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In his book "Natural Process", freeper Carry_Okie proposed land owners pay a "view fee" to the owner of the property they like viewing. This way the property owner of the hillside has some incentive to leave the property undeveloped. T. Sowell, take note.

Interesting thought, much easier than selling, packing up and relocating

I tried to get Sowell to read the thing, but since I'm not famous and don't have a PhD he wasn't interested. IMHO, while he understands that property rights are important and recognizes the consequences of regulatory government, his understanding of the role of corruption in regulatory government and how property rights and free markets can slowly eliminate the need for regulation is superficial, at best.

Great idea!

I remember similar analysis being discussed more than 20 years ago when I was in law school. The problem with the proposal is not theoretical, but practical.

There's no technical impediment preventing one landowner from obtaining the voluntary agreement of a second landowner not to interfere with the first landowner's view. For example, one landowner could agree not to "improve" the hill, not to harvest the trees on the hill, and not to build anything on the hill, but to maintain the hill forever in its then-current condition, all so as not to interfere with another landowner's view. Generally speaking, restrictive covenants burdening certain lands for the benefit of other lands are really quite common.

There are practical problems with your proposal, however.

Assuming a permanent restriction, at what price (less than the fair market value of the hill property) would the hill owner (the property being viewed) (the "Viewee") charge the hillside homeowner (the owner viewing the hillside) (the "Viewer") permanently to restrict use of the property to be viewed? If the Viewee's land can't be used because of the restrictive covenant, the Viewee's land is no longer an asset but has become a liability (the Viewee must continue to pay taxes on the land). Consequently, the Viewee has no incentive to agree to the restrictive covenant unless the Viewee is paid the land's full fair market value.

That raises a question on the other side of the equation. If the purchase price for the restrictive covenant is same as the purchase price for the land (the land's fair market value), why would the Viewer buy only a restrictive covenant and not the full fee simple absolute (full ownership of the property)?

Then there's the problem of free riders. Why would Viewer buy the restrictive covenant which is enjoyed not just by Viewer, but also by all of Viewer's near neighbors? Viewer's near neighbors benefit from the restrictive covenant Viewer paid for, but pay nothing for it. Again, the Viewer would buy the fee simple absolute for the fair market value, but would have no incentive to buy a mere restrictive covenant at that same price.

One approach would be to have government buy the restrictive covenant. But why would taxpayers across town be expected to pay for a restrictive covenant from which they receive no benefit?

If a single developer developed lands in a neighborhood, that developer could limit use of a portion of the development by restricting use of specified lands ("Common Areas"). Other lands ("Lots") would benefit from the restrictions imposed against the Common Areas. The developer would then sell the Lots, charging a premium for the Lots especially benefiting from the restrictions (in California, it may be a hillside lot; in Florida, lots adjacent to a "water feature"). Lots not especially benefited from the Common Areas would not command a premium price. What I've described in this paragraph is, in fact, the principal way restrictive covenants are used.

The proposal may work if the "view fee" is only temporary. For example, Viewee would agree not to develop Viewee's lands for (say) five years, at the end of which time Viewee would be free to develop the lands.

Viewee would have an incentive to sell viewing rights when Viewee has no present plans to develop (Viewee gets something, rather than nothing, for his vacant property). When the land is to be left vacant anyway is precisely the time, however, that the Viewer has the least incentive to pay the view fee.

Viewee would have no incentive to sell viewing rights when Viewee is planning to sell the land or develop it, however. But that is precisely the time Viewer would most be interested in paying a view fee to acquire viewing rights.

In any event, there is nothing that would prevent landowners from entering into such voluntary arrangements. Obviously, the agreements would need to be adequately documented and would have to be done in such a way as to give third-party purchasers of property adequate notice of the agreements if the Viewer wishes to bind the land.