Additional concern is generated by the fact that the IAC is linked to Colombian terrorist groups now said to be involved with Islamic terrorists. Terrorism experts cite the secretive tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay, where Colombian and Islamic terrorists are said to be coordinating their activities. Other reports suggest the presence of Islamic terrorist groups in Venezuela, where the anti-American regime headed by Hugo Chavez is also said to be aiding and providing sanctuary for Colombian terrorists.
Here Comes the Judge
The information provided by the D.C. Metro Police Department by court order to the IAC so far includes:
Lesson plans and handbooks on use of aerosol sprays, force and tactical batons;
Management of Mass Demonstrations, Civil Disturbance Units training documents;
Metro Police Department (MPD) instruction on use of firearms and other service weapons;
Portions of Operations Plan, Parade Manual and Civil Disturbance Unit Response Plan for the 54th Inauguration of the President of the United States;
All rooftop and street-level surveillance videotapes of the presidential inauguration;
Redacted logs from the Synchronized Operations Command Center and the Running Resume for the Inauguration Day intelligence teams; and
The identification of all plainclothes MPD officers who were detailed to intelligence teams for the Inauguration.
The plainclothes intelligence officers identified by name were stationed at various locations along and near the presidential parade route in order to monitor the crowds and to report any information heard or observed concerning plans, attempts or actions that might disrupt Inaugural events and/or violate the law and to take law enforcement action, if needed.
Judge Gladys Kessler, who handled the case, issued the orders disclosing the security data. (Kessler was appointed to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in July 1994 by former president Bill Clinton and confirmed by the Senate.)
D.C. Fights Back
The security data was sought during the discovery process of the ongoing lawsuit which charges the U.S. government, the Bush-Cheney Presidential Inaugural Committee and the District of Columbia with constitutional violations. Plaintiffs' charges include the use of government agents provocateurs who allegedly assaulted protesters lining the inauguration parade route, the discriminatory operation of security checkpoints to deny access to protesters and unconstitutional disruption tactics of the police Civil Disturbance Units. Judge Kessler attributed significant importance to the lawsuit and its attendant First Amendment issues, and she bent over backwards to accommodate the plaintiffs
The plaintiffs(aka Kooks and terrorist's sympathizers) allege covert law-enforcement personnel beat, pepper-sprayed, intimidated and terrorized peaceful protesters. They also contend a key checkpoint that was supposed to be manned by either the Secret Service or the Metro Police Department was instead delegated to the control of the Presidential Inaugural Committee, a private corporation that subsequently detained protesters for hours while allowing Bush supporters to pass. Lawyers from the Partnership for Civil Justice filed the case on behalf of IAC.
In the case, which is still ongoing, the plaintiffs are seeking compensatory and punitive damages from the Presidential Inaugural Committee and compensatory damages from the District of Columbia, as well as the filing of various permanent and declaratory injunctions.
Lawyers for D.C. unsuccessfully fought handing over most of the data, arguing that the IAC had made "exceedingly broad" discovery requests that were irrelevant to the claims and which were protected from disclosure by the law enforcement privilege. Several of D.C's and the federal government's requests to withhold information were granted by the court but the majority were granted despite warnings of repercussions to national security.
Notwithstanding D.C.'s production of "thousands of pages of documents," the IAC pushed for more, prompting another reaction:"[We] object to producing intelligence reports and the Intelligence Operational Plan developed for the Presidential Inauguration." After the judge ruled in favor of D.C. on the Intelligence Operational Plan, IAC pushed once again to get the document.
Since the plaintiffs were in part seeking information related to the pepper-spraying of protesters, Assistant Police Chief Alfred Broadbent, in his Declaration, argued that "[N]othing in the Intelligence Operational Plan or the intelligence reports authorizes, sanctions or directs the use of O.C. spray by Metropolitan Police Department officers in the manner alleged in the complaint filed in this civil action. Neither the Intelligence Operational Plan nor the intelligence reports authorize, sanction or direct undercover officers to suggest or take any illegal action.
Moreover, the events at 14th and K Streets, NW, were based on reports of a large crowd of demonstrators marching in the street, south on 14th Street, without a permit, and reports of cars and/or property being damaged, and vending machines being thrown into the street." Attached to the declaration was a "Destruction of Property Incident Report."
The IAC also sought any correspondence from MPD officers to counterparts in other jurisdictions or countries; audits, evaluations, and reviews that relate in any way to mass protests
D.C. refused to produce a video copy of the MPD training video on "Crowd Control Formations," arguing it was not relevant and could be misused to counter such formations.
Undercover Operation Exposed
As these court decisions played out in the courtroom, another drama was unfolding. Before the lawsuit was filed in 2001, undercover police officers had monitored or infiltrated the IAC and its affiliated organizations. As the court case progressed, they continued their assignment to gather intelligence for law enforcement agencies. Soon, however, the courtroom spotlight focused on these undercover officers. The IAC succeeded in convincing Judge Kessler to order the disclosure of the identities of these officers, arguing the plaintiffs needed to "evaluate the conduct" of the officers. Now the tables had been turned: the plaintiffs were positioned to gather intelligence about the undercover officers, adding to their pile of discovery about law enforcement tactics, training and strategies.
