US-India military ties mature cautiously

www.ndtv.com ^ | 11-10-04

[sukhoi-30mki]

Friends and rivals: India, US carry out Naval exercises --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Vishnu Som Sunday, October 10, 2004 (Aboard USS Cowpens):

India and America are holding their latest round of Naval exercises off the coast of Goa. But though both countries have made remarkable strides in their military equation there are some who believe that both sides still consider each other regional rivals waging a turf battle for control of the Indian Ocean. Even exercises as basic as the current ones, would have been unthinkable just a few years ago when diplomatic ties between the two sides were tepid at best.

Growing ties

Today though, the Navies of the two sides are involved in a series of relatively advanced annual exercises held off India's West Coast. This year's exercises called Malabar 4, feature an American nuclear attack submarine, a frigate and the USS Cowpens - a cruiser equipped with state of the art radars and surface to air missiles. But there's more to the new military relationship than just exercises. But for the moment, the Indian Navy seems reluctant to reveal its true capabilities. More than three decades after the USS Enterprise sailed into the Bay of Bengal during the 1971 war, there has been a profound change in America's military equation with India. But despite that, there is a sense of curiosity, even suspicion. The US has an enormous Naval presence in the Indian Ocean, but India considers itself a blue-water force, at least in our own backyard. It is here that there are differences.

'Classified' information

India has consistently rejected the American demand to field its latest Russian built Kilo class submarines in naval exercises, choosing instead to deploy the German HDW-1500 submarine – a type which the US Navy is familiar with. The intention here is to prevent the US Navy from getting an idea of just how quiet the submarine actually is. For America this is a setback because besides India, two of its primary military adversaries – China and Iran also operate these submarines and a better understanding of the true capabilities of this vessel would be invaluable. "I wouldn't necessarily say that they are holding back. What I would say is that we are working towards having a mutual allied relationship," said Lt Henry Holcombe of the USS Cowpens.

Veil of secrecy

But it's not just the Indian Navy which is denying the US a peek at its latest technology. The Indian Air Force has also consistently denied the Americans a chance to exercise with its latest Sukhoi 30 MKI fighter, widely considered the most advanced fighter currently in service. In exercises earlier this year in Gwalior, the IAF gave the Americans a whiff of the far less advanced Su-30K and again rejected an American request when they sent in 25 year old Jaguar fighter-bombers for multinational exercises held in Alaska recently.Perhaps to drive home the point, it is the tiny Singapore Air Force which is the first air force to exercise with the IAF's Su-30 in exercises over Gwalior with the Israeli Air Force next in line. "Whenever the US carries out military exercises with other countries, it's really clear who's calling the shots. All other countries are subordinate powers. For India, we have not worked out the nature of this relationship," said defence analyst Commodore Uday Bhaskar.

Uneasy relationship

Senior US military officers linked to the Malabar exercises say off the record that making progress in the bilateral military relationship has not been easy. They say the Indian Navy needs to accept that the US has the largest maritime force in the region and it is in India's interests to fully engage the US Navy. The Indian Navy sees things quite differently. In its maritime doctrine released this year the Navy has moved to an aggressively competitive strategy aimed at dominating the Indian Ocean Region.It says, "If India is to exude the quiet confidence of a nation that seeks to be neither deferential nor belligerent, but is aware of its own role in the larger global scheme, it will need to recognise what constitutes strategic currency."And clearly, the Navy is wasting no time in implementing this doctrine. The cream of the Western Fleet – six ships and one submarine – are presently operating in the Persian Gulf – a region which the Navy says is well within its sphere of influence. Some of these ships will sail into the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, a move bound to irritate the US.

