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In the area of weapons of mass destruction, we know that:

Saddam Hussein in the far and recent past had an active chemical and biological weapons program.
Saddam had as recently as 1998 significant stockpiles of these weapons, according to both U.S. intelligence and U.N. weapons inspectors, who had seen and catalogued this stockpile.
The Baathist regime used these chemical and biological weapons on at least half a dozen instances.
Saddam provided no significant evidence to inspectors in 2002-2003 that he had destroyed any of this stockpile.
In 1998, the Clinton administration launched an intensive, though short, preemptive air war against Iraq because it was convinced that Saddam’s WMD program was unchecked.
The Iraqi dictatorship was reasonably close to obtaining nuclear weapons on two occasions in the past, and was prevented from doing so only by military force. In 1981, an Israeli air strike crippled the Osirik nuclear reactor which had been producing nuclear material for bomb use. In 1991, Operation Desert Storm again crippled Iraq’s nuclear program, which experts later estimated had been within one year of developing a bomb.
The Iraqi dictatorship retained the scientific know-how and the services of many of the scientists who had been active in its previous nuclear efforts. It also coordinated the concealment of equipment necessary for a nuclear program. Recently, an Iraqi nuclear scientist led allied forces to a key piece of equipment that he had been instructed to bury under a rose bush at his home.
Likewise, in late April, an Iraqi scientist involved in the biological and chemical weapons program led Americans to a site in the desert where chemical components for chemical weapons had been buried by the regime immediately prior to the onset of war.
In both the nuclear and chemical/biological arenas, Iraq possessed many “dual use” facilities that had been used for weapons programs and could have been again with little difficulty. For example, early in the war U.S. forces stumbled across a giant buried complex which seemed well-suited for chemical weapons production. As it turned out, the facility had been a chemical weapons plant until 1998, when it had been converted to civilian production. A vast underground facility was also discovered beneath Iraq’s main civilian atomic research center, filled with sealed barrels of uranium. Upon investigation, the site was known to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which had sealed the uranium. In neither case was there any significant barrier to the reconversion of those facilities for WMD purposes on short notice.
As was widely reported, two mobile laboratories have been captured, and many (though not all) weapons analysts consider it either probable or possible that they were used for biological weapons development.
Along the route to Baghdad, large numbers of Iraqi troops were killed or captured in possession of gas masks. Military headquarters and bases were consistently found stocked with chemical warfare suits and large stockpiles of nerve gas antidote.

When it comes to terrorism, what we know is this:

Saddam actively sponsored the terrorist group Hamas, boasting that he had sent $35 million to provide for the families of Hamas suicide bombers.
Notorious terrorist figures Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas (of Achille Lauro fame) had taken up residence in Baghdad under Saddam’s protection (at least until Abu Nidal committed "suicide" last year by multiple gunshots to the head).
A Palestine Liberation Front training camp was maintained outside of Baghdad, complete with airplane chassis for hijacker training.
In northern Iraq, U.S. and Kurdish forces overran a base and training camp for Ansar-al-Islam, an Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist organization with hundreds of members. The Ansar-al-Islam camp included a crude poison lab, with evidence pointing to the possibility that the group had made the deadly toxin ricin for use in attacks.
Another major terrorist facility in the desert of central Iraq was recently uncovered and destroyed by U.S. forces.
Iraqi intelligence documents published by the London Daily Telegraph indicated that Iraqi officials had traveled to Sudan in 1998 to meet with Osama bin Laden, seeking a “strategic alliance” against America. For his part, bin Laden released a tape shortly before hostilities began urging jihadists to flock to the defense of Iraq.
The deputy of a key Al-Qaeda associate who had been reported in Baghdad receiving medical treatment after fleeing Afghanistan was captured there shortly after the fall of the Iraqi capital.
Whatever ties Iraq did or did not have with Al-Qaeda, it is clear that Saddam supported the 9-11 terrorist attacks. Upon their arrival in Iraq, coalition forces found items like official murals celebrating the 9-11 attack and 9-11 commemorative cigarette lighters complete with etchings of bin Laden and the World Trade Centers carried by Baath Party functionaries.
Saddam had no compunction about using terrorism against the United States directly. In 1993, Iraqi agents were apprehended in Kuwait before they were able to carry out a plan to assassinate former president George H.W. Bush on his visit to the Emirate. Considerable evidence also links Saddam and Iraqi intelligence to the first attack on the World Trade Centers in 1993.

http://www.mafhoum.com/press5/154P5.htm

DUELFER REPORT SUMMARY

Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that which previously existed.

Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of this policy. All senior level Iraqi officials considered Iran to be Iraq’s principal enemy in the region. The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and influence in the Arab world
were also considerations, but secondary.

ISG uncovered Iraqi plans or designs for three long-range ballistic missiles with ranges from 400 to 1,000 km and for a 1,000-km-range cruise missile, although none of these systems progressed to production and only one reportedly passed the design phase.

Iraq Survey Group (ISG) discovered further evidence of the maturity and significance of the pre-1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq’s ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program progressively decayed after that date.

While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, ISG judges that iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991.

In practical terms, with the destruction of the Al Hakam facility, Iraq abandoned its ambition to obtain advanced BW weapons quickly. ISG found no direct evidence that Iraq, after 1996, had plans for a new BW program or was conducting BW-specific work for military purposes. Indeed, from the mid-1990s, despite evidence of continuing interest in nuclear and chemical weapons, there appears to be a complete absence of discussion or even interest in BW at the Presidential level.