Supreme Court Declines to Hear Case on Adoption by Gay People

WASHINGTON, Jan. 10 -- The Supreme Court declined today to hear a challenge to Florida's ban on adoption by gay people, the only such state law in the country.

The justices refused without comment to consider an appeal by four Florida men who had argued that the 1977 law violated their rights to equal protection under the United States Constitution, and that it was irrational because it automatically excluded potential adoptive parents for abandoned children.

The case, Lofton v. Secretary of the Florida Department of Children and Families, 04-478, had been closely watched as a possible test case. But with the Supreme Court's refusal to consider it, the final word is that of the United States Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit, in Atlanta.

A three-judge panel of the circuit ruled last January that the Florida Legislature had the right to enact the law. The full circuit voted, 6 to 6, not to review the panel's conclusion, leaving the plaintiffs with only a possible appeal to the Supreme Court, a hope that was dashed today.

The panel's opinion was written by Judge Stanley F. Birch Jr., who noted that under Florida law adoption is not a right but a privilege.

"Because of the primacy of the welfare of the child, the state can make classifications for adoption purposes that would be constitutionally suspect in many other areas," Judge Birch wrote. People who hope to adopt, he said, "are electing to open their homes and their private lives to close scrutiny by the state."

The opinion did not condemn gay lifestyles. Referring to the plaintiff Steven Lofton, a pediatric nurse who has raised from infancy three foster children infected with the virus that causes AIDS, it noted that "by all accounts, Lofton's efforts in caring for these children have been exemplary."

Other plaintiffs in the case have also raised foster children. But foster care is meant to be temporary and cannot be seen as an automatic prelude to adoption, the ruling stated.

Child-welfare groups advocates had urged the Supreme Court to take the case. So had the American Civil Liberties Union's Lesbian and Gay Rights Project.

In his January 2004 ruling, Judge Birch said the state's primary concern is not those prospective parents who would like to adopt but, rather, the children who are destined for adoption.

"Openly homosexual households represent a very recent phenomenon, and sufficient time has not yet passed to permit any scientific study of how children raised in those households fare as adults," he wrote.

"Given this state of affairs, it is not irrational for the Florida Legislature to credit one side of the debate over the other. Nor is it irrational for the Legislature to proceed with deliberate caution before placing adoptive children in an alternative, but unproven, family structure that has not yet been conclusively demonstrated to be equivalent to the marital family structure that has established a proven track record spanning centuries."

And should the State of Florida wish to reconsider its policy, "the Legislature is the proper forum for this debate," not the courts, Judge Birch wrote.

This is the NYT, they will select the most unflattering parts to report. It is worth noting the 11th circuit affirmed the prohibition of homosexuals adopting had a judge from the 9TH CIRCUIT sitting by special designation.

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/11th/0116723p.pdf

link to text of case, all 47 pages of it. It is very well reasoned and very specific in nailing each pro-homosexual argument.

for example

=snip=

This case is distinguishable from Cleburne. The Florida legislature could rationally conclude that homosexuals and heterosexual singles are not “similarly situated in relevant respects.” It is not irrational to think that heterosexual singles have a markedly greater probability of eventually establishing a married household and, thus, providing their adopted children with a stable, dual gender parenting environment. Moreover, as the state noted, the legislature could rationally act on the theory that heterosexual singles, even if they never marry, are better positioned than homosexual individuals to provide adopted children with education and guidance relative to their sexual development throughout pubescence and adolescence.’9 In a previous challenge to Florida’s statute, a Florida appellate court observed:

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[W]hatever causes a person to become a homosexual, it is clear that the state cannot know the sexual preferences that a child will exhibit as an adult. Statistically, the state does know that a very high percentage of children
available for adoption will develop heterosexual references. As a result, those children will need education and guidance after puberty concerning relationships with the opposite sex. In our society, we expect that parents will provide this education to teenagers in the home. These subjects are often very embarrassing for teenagers and some aspects of the education are accomplished by the parents telling stories about their own adolescence and explaining their own experiences with the opposite sex. It is in the best
interests of a child if his or her parents can personally relate to the child’s problems and assist the child in the difficult transition to heterosexual adulthood. Given that adopted children tend to have some developmental problems arising from adoption or from their experiences prior to adoption, it is perhaps more important for adopted children than other children to have a stable heterosexual household during puberty and the teenage years. Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1220. “It could be that the assumptions underlying these rationales are erroneous, but the very fact that they are arguable is sufficient, on
rational-basis review, to immunize the legislative choice from constitutional challenge.” Heller, 509 U.S. at 333, 113 S. Ct. at 2649-50 (citation and internal punctuation marks omitted). Although the influence of environmental factors in forming patterns of sexual behavior and the importance of heterosexual role models are matters of ongoing debate, they ultimately involve empirical disputes
not readily amenable to judicial resolution--aswell as policy judgments best exercised in the legislative arena. For our present purposes, it is sufficient that these considerations provide a reasonably conceivable rationale for Florida to preclude all homosexuals, but not all heterosexual singles, from adopting.

FOOTNOTE 19 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in considering the constitutionality of a similar
prohibition on homosexual adoption, concluded that the prohibition was rationally related to the
state’s desire “to provide appropriate role models for children” in the development oftheir sexual
and gender identities. In re Op. ofthe Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 25 (N.H. 1987). That court noted
that “the source ofsexual orientation is still inadequately understood and is thought to be a
combination ofgenetic and environmental influences. Given the reasonable possibility of
environmental influences, we believe that the legislature can rationally act on the theory that a
role model can influence the child’s developing sexual identity.” Id. (citation omitted).

=END SNIP=

AND now here is the entire conculsion

III. CONCLUSION

We exercise great caution when asked to take sides in an ongoing public policy debate, such as the current one over the compatibility of homosexual conduct with the duties of adoptive parenthood. See Reno, 507 U.S. at 315, 113 S.
Ct. at 1454; Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281, 104 5. Ct. 2403, 2419 (1984). The State of Florida has made the determination that it is not in the best interests of its displaced children to be adopted by individuals who "engage in current, voluntary homosexual activity," Cox, 627 So. 2d at 1215, and we have found nothing in the Constitution that forbids this policy judgment. Thus, any argument that the Florida legislature was misguided in its decision is one of legislative policy, not constitutional law. The legislature is the proper forum for this debate, and we do not sit as a superlegislature "to award by judicial decree what was not achievable by political consensus." Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 923 (4th Cir. 1996). The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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Bold was added. Here is a text version of the opinion as a bonus.

http://www.hppub.com/florida.htm

There is no double standard per se based on the ENTIRE opinion, not just the NYT selectiv OMMISIONS.

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