Iran's Nuclear Bargaining

[PrinceMarko]

Iran politics: Nuclear bargaining COUNTRY BRIEFING FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT Iran has succeeded in presenting a moving target to the Western powers seeking to shoot down its supposed plans to develop nuclear weapons. It has made periodic concessions to the trio of EU member states trying to achieve a negotiated solution that would entail the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) being able to state with final certitude that Iran’s nuclear programme is entirely peaceful, as the Iranian government claims it to be. However, these concessions have always been hedged around with conditions that have fortified suspicions that Iran is engaged in a game of gross deception. The agreement reached with the EU trio of France, Germany and the UK on November 7th resulted in Iran announcing a suspension of uranium enrichment and of "related activities". For the EU, the critical element in the agreement was the related activities, as this means that Iran will cease producing feedstock gas which can be processed through centrifuges to make weapons-grade uranium. According to the new agreement, Iran has also undertaken to suspend production of the centrifuges. The agreement provides for further negotiations to start with the EU from mid-December with the formation of three working groups. One will deal with nuclear issues, including the EU’s provision of advanced nuclear technology and fuel for Iran’s nuclear power programme. EU officials have said that these talks will also cover Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor, which was not mentioned in the November 7th agreement. Another working group will cover non-nuclear issues, such as trade, and the third will focus on regional security. The agreement was clearly timed to allow for Iran to get through a meeting of the IAEA board starting on November 25th without risking censure for its nuclear activities, or, worse still being referred to the UN Security Council. However, as the IAEA was preparing to meet, Iran raised objections to the text of the resolution that had been drafted by the EU, and demanded to be allowed to continue operating 20 centrifuges for research purposes. By raising these objections and demands, Iran risked undermining the accord with the EU. However, Iran was thereby able to demonstrate to its domestic audience that it was not capitulating to external pressure. Iran also appeared to be concerned to have an issue to bargain with in the event of the US pushing to include in the final resolution a clause calling for automatic referral to the UN Security Council in the event of Iran resuming its enrichment activities. The Iranian officials involved in the deal with the EU have emphasised that it is a voluntary agreement that in no way commits Iran to a permanent cessation of uranium enrichment. "Our negotiations with Europe will be for a short period of time to create an atmosphere of confidence," said Hassan Rohani, the head of the Iranian National Security Council. European diplomats have indicated that the EU envisages the negotiations (and the suspension) lasting for a longer period of time than is suggested by Mr Rohani’s statement. There is clearly a danger that after a few months Iran will decide to resume its uranium enrichment and related activities on the pretext that the EU has not lived up to its commitments. This was indeed what happened with the first agreement reached with the EU in October 2003. Where does it go from here? Analysts consider that there are four broad possible outcomes to the affair. Two of these outcomes, to which we attached a combined probability of 60%, entail a resolution of the issue. This would be either through a negotiated agreement between Iran and the US (co-ordinated through the EU; 25%) or with the involvement of the UN Security Council (35%). We consider that there is 20% risk of the issue leading to military conflict and a 20% probability of the international community concluding that it has no option but to accept the reality of a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic of Iran. Over the next six-nine months we expect that there will be concentrated efforts by the EU to build on the recent agreement and to bring the US into the negotiations. The success of this approach will depend on whether Iran is willing to sacrifice the option of developing nuclear weapons for the presumed benefit of restoring normal relations with the US and getting rid of US sanctions. It also depends on the US administration being genuinely interested in engaging in dialogue with the current Iranian regime. There is also the possibility that Iran could decide that it is in its best interests to back down even if the US maintains a threatening posture. If the matter were referred to the UN Security Council, Iran would face a similar set of choices, but in the context of the threat of economic sanctions being applied. Such sanctions are unlikely to include an embargo on Iranian oil sales, if only because of the havoc this would cause in the global oil market. The threat of or the actual imposition of sanctions would only result in Iran climbing down if there were sufficient inducements offered by the EU and the US. The military options available to the US (and presumably Israel) in the event of diplomatic efforts being exhausted all carry a high degree of risk. A full-scale invasion is most unlikely given the heavy commitments the US has in Iraq and Afghanistan. Air and missile strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities would be difficult to carry out successfully, because Iran has widely dispersed its plants and buried some of them deep underground. Iran is also in a position to retaliate effectively in several direct and indirect ways. The final outcome could be for Iran to emerge, after a long period of attrition, with an arsenal of nuclear weapons, perhaps even while continuing to maintain in public that its nuclear programme is entirely devoted to peaceful purposes.

[backhoe]

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[WmShirerAdmirer]

"Iran has succeeded in presenting a moving target to the Western powers seeking to shoot down its supposed plans to develop nuclear weapons.

It has made periodic concessions to the trio of EU member states trying to achieve a negotiated solution that would entail the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) being able to state with final certitude that Iran’s nuclear programme is entirely peaceful, as the Iranian government claims it to be.

However, these concessions have always been hedged around with conditions that have fortified suspicions that Iran is engaged in a game of gross deception."

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http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1304536/posts

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