How did it happen? First, the plaintiffs told the court that one undercover officer had already been revealed when he tackled a demonstrator at a protest, sprayed people with pepper spray and was recognized as having attended the meetings of the organizations. A second officer was allegedly revealed when he was recognized leaving the courthouse and admitted he was a detective. Court documents dated April 4, 2003 note, "District of Columbia refused to acknowledge that these officers were, in fact, undercover officers."
The plaintiffs told the court that they sought to compel the disclosure of all undercover officer identities because they wanted to "evaluate the conduct of the officers" and "determine whether additional acts of alleged misconduct [had] occurred." The IAC complained that the "officers" did more than passively observe, but that they engaged in "conduct disruptive to the organization's purposes and that reflected poorly on the organizations." What sort of disruptive conduct? Court documents note, "For example, an undercover officer could seriously disrupt Plaintiff's legitimate protest activities by accepting responsibility for certain tasks at an event and then failing to follow through or by suggesting the organizations engage in illegal and violent conduct."
Did these as-yet anonymous undercover officers engage in such activity? Many allegations were made. Court documents note the plaintiffs alleged one undercover officer they were able to identify on their own "disrupted a meeting by allegedly 'suggesting that activists place bombs on bridges and call in bomb threats.'" Plaintiffs complained that they lacked information as to who else might have been an undercover officer and so could not "necessarily link any other disruptive conduct to such unidentified persons."
Secrets Revealed
Kessler agreed. This information was relevant and the IAC ought to have it. Furthermore, Kessler argued, "Plaintiffs had little chance of obtaining this information through alternate sources." She concluded that information was not protected by the law enforcement privilege and in an order filed August 30, 2002 Kessler wrote: "ORDERED that Defendants shall disclose the identities of those undercover officers who infiltrated Plaintiff's organizations " (In the course of the lawsuit DC did not object to identifying plain clothes officers but it did object to identifying undercover officers.)
The District asked the court to reconsider and vacate that order, arguing that the law enforcement privilege was indeed applicable, that there was no compelling need for such disclosure. Public interest in non-disclosure outweighed plaintiff's stated need for disclosure, they argued.
"[P]laintiffs have never specifically described any other 'disruptive' or illegal conduct that occurred at their meetings that they suspect may be attributable to an undercover officer in order to determine whether such misconduct may have occurred," the defense argued. The law enforcement privilege is rooted in the need to "minimize disclosures that might impair the necessary functioning of an executive branch department" and based on "the understanding that many law enforcement operations cannot be effective if conducted in full view, they stated. [Cited: Black v. Sheraton Corporation of America, 564 F.2d 531, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1977)]
D.C. laid out risks involved in such disclosure:
"Law enforcement's ability to prepare for and provide security at countless demonstrations that occur in Washington, D.C. and to gather critical related intelligence would be impaired if the identity of undercover officers was disclosed."
" related techniques and strategies would, necessarily, be ascertained if the undercover officer's identity was disclosed."
"Defendants do object to identifying any 'undercover officers.' 'Undercover officers,' if utilized, conduct on-going investigations to monitor and report on individuals and groups who may be planning actions that threaten property or persons or otherwise violates the law. Unlike officers in plain clothes, 'undercover officers' do not carry MPD issued service weapons, do not take law enforcement action while acting in an undercover capacity and take precautions not to identify themselves as police officers. Their operation (and safety) depends on their ability to ensure their anonymity."
D.C. also cited a declaration by Assistant Police Chief Broadbent given at a hearing on the issue on December 12, 2002. The declaration described how disclosure of the undercover officers' identities would impair and thwart the Department's ability to prepare for and provide security at demonstrations and jeopardize and/or chill the department's intelligence-gathering capability.
Among Chief Broadbent's concerns reiterated by the defense in the motion to reconsider and vacate the order were:
"[D]isclosing the Department's intelligence reports, Intelligence Operational Plan or the identity of any undercover officer that may have been conducting an investigation would undermine significantly the Department's ability to plan for and provide security at mass demonstrations."
"Disclosure would create a huge void in the Department's intelligence gathering capability, threaten undercover officer's physical safety and expose citizens, visitors, and demonstrators themselves to increased risk of violence, physical injury, and property damage."
"Disclosing such information could forewarn suspects and suspect groups, providing them with sensitive law enforcement information, including possible strategies, procedures and directions for confidential investigations."
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[T]he Metropolitan Police Department's intelligence gathering methods, including the use of undercover investigations, have been integral to the Department's success in minimizing property damage, violence and physical injuries at mass demonstrations."
The world has gone crazy ping.