Positive experience

But despite these differences, for the sailors and pilots not involved in deciding policy, the experience of working closely with professionals of the Indian Navy is a new and positive experience. "I just spent 3 days on the INS Mysore and I didn't detect any reservation at all. I detected fellowship and friendship. We have several vital interests that coincide - regional stability, anti-terrorism, and these exercises bring all of that together," said Lt Sam Barris of the USS Cowpens."I have been on the INS Mysore and it's a beautiful ship. I have talked to some of the Indian pilots and they were very professional. They do exactly what I would expect from another navy," said Lt James Thompson, US Naval Aviator.One way or the other, the partnership with the most powerful armed forces in the world will continue, but unless both sides take a leap of faith, it may be a relationship with an uncertain future

[sukhoi-30mki]

I don't see any reason for the USN to get too worked out bout the Kilos.Poland operates 1 such boat,though it's much older & less sophisticated than the Indian ones.Besides,while the Kilos may be very quiet & carry pretty potent torps & missiles, they do have pretty substandard sonars,ESM & batteries -a weakness which the US & Japan can easily exploit against China's Kilos.The real reason why India doesn't show it's Kilos is because of Russian pressure.Russia being India's largest arms supplier(followed by Israel) wouldn't necessarily be pleased with the US military getting more than a fleeting glance at it's latest toys.Anyway,despite the current hiccups,the fact that India & the US conducted air exercises after nearly 40years(of mutual distrust & suspicision) is enough cause for celebration.

[Eric in the Ozarks]

My dad was stationed in India in the China-Burma-India Campaign. A few years after the war ended, 1948 I think, India became independent from the UK and joined the Soviet orbit.

[razoroccam]

Yep, India joined the Soviet orbit. Thanks to Nehru and his fabian socialism, and the US attitude of "for us or agianst us". America did not understand non-alignment, which it considered morally unacceptable. To boot, India's distrust of Britain rubbed off onto US and Soviets were only too willing to step into the breach. They willingly gave India technology that US/Britain was unwilling to. Such as establishing heavy industries, IIT, etc.

Oh well, that is history. We move on from here.

[El Gato]

A few years after the war ended, 1948 I think, India became independent from the UK and joined the Soviet orbit.

Actually I'd say they didn't really move into the Soveit orbit, or more properly become a Soviet client state, until the Kissenger "tilt towards Pakistan" under Nixon. Before that they were socialist of course, but more on the model of say Sweden. After that they really had little choice but to turn to the Soviets for support against both Pakistan and Red China. Still, they maintained their British military traditions, and a certain degree of foreign policy independence, even fiestiness. For instance they've always maintained close ties to Israel even when that could not have made their Soviet suppliers very happy.

[CarrotAndStick]

Yeah, but a lot of American help went into ensuring India's decision to go pro-Soviet. America(on the suggestions of a CIA director) expected India to disintegrate into several states, and thought Pakistan would be a better bet(we all know the truth today after a broken Pakistan, a la Bangladesh, and a united India). So, what did this great guy prod America to do? Deny critical know how on power, weapons systems etc.,even from American satellites like the UK, France et al. And guess who came to fill in the vacuum? Yes, the Soviets. And Indians haven't failed to show their gratitude to the Russians ever since, for the aid they provided underpinned India's very existence.

But this still did not mean a pro-Soviet tilt. The last straw was broken(by the Americans, obviously) when Nixon ordered the US Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, as if to threaten India, when it was neck deep in a war with Pakistan. This was such a crude shock to India, she never forgave the Americans since then. Mind you, it was the Soviets again who had assured India during that time, by mobilising their carriers and defense ships stationed in the Indian Ocean, toward India, as a way to show America that the Soviets would get involved if America did anything to attack India. It was after this that the Americans retreated. Now what do you expect the Indians to do?

I hope I have shed light on why India was so paradoxically pro-Soviet, even though her soul was a Democracy.

But the good news is, George Bush did more than most in repairing this damage caused in the past, and so we have the beginnings of a very important relationship, both to the Americans as well as the Indians, and the rest of the Sane World.

[sukhoi-30mki]

Actually the Soviets did not have "real" carriers till around 1975 -IIRC,they only had a pair of helicopter carriers & hence didn't have a major surface fleet near the Bay of Bengal in 71.But Admiral Sergei Gorshkov(after whom the Russian carrier which India has acquired is named!!!!) said that the Soviets deployed their nuke subs in the region to watch out for the big E & her escorts.The Soviets signed a pretty comphrensive Treaty of Friendship & cooperation with India in 1971-it was arguably one of Indira Gandhi's masterstrokes as she herself anticipated war & expected China & the US to back Gen Yahya.

