devices. None of this, however, seems to have made the slightest impression on many of the war's architects, whose dogmas--the sufficiency of current troop levels in Iraq, the claim that $87 billion will suffice to put the country back together again, and the assumption that Iraqis will step into an administrative vacuum that I believe only Americans can fill--have blinded them to disturbing trends on the ground. This is not to say that Iraq is incapable of democracy, much less stability. But either the United States will ensure--or, to use an unpopular term, impose--both democracy and stability in Iraq, or the country will never come to know either.
The task may not be so difficult in the Kurdish north or the Shiite south, which have been mostly quiet. That comes as good news indeed, but for Americans counting casualties on the evening news, it is also irrelevant. As this poll points out, Iraq's Sunnis maintain a decidedly anti-Western bent, and it is in the Sunni triangle that America's occupation will ultimately succeed or fail. "If the small number of militants conducting sabotage and murder inside the country can gradually be dispatched to paradise by American troopers," Karl Zinsmeister writes in the Wall Street Journal, "then the mass of citizens living along the Tigris-Euphrates Valley are likely to make reasonably sensible use of their new freedom." Undoubtedly true, but whether these militants can be successfully dispatched remains a rather large "if." They have already maimed upwards of 1,700 Americans, and wound another 10 every day. Perhaps the answer lies in new tactics, looser rules of engagement, more troops, or better intelligence. Wherever it lies, this much is evident: America's stamina, as measured in U.S. opinion surveys, is eroding quickly under the weight of these attacks. And it is that body of opinion, not the opinions of ordinary Iraqis, that will decide America's fate in the Middle East.
Lawrence F. Kaplan is a senior editor at The New Republic and a Hudson Institute fellow.
Grounds for Hope By Ben Wattenberg
The TAE survey is not a slam-dunk, but it does give grounds for hope. Young people are more optimistic than their elders. That bodes well for the future. Iraqis want to work things out for themselves; that is the native impulse behind democracy and individual liberty, or at least it can be. Many Iraqis have at least some college education, and it turns out they are the people most likely to support democratic values.
Two thirds of the Iraqi population does not want a theocratic government. That's very good news. The survey says that Iraqis think the U.N. is more likely to help Iraq than is the U.S. I doubt that, but no one's perfect.
America's primal mission and broadest international goal, beyond self-defense, is to defend and extend the writ of individual liberty. When this is possible, and there is something worth fighting for, we have been prepared to flex our military muscle. In all, the results have been positive. Strength has paid off.
We should have a balanced perspective of Arab/Muslim demography. Arabs and Muslims are many in number; they are not ten feet tall.
There are about 275 million Arabs, and 1.2 billion Muslims. Almost one out of six human beings is a follower of Islam. There is a belief afloat that the Islamic countries have "exploding" populations. That is not correct. The Arab/Muslim population will grow for a few decades, but their birth and fertility rates are sinking rapidly--faster even than those of the Europeans did at a similar stage of development.
It takes about 2.2 children per woman (the Total Fertility Rate, or TFR) just to "replace" the population in a society with Middle Eastern-level lifespans. In recent decades the TFR in Egypt has fallen from 7.1 to 2.9 births per woman. In Syria it went from 7.8 to 3.6, in Lebanon from 6.4 to 2.2, in Tunisia from 7.2 to 2.1. In Iraq from 7.2 to 4.8--still very high, but falling rapidly. In Iran,with its theocratic Muslim government, the TFR has fallen to about replacement level. Arabs and Muslims aren't necessarily going to inherit the world anytime soon.
The eyes of the world are fixed on the Middle East. It is the biggest story of our day. If we can win there, one way or the other, wholly or partly, intermediate term or long term, it will be a very big victory for American values. Progress in Iraq would bring the world a giant step closer to individual, economic, political, and social liberty.
The game is worth the candle.
Ben Wattenberg is a senior fellow at AEI and host of PBS's "Think Tank."
Still Learning to be Free By Nimrod Raphaeli
The American Enterprise has taken a bold step in carrying out a public opinion poll in a country in which, until recently, only one opinion mattered--Saddam Hussein's. The poll offers significant findings which augur favorably for the reconstruction of Iraq. Some results seem ironic. When asked whether, over the next five years, the U.S. would help or harm Iraq, 50 percent said harm. Yet when asked to name one foreign country that Iraq should model itself after, respondents placed the United States first. It is not surprising that those who chose the U.S. are largely in the 18-29 age group. In Iraq, as in most countries, this is the first group to demonstrate against the U.S. for political reasons, but also the first to adopt the American way of life and culture.
One of the most surprising results is the answer to the question of whether Iraq should have an Islamic government. Among the Shia, only 29 percent responded in the affirmative, compared with almost 50 percent of the Sunni. The attitudes of the two groups are correlated with their attendance at religious services. In response to the question about frequency of attendance at Friday prayer during the previous four weeks, 48 percent of the Shia and 34 percent of the Sunni responded "never." Perhaps more importantly, leading Shia ayatollahs, such as Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and the recently murdered Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir Al-Hakim, have gone on record in support of a new regime that reflects the pluralistic nature of the Iraqi society. They have also urged Iraqis to give the Coalition Provisional
Authority time to introduce necessary reforms.
