This topic doesn't lend its self easily to discussion between persons having different worldviews. We will continue to talk past each other.
I would argue that pain and emotions do not exist independently of the physical body which experiences them.
Ideas are trickier, particularly mathematical ideas that are widely accepted.
We do disagree on whether the mind is an epiphenomenon of the physical brain. I say no, you say yes. But I consider that issue separate from qualia which (IMHO) more closely relates to a (non-corporeal, non-spatial, non-temporal) mathematical structure or idea.
And I would argue that pain and emotions, though they may have their source in bodily troubles, are not experienced as such by the body, but by the mind.
But I imagine this cuts no ice with you, js1138, for the simple reason that you make no distinction between body and mind, seeing the latter as mere epiphenomenon of the former. But this strikes me as a grostesque reductionism. For the mind often (usually) works independently of organic processes taking place in the physical body, most of which we are typically unaware of in any case. To that extent, indeed the mind "had a life of its own." And we can freely direct it to the objects we wish to think about, without having to get the body's "permission" first, so to speak.