[sukhoi-30mki]

Actually the Soviets did not have "real" carriers till around 1975 -IIRC,they only had a pair of helicopter carriers & hence didn't have a major surface fleet near the Bay of Bengal in 71.But Admiral Sergei Gorshkov(after whom the Russian carrier which India has acquired is named!!!!) said that the Soviets deployed their nuke subs in the region to watch out for the big E & her escorts.The Soviets signed a pretty comphrensive Treaty of Friendship & cooperation with India in 1971-it was arguably one of Indira Gandhi's masterstrokes as she herself anticipated war & expected China & the US to back Gen Yahya.

[CarrotAndStick]

You 've got to read this: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2619317.stm

Bangladesh war secrets revealed

By Rick Fountain BBC correspondent in London Secret British official papers from 30 years ago shed new light on the bloody confrontation between India and Pakistan in 1971.

Mr Heath met both Nixon and Gandhi

The papers show that the US administration believed that India was about to dismember Pakistan. The papers include secret transcripts of a summit meeting between the US and British leaders in December that year. US President Richard Nixon and UK Prime Minister Edward Heath met in Bermuda as India and Pakistan fought their third war since gaining independence. The papers relating to that war which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, were released on Wednesday at the Public Record Office in London. Cabinet pressures This was the war that saw the break up of Pakistan's two separate territories, the flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees into India and then the birth of the new state of Bangladesh.

Mr Nixon suspected India of designs on Pakistan

Beyond South Asia, many people saw it as a freedom struggle in which India played a helpful role against an oppressive military hierarchy in West Pakistan, led by General Yahya Khan. But the transcripts of talks between the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and Mr Heath, and of the Heath-Nixon summit in Bermuda, show it was more than that. Mrs Gandhi, on a visit to Britain, told Mr Heath of the pressure in her cabinet for her to take Pakistani territory and not return it. India, she said, had seen Pakistan tying itself to China and now the United States also was establishing links with China. Nixon's friendly overtures to the Chinese, and their closeness to Pakistan, she said, had made it necessary for India to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union. Grim suspicions Meanwhile, Yahya Khan was also seeking British support.

Mrs Gandhi spoke of pressures in her cabinet

He wrote to Mr Heath outlining the Indian military build-up near Pakistani territory, which included seven army divisions confronting West Pakistan and eight near East Pakistan. He also wrote about the deployment by India of comparable air force and naval threats. The offensive posture adopted by India pointed in the direction of conflict, he wrote, not of peace. The other papers, from the Bermuda summit, reinforce that position and highlight US fears. They show that President Nixon and his foreign affairs adviser, Henry Kissinger, suspected India of scheming not just the separation of East Pakistan, but the break-up of West Pakistan and even moves against the Pakistani side of Kashmir. Threatening posture Nixon told the British that Mrs Gandhi was being steered by the Soviets, in response to the building of ties between Pakistan and China.

Sheikh Mujib had been jailed by Yahya Khan

And Mr Kissinger said Nixon had secretly contacted the Soviet leadership to seek an assurance it would restrain India from breaking up West Pakistan. But it was only after the American Seventh Fleet took up a threatening posture offshore that the promise was forthcoming. The outcome, as the world knows, was the creation of Bangladesh, ruled by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and the temporary eclipse of military government in West Pakistan. Mr Rahman was the civilian politician who had been jailed by General Yahya Khan.

