And I would argue that pain and emotions, though they may have their source in bodily troubles, are not experienced as such by the body, but by the mind.
But I imagine this cuts no ice with you, js1138, for the simple reason that you make no distinction between body and mind, seeing the latter as mere epiphenomenon of the former. But this strikes me as a grostesque reductionism. For the mind often (usually) works independently of organic processes taking place in the physical body, most of which we are typically unaware of in any case. To that extent, indeed the mind "had a life of its own." And we can freely direct it to the objects we wish to think about, without having to get the body's "permission" first, so to speak.
At first glance this seems to be axiomatic. If a finger felt pain without the mind, a severed hand should react the same as an attached hand to an external pain stimulus like flame.
If I might add one other point - pain is relative. One person may shake off an event that immobilizes another. Likewise, one might feel pain without any physical cause at all - dread, loneliness, Kerry's loss, etc.
The problem we have communicating is that I think you and Alamo engage in reductionism when defining the concept of "physical".
Is a quark a physical object? A photon? An electron? Do you believe these represent the end of our understanding of the physical? How do you assign limits to the properties of physical objects?
Subatomic particles have properties that were not imagined by our ancestors. Heck, they have properties that are impossible to imagine, and which have to be described by mathematics. If you place arbitrary limits to the properties of physiclity, then you are going to wind up with a lot of phenomena that are excluded.