The widely respected Iraqi daily Al-Zaman (The Times) has taken issue with some of the public opinion polls and surveys conducted by the Arab press in post-Saddam Iraq. It writes that "the Iraqis' battle today is multifaceted…. It is a battle against the environmental, psychological, political, economic, and moral devastation that was left behind by an astonishing and horrifying regime that ruled a rich country and an ancient people with no consideration [of] history and no justice to the country and its people.… Therefore, it is not moral or wise…to take advantage of the majority of people by conducting extemporaneous and biased surveys about sensitive issues that deal with the future of Iraq."
The suggestion is that just-liberated Iraqis are not yet ready to offer full, free, and informed opinions on issues of the day.
The problems, statistical and otherwise, associated with the newness of the Iraqis' ability to express their own views must be taken into account in determining the accuracy of these results.
Native Iraqi Nimrod Raphaeli is an analyst at the Middle East Media Research Institute.
Give Iraq to the Iraqis By Newt Gingrich
The TAE poll of Iraqi public opinion reinforces what a number of us have been arguing for years. There is, not surprisingly, only a very narrow base of support in Iraq for the murdering, raping, and looting dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Most Iraqis know their future is better since liberation than under Saddam's rule.Most Iraqis also prefer a free society to an Iranian-style religious dictatorship.
Our current problems may lie as much in a Washington that is slow to accept the fruits of its own victory as in Baghdad. Rather than imposing an orderly bureaucratic rule that inevitably makes us too responsible for daily life in Iraq, I suggest we should support the Iraqi people governing themselves, even with some inherent disorder. The first steps to that end are simple and immediately doable:
First, the U.S. should move as quickly as possible to transfer legitimate authority on a wide range of decisions to the Iraqi Governing Council. Second, the Governing Council should name an ambassador to the United States immediately. The United States should encourage Great Britain and other countries to accept an ambassador from Iraq as quickly as possible. Third, the Governing Council should start making more practical decisions about daily life in Iraq.
In local communities, elections for mayor and city council should proceed in 30 days, not 30 months. Most Iraqis under Saddam were not torturers, rapists, killers, and looters. Most are decent people who want a chance to have safety, health, prosperity, and freedom. The worst 30,000 or so Iraqis can be proscribed from elective office and prohibited from serving in the military or the police, leaving some 25 million Iraqis who can begin the process of running their own country.
Finally, we must do whatever it takes it to get the Iraqi police to be more engaged in immediate local security, allowing the U.S. and Britain to get troops off the streets and into a back-up role. This process, turning authority on most decisions over to Iraqis while retaining the ultimate military power for the next year or two, would allow the United States to minimize military risk and political anger while still guiding Iraq toward a safe and free society.
Newt Gingrich is a senior fellow at AEI and a member of the Defense Policy Board.
Prepare for Trouble, Take Risks for Success By Reuel Marc Gerecht
It is still far from clear what kind of opposition the United States is confronting in Iraq. Neither the Pentagon nor the Central Intelligence Agency have an accurate picture of the enemy. They know that foreign Sunni jihadists are crossing the Syrian, Iranian, and Saudi borders, but they don't know how many, or how large the local logistical network supporting them is. They don't know how many home-grown Sunni militants there are in Iraq, or how many militants really want a holy war against the "American occupation." They know that former Baathists--Republican Guards, Saddam's security officers, and fedayeen--are killing coalition personnel and allied Iraqis, but they aren't sure of the numbers or level of coordination among the Baathists. Most worrisome, the U.S. military does not know the breadth or depth of support for these various forces existing among the natives of the Sunni belt in central Iraq.
Sunni Arabs probably make up less than 20 percent of Iraq's population. But if a significant slice of the Sunni community supports violence against Americans and allied Iraqis, it is unlikely today's resistance will disappear in the foreseeable future. That needn't block the Bush administration's efforts to create a democratic country. As long as the violence doesn't spread into Shiite regions--and it is a surprising and good sign that the various Sunni forces have not tried more aggressively to wage a campaign against the Americans in the Shiite south--the United States can probably keep progress toward democratic self government in Iraq alive. The one stumbling block would be if the sustained casualty rate of a soldier a day seriously undermines popular support of the administration back in the United States.
There is no need to flood the Sunni trouble spots with more troops if the United States isn't facing a broad Sunni insurrection. Trying to avoid excessive force in fighting a guerrilla terrorist enemy hiding amidst a civilian population makes sense. But if the Sunni violence significantly increases, and especially if it expands into the Shiite south,Washington should be prepared to take up the old, heavy-handed (and usually successful) "imperial" methods of dealing with insurrections. The United States cannot afford to look impotent in Iraq. If the Kurds and the Shiites, who are the vast majority of Iraq's population, lose faith in the efficacy of American efforts to control Sunni violence, they may well lose faith in U.S. efforts to help create a functioning Iraqi democracy.