[CarrotAndStick]

Here's one more item: http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NAVY/History/1971War/Games.html

© Naval War College Press Vice Admiral Swaraj Prakash (Retd.), NCC Class of 1965 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

I graduated from the Naval Command Course (NCC) at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in 1965. On my return to India, I reported at Naval Headquarters New Delhi for an appointment at sea. As a matter of protocol and having undergone training abroad, I was required to call on the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS) to apprise him of my assessment of the NCC course. I briefly narrated the curriculum, concluding that it was a wholesome course promoting understanding amongst the international naval community. After carefully listening, the Chief shot a straight question back at me: "Do you believe this training in the USA is of any value to the Indian Navy or a prop to your personal career?" I was taken aback a bit, but collecting my wits, I replied that such an exposure as in the NCC should help one to contribute to the interests of the Navy in the long run, and that my career was only a side issue. He gave an enigmatic smile. To date I have not been able to figure out whether the Chief thought that I believed in what I said.

It was exactly six years after the NCC experience, in 1971, that I had the privilege of commanding the only aircraft carrier of the Indian Navy, INS Vikrant. The tension between India and Pakistan was building up. The USA/Soviet Union cold war was at its height, with the famous U.S. tilt against India. A good deal is on record as to how the nuclear carrier task force led by USS Enterprise (the 'Big E') was sailed from the Far East to create a presence in the Bay of Bengal to influence the outcome of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. INS Vikrant Task Force, comprising the carrier and three anti-aircraft/anti-submarine frigates, was deployed in the Bay of Bengal with a directive to establish a Zone of Command to ensure that there was no outside interference from the sea with the advancing Indian Army in the erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). In the execution of its aim the Indian Task Force had in a short time captured about forty foreign and Pakistani ships attempting to break the blockade to reach East Pakistan ports, carrying reinforcements and supplies for the beleaguered Pakistani Army. By 12 December 1971, the fighting on land had entered the final phase in favour of the Indian Army.

INS Vikrant was on patrol north of Andaman Islands blocking the approaches to Chittagong when, on December 15th, late in the evening, the BBC announced the entry of the 'Big-E' task force in the Bay of Bengal. The broadcast added that the U.S. task force was to make for Chittagong to evacuate the stranded American citizens. This was a bolt from the blue. I conjured up a situation of a direct confrontation. I waited for instructions from the Naval Headquarters but none arrived. It was later at night that I decided to proceed south anyway, to intercept the 'Big-E' before she could enter the war zone. It was near midnight when the Midshipman on Watch approached me on the bridge and sought permission to ask a question. I nodded, and he said, "Sir, what would you do when you sight the Big-E?" This question was no doubt uppermost on my mind, but without any hesitation I replied, "You do not have to worry, young man. America is a friendly country, so I would wish the captain of the 'Big E' a good morning and ask him what I could do for him." The midshipman was not convinced and added, "What if the 'Big-E' opened fire against us?" I replied, "I have been educated in the Naval War College, and I understand the American psychology well. If the 'Big-E' attacks us, Abraham Lincoln would be turning in his grave."

Throughout that night INS Vikrant continued her sortie south, and our air recce covered an area to a depth of 500 miles. There was no sign of the U.S. task force, so in the absence of any instruction from the Naval Headquarters I turned back north to rejoin my patrol area. As the day dawned, BBC broadcast amplified its earlier report: that having entered the Bay of Bengal from the Malacca Straits, the U.S. task force had proceeded west instead of going north to Chittagong. On reflection I felt that my reactions in the warlike situation proved the value of my tenure at the NCC. As a postscript to this anecdote, soon after the victory of the Indian Armed Forces, one of the foreign celebrities that visited India was the renowned naval leader Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, Chief of the Soviet Navy. During his visit to Bombay he came onboard INS Vikrant. I had known the Admiral well earlier during my tenure in Moscow as the Indian Naval Attaché. The Admiral congratulated me and asked, "Were you worried about a battle against the American carrier?" He answered himself: "Well, you had no reason to be worried, as I had a Soviet nuclear submarine trailing the American task force all the way into the Indian Ocean." I thought to myself, it is not easy to convert a cold war into a hot war. Cold war is brinkmanship and only posturing. When the chips are down, you do not play cat and mouse games but come prepared to hit hard to vanquish your adversary. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Copyright © Naval War College Press. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part in any form or medium without express written permission of Naval War College Press is prohibited.

