Posted on 11/17/2004 9:32:34 AM PST by Paul Ross
The High Ground
The next missile-defense battle heats up in space.
Sometime between now and the end of September, President Bush will tell Americans that the United States finally has a rudimentary missile-defense system. The announcement will come shortly after the Pentagon activates a handful of interceptors at Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. They'll be advertised as capable of stopping a limited ICBM attack from the likes of North Korea.
Democrats then will repeat their standard arguments about why it's better to have no missile defenses at all. They'll say that it costs too much, won't work, threatens to ignite a new arms race, and so on. They'll also accuse the president of playing politics, because it isn't fair to make John Kerry explain his party's views in public so soon before an election.
The real agenda, of course, is to pull the plug on missile defense entirely. That's what happened in 1975, when the military deployed Safeguard, a limited missile-defense system permitted under the rules of the ABM Treaty. One day after it went on alert, Democrats in the House of Representatives voted to withdraw funding. Six months later, Ted Kennedy led the Senate in doing the same. The program died in its infancy.
As a senator, Kerry has voted against missile-defense programs more than 50 times. As a president, he might very well try to dismantle what otherwise promises to be one of the most important accomplishments of the Bush administration.
If this initial round of missile-defense deployments survives, the six interceptors at Greely and four at Vandenberg will be just a start. There could be a total of 20 interceptors online by the end of 2005 and even more after that.
Missile-defense advocates — normally unified because they're so embattled — are now starting to argue about what comes next. The chief dispute centers on how soon space-based missile defenses will become feasible.
The best time to shoot down a missile comes right after its launch, when it is big, slow, and hot — as opposed to later, when it's small, fast, and cold. The problem with a "boost-phase" attack is that it requires an almost immediate response. Interceptors based in Alaska can't strike ICBMs until they're well into their trajectories. There's simply no way they could hit North Korean rockets unless they were stationed very close to the launch site. A space-based interceptor, however, essentially could look down on the enemy's blastoff, giving it a huge advantage over other countermeasures.
That's the theory, anyway. The challenge is turning theory into reality.
"Space provides great advantages, but it is also complicated," says Air Force Lt. Gen. Ron Kadish, head of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency. "This is difficult technology. The idea that we can make rapid progress without evolutionary steps is immature thinking."
Kadish has called for funding an intermediate program called Kinetic Energy Intercept, which would develop land and sea-based interceptors that would aim to reach their targets during their boost phase or shortly thereafter. Many of the country's most outspoken supporters of missile defense, such as Henry Cooper of High Frontier and Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy, have called this a huge mistake.
One of the chief weaknesses of KEI, they say, involves the basing. To target an ICBM launched from Iran, for instance, interceptors would have to be stationed in the region. Is it wise to invest billions in a new missile-defense system whose sine qua non may become the friendly cooperation of future regimes in Uzbekistan?
"I recognize that there's concern over this, but it's the right approach," insists Kadish. "Boost phase is hard, but space is much harder."
Last December, the Pentagon awarded a $4.5 billion contract to Northrup Grumman to begin developing KEI. Current plans call for spending more than $22 billion on it between now and 2014. At the same time, proposed funding for space-based interceptors has been cut by more than $5 billion over the next five years.
"This makes no sense," says one defense-industry source. "It will turn one of President Bush's signature national-security issues into a forgery. We should be going hard into space."
The technical aspects of space may not be as difficult as Kadish suggests. In the first Bush administration, the Pentagon drew up plans for hundreds of mini-satellites, sometimes called "Brilliant Pebbles." During an ICBM strike, they would shift their orbits into enemy flight paths. The ensuing collision would destroy both the interceptors and their targets.
Best of all, say advocates like Cooper, the technology behind Brilliant Pebbles was proven during NASA's Clementine mission to the moon several years ago. The system would not require starting from scratch.
One reason why some in the Pentagon may resist proposals like Brilliant Pebbles is because the foes of missile defense will label them "space weapons" and demand that the United States forsake the "weaponization" of space. This is a canard, because space was weaponized long ago. Every ICBM leaves the atmosphere and thereby becomes a space weapon.
The main difference with Brilliant Pebbles is that the mini-satellites would be based in space, rather than on the ground. The fact that they're meant strictly for defensive purposes won't stop arms-control liberals from calling them "weapons."
"The notion that defensive space-based interceptors will somehow weaponize space is intellectually dishonest," said Sen. Jon Kyl, Republican of Arizona, in March. "And we shouldn't be using the phrase 'weapons in space.' Space is already used by militaries and of offensive missile in space is no less using space than its defensive interceptor."
Nonetheless, many on the Left are calling for the United States to demand an international treaty banning weapons from space. John Kerry is one of the leaders of this movement. He has called space weapons "very disturbing." A few years ago, he proposed "to offer the world the potential of a treaty that says, 'We will only use space for peaceful purposes.'"
So even if a President Kerry acquiesces in his career-long goal to prevent the United States from deploying a bare-bones version of missile defense, like the one now taking shape in Alaska and California, he's ready to fight the next battle. The question is whether the supporters of missile-defense will agree to meet him there, or whether they'll concede the high ground.
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http://www.nationalreview.com/miller/miller200405240843.asp
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A healthy reminder of the bullet we missed on November 2nd.
Amazing how GWB never really capitalized in the debates, or the campaign on the virtue in deploying NMD. Explaining how we already have vastly more leverage in dealing with both North Korea and China with the minimal system in place.