Politically, the United States needs to ensure that a constitutional convention isn't delayed by the violence. The writing of a constitution and national elections are the most effective mechanisms for isolating radical elements in Iraqi society. The Bush administration appears now to prefer a constitutional convention composed of individuals selected by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Governing Council. Such an arrangement, according to theory, would allow a quicker transfer of sovereignty and withdrawal of U.S. forces than electing a constitutional assembly.
This could be mistaken. The key to the successful, long-term democratization of Iraq lies in the development of a political, cultural, and religious elite capable of guiding the Iraqi people to democracy. The election of a constitutional assembly is more likely to elevate individuals who will be seen by the Iraqi people as their legitimate representatives.
The elective process would undoubtedly be more convulsive, and may be less liberal, so it is understandable that the Bush administration might be wary of this approach. Yet it is probably worth the risk. The Shiite religious establishment, backed by a fatwa from Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, is in favor of an elected assembly. Though Iraq's minorities may fear domination by the Shia in such an elected body, no constitutional arrangement in Iraq is likely to succeed if the traditional Shiite clergy oppose it.
It may be time to bet on the Shiite clergy and take a risk in favor of the democratic experiment in Iraq.
Reuel Marc Gerecht is a resident fellow at AEI and a former Middle East specialist in the Central Intelligence Agency.
Freedom is the Right Cause By Meyrav Wurmser
If one concept has guided the Bush administration since September 11, it is that the Middle East as a whole is so dangerous because abysmal tyranny prevails and freedom languishes. While undertaken partly for self-defense, the war in Iraq is thus ultimately based, more than any other struggle since World War II, on America's core values: an individual's right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
As straightforward and traditionally American as a war for freedom may seem, it is a revolutionary break from the way the Middle East has long been approached by the foreign policy establishment, especially on the Left. Most diplomats and academic experts opposed the war. They expected the Iraqi people to resent us as occupiers, not regard us as liberators. They doubt that all men share the desire to be free, or that most are capable of understanding freedom. According to this perspective, modern Arab politics are so deeply rooted in a hatred of America and everything it represents that Arabs identify democracy as a colonial assault. Arabs, in other words, would rather be oppressed by fellow Arabs than freed by Americans.
The differing views of the administration and its critics are irreconcilable. One is right. The other is wrong.
American soldiers were not greeted in the streets of Baghdad with flowers, opponents of the war state today. This is seen as proof that the administration was wrong in assuming that the Iraqi people would delight in their new freedom. The TAE poll, however, tells a different tale. It demonstrates that Arabs, like all other men, do indeed wish to be free.
A plurality of Iraqis believe the new Iraqi government should be modeled after the American government, and nearly 40 percent of those polled already think that democracy can work in Iraq. Iraqis are now optimistic about their future. These things suggest that, despite some anti-American sentiments, the majority of Iraqis will indeed view us as liberators, eventually.
These sorts of findings shatter the myth that Arabs and Muslims are driven inexorably by their culture and religion to regard the West as a hostile force. Even in the Middle East, men strive to be free. The U.S. has done nothing more than respond to the Iraqi people's most basic aspirations to be liberated from tyranny.
Meanwhile, polls taken in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt show that America's old way of treating Middle Eastern nations--as places incapable of freedom, and thus best accepted and worked with under authoritarian, unfree governments--has produced resentment against the U.S. This is the legacy of the decades-old policy which simply wrote off the cause of freedom in the Middle East.
The lesson is clear: However difficult it may be to plant the seeds of liberty in the Middle East, that is the only long-term way to get the populations there to see us as allies. When we capitulate to toleration of their oppressors, we are doomed.
This poll, the images of Iraqis tearing down Saddam's statues, and many other observations from visitors to Iraq (few of them reported in today's media, alas), vindicate the administration's revolutionary shift to a pro-freedom strategy in Iraq. Along with the attacks of September 11, the collapse of the Arab-Israeli Oslo process, and other wake-up signals, these developments ought to permanently discredit the received wisdom of the liberal foreign-policy establishment.
We must navigate toward the beacon of freedom in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East, and not retreat into the safe harbor of "stability." If most Iraqis see the U.S. as the agent and protector of freedom, they will accept us.As soon as they see us as too weak to last, too eager to leave, or too inattentive to the scheming of tyrants, they will lose confidence in us, and make peace with the darker fates to which they have resigned themselves so often in the past.
This poll tells us to stay today's bold new course.
Meyrav Wurmser is director of the Center for Middle East Policy at the Hudson Institute.
Thanks for the post.
Karl Zinmeister is a national treasure.
That sums it up pretty well.
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