[Cronos]

A few years after the war ended, 1948 I think, India became independent from the UK and joined the Soviet orbit.

QUite incorrect -- India only joined the Soviet orbit when Nixon threatened India by sending an aircrat carrier into Indian waters to scare India from liberating Bangladesh

Smatterofact, the Indians were well in the AMerican sphere of influence during the Eisenhower-Kennedy era before Nixon played footsie with commies and slamofascists (in China and Pakistan respectively).

India's played real-politik --> if the US supported India's two enemies, India had to get some other support to balance the power with China -- that was Russia, and to balance the power with Pakistan -- that was Iran.

[Cronos]

The last straw was broken(by the Americans, obviously) when Nixon ordered the US Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal, as if to threaten India, when it was neck deep in a war with Pakistan. This was such a crude shock to India, she never forgave the Americans since then

Nixon WAS a crook. No wonder the Indians find it so hard to forgive. However, you're right -- our present President has pushed ties further with India. During Dubya's second term, I see a much closer relationship

[vfrickey]

I am sure that much of this Indian demurral was for public consumption.

India is a observer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

As such, it actually is to our advantage for India to protect its relations with the Russians - it gives us a potential source of intentions intelligence, to some extent, anyway.

I’m sure that our intent to forgive India’s circumvention of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is something Russia and China have factored into their disclosure of strategic information when India and other observer states have representative at SCO conferences.

However, this is an important juncture in the history of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and it would be very difficult for every person in every SCO full member delegation to exercise complete discretion in what they say around Indian representatives regarding long-range plans for the SCO - such as how much of an hegemony they plan to build - re-integration of some of the more independent trans-Caucasion former republics, such as Kazakhstan, into the Russian orbit, or even use of the SCO as a surrogate entity for the Russians’ and Chinese’s expansionist plans.

That kind of intel is potentially worth a LOT more than what we could learn from trailing new-build Kilos (besides, if we REALLY wanted that intel, that’s what special-ops subs, seafloor hydrophone nets and “tuna clippers” are for).

[vfrickey]

I have to agree with you on every point.

I’ll go further - the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty isn’t worth passing up the chance to repair our relations with India.

NNTP has failed dismally in its stated purpose - every small nation with a pressing perceived need to have nuclear weapons has indeed gotten them, despite the huge costs of doing so before the advent of computer-aided manufacturing (needed to give the necessary finishing some elements of the physics package in a well-designed nuclear weapon), cheap data-processing and acquisition software and hardware, and dramatic improvements in nuclear technology (such as laser isotopic separation).

Now, the chief obstacles of a small nation with a healthy economy to building their own nuclear weapon are human capital and acquiring fissile material. Everything else is much easier and cheaper than it was when France, China, India, Israel and Pakistan were developing their nuclear weapons. (The UK got access to our nuclear weapons technology in exchange for access to their V-agent nerve gases, and to mollify them after the Suez Crisis.)

So the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty hasn’t even been able to stop church mouse-poor North Korea from getting nuclear weapons. I think that the cases generally held up as NNTP “success stories,” Brazil and Argentina, are cases in which neither country was that desperate to get the Bomb.

Likewise, the white South Africans didn’t want to bequeath nuclear weapons to a majority-rule government and Libya was so desperate to resume trading with the West that handing over their nuclear weapons program was much cheaper than continuing to be the pariah state of North Africa.

I am firmly convinced that W. did the right thing by pulling us out of the ABM Treaty - any instability that may have caused is more than compensated for by the added margin of safety when the Russians apparently resumed nuclear testing in direct violation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, going by seismic evidence of several shocks which were in the right energy range to be small nuclear detonations, all near the Russians’ nuclear proving grounds.

Apart from which, Vladimir Putin is himself unstable to a degree that it would probably be a prudent move for us to either insist on on-site verification of the Treaty of Moscow or withdraw from it as well, citing overriding national security interests (but only after replacing Rocky Flats as a plutonium processing center for additional nuclear weapons).

No, the NNTP is a dead letter. It’s time to bury it and go on with our lives and deal with the world we have, not the world we would like.