Nice concept... However, if it would come to that, better to have good offense (deterrent) than a "rudimentary" defense. No, this isn't about sports.
We've got a "deterrent" but one which may not in fact deter. In a proliferated environment, deterrence begins to fail. That is why our enemies have in fact been abetting proliferation (E.g., Russia, China, North Korea, and France) with their various proxies, surrogates, such as North Korea...and terrorists...these need to be thwarted with a good defense as well, so that we then have the luxury of sorting out who actually attempted...repeat...attempted to attack us.
Along those lines, you can bet that the NSA, CIA liberals notwithstanding despite their incessant contrary and foolish leaks, concluded that Saddam DID have a hand in 9-11. His posing next to the painting celebrating 9-11 is no accident. We went to great expense and lengths to make things "right" afterwards.
If a nuclear hit on us is successful however, we may not have any way of ascertaining who is responsible. We need defense too.
Indeed. I can't help but wonder if there was a Rove like reason for it.
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www.washingtontimes.com Taking shots at missile defenseBy Baker SpringPublished June 2, 2004 "In vulnerability, there is virtue." That was the notion behind Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), the policy that practically defined the Cold War. For more than 30 years, it barred our country from developing a defense against ballistic missile attacks. During that time, however, the threat of attack continued to grow as more and more countries acquired missile technology. Faced with our increasing vulnerability -- and their moral obligation to protect Americans from all forms of attack -- federal lawmakers officially retired the MAD doctrine five years ago. They adopted a new policy requiring the U.S. "to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system that is capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack." By year's end, our nation will have in place a system able to defend against such an attack. Interceptor missile batteries will be up and running at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, Calif., offering rudimentary protection from ballistic missiles such as those deployed by North Korea. Of course, more needs to be done to enable these missile defenses to catch up with the threat we face. Yet some members of Congress -- perhaps pining for the "good old days" of MAD vulnerability -- want to delay fielding the operational systems and cut the program's budget. Opponents of the systems cite a recent "technical" report from the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) arguing the systems haven't been tested adequately. The report complains the (successful) tests to date weren't fully realistic, that they failed to incorporate all the real-world challenges an operational system must face. But, as Lt. Gen. Ronald Kadish, director of the Missile Defense Agency, rightly observes: "You can't operationally test a system until you put it in place." Indeed, a primary purpose of fielding the system is to test the technologies. For the last three years, Gen. Kadish's agency has followed a new testing approach -- called spiral development -- that allows testing capability and operational capability to feed and inform each other. Imposing traditional "linear" testing standards at this stage -- as urged by UCS and embodied in legislation that may be offered by Sen. Jack Reed, Rhode Island Democrat -- would completely disrupt progress and, paradoxically, produce an even less rigorous testing. The ultimate aim of the UCS report is change policy rather than to uphold or advance science. Their report presents technical arguments only to support the policy argument that the U.S. is better off remaining vulnerable to missile attack. The report's failure to make even one recommendation on how to overcome an alleged technical shortcoming or build a more effective missile defense system exposes the true purpose of the authors. Other members of Congress are prepared to go after funding for the program, arguing that the Pentagon spends too much on missile defense. Sen. Ben Nelson, Nebraska Democrat, may offer an amendment that would cut funding for the construction of additional missile defense interceptors. But missile defense spending has been -- and is projected to remain -- at levels that can be considered only modest at best, by congressional standards. The Bush administration's request for the defense authorization bill now before Congress -- roughly $422 billion -- would devote less than 3 percent of that amount (about $10 billion) to missile defense. No one is arguing the administration's missile-defense program is perfect. For example, there are more promising approaches to building a Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) system than the one currently on the Pentagon's front burner. The administration also should consider trying to adapt the Navy's Standard Missile 2 to missile-defense purposes. These changes could actually accelerate deployment of a fully operational missile defense, but they shouldn't be used as excuses to cut the overall missile-defense budget. For the short term, America must continue to test and field defenses able to defeat limited missile attacks on our homeland. With an operational capability only months away, Congress shouldn't change either the law or existing policy. Instead, it should fully fund the administration's missile defense program. Baker Spring is the Kirby research fellow in national security policy in the Davis Institute for International Studies at the Heritage Foundation. Copyright © 2004 News World Communications, Inc. All rights reserved. |
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Finally, at least the Conservative Press is beginning to go after these phony "scientists" relied upon by the MSM.
Indeed. I'm very glad to see it!
"Agreed we need a deterrent, and should not be dismantling the MX's. Instead we should be deploying them in mobile fashion, ala the new Topol-M."
We already have an offensive deterrent. We have a very large fleet of ballistic missile submarines that circle the globe under the high seas and are virtually impossible for any country on earth to neutralize. This sub fleet can strike anywhere in the world at a moment's notice. The greatest deterrent of all, though, is the will to use this firepower when required. If some Democrat ever gets elected president again, all the high technology we possess won't protect us.
Would a Democrat ever believe that the proper response to a nuclear missile attack on California from North Korea would be a nuclear retaliatory strike? I don't think so! We've already seen that these people don't have the will to avenge the deaths of over 3000 of their own constituents in their own congressional districts! They'd be more likely to just chalk up the loss of Los Angeles as a regrettable, lamentable, but ultimately forgettable, experience. Don't you think?
As for your point about the democrats in the White House...I certainly agree. Kerry and Co. would be more likely to nuke the Red States, than North Korea.
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