Khomeinism vs Quietism and the Battle for Najaf

.southernutah.com ^ | 8/19/04

[Valin]

The stakes in Najaf are more than just control over the sacred shrine of Imam Ali. If Najaf again becomes the core of Shiism, the effects could be far-reaching. One way or another, Iraqi forces and U.S. troops may now be finishing a two-week standoff with Moqtada al-Sadr and armed militiamen entrenched around the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf. As I write, there are reports that Sadr has agreed to leave the shrine, but facts are still elastic. It is clear, though, that the battle’s outcome will be key in a tactical-political-military sense and in a more strategic dimension.

The birthplace of Shiite Islam is in Iraq, not Iran, and Najaf is its ancient heart . The city was founded in the 7th century when the body of Ali ibn Abi Talib was entombed there. Ali was the faithful son-in-law of Mohammed and is revered by Shiites as second only to prophet himself. It was the issue of Ali’s right to succeed Mohammed that led to the great schism between Sunni and Shiite. The Imam Ali mosque in Najaf, where he is buried, is the central holy site for 170 million Shia around the world.

Najaf is also the seat of the oldest Hazwa (seminary) for Shiite religious scholars. This thousand-year-old institution is a community of schools, akin to a western university and its cluster of colleges. For centuries the most respected Shiite clerics studied and earned their honors in Najaf and devout Shiites made pilgrimages there.

But over the last 35 years, under severe persecution by Iraq’s secularist Ba’athist party, Najaf was eclipsed as the center of Shiism. Many Najaf clerics and scholars were imprisoned or killed by Saddam’s dictatorship, and others fled to exile in Iran.

Indeed, the most well known alumnus of the Najaf Hawza was the Ayatollah Khomeini. From 1965 to 1978, Khomeini developed the doctrine of “wilayet al-Faqih” which means “the right of the most learned to rule.” Under this concept of governance, absolute authority over all matters--religious, social and political--goes to a supreme judge and theologian.

After the Shah’s overthrow in 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran to build an Islamic theocracy. His doctrine formed the ideological core of Khomeinism, and still supports the monopoly on power held by Iran's ayatollahs. As Najaf’s influence faded under Saddam, Khomeini also pushed to establish Qom, Iran as the preeminent Shiite Hawza. Leaders of the Qom Hawza have buttressed Khomeinist doctrine through their writings and pronouncements.

There is a competing strain of Shiite doctrine, however, stemming from far older roots. That is the “quietist” tradition that the ayatollahs of Najaf have espoused for generations. Quietism holds that a cleric’s proper calling is not to rule, but to advise, teach and guide adherents according to God’s law as found in the Koran and the holy writings. This pure Islamic duty transcends involvement in politics.

The Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is today’s leader of the Najaf Hawza, and is thereby the mouthpiece of Shiite quietism. His moderating voice has consistently called for calm in post-Saddam Iraq, broad cooperation with coalition authorities and the new government, and a push for popular elections. In essence, Sistani’s is a voice for pluralism and against Khomeinist theocracy.

Sistani and other senior clerics of Najaf’s Hawza now pose a major challenge to Iran’s ayatollahs and their claim to leadership of Shiite Islam. Najaf has re-emerged to reclaim its ancient place as Shiism’s center. Islamic scholars have been quitting Qom for Najaf and (until the recent fighting) thousands of pilgrims have flocked to the city’s holy sites. Along with returning scholars and pilgrims have come money and renewed influence for Najaf in the Islamic world.

This resurgence greatly worries the mullahs in Iran, and their anxiety goes a long way to explain the actions of Sadr, who claims allegiance to Khadem al-Haeri, a senior Shiite mullah in Qom. Iran has also reportedly sent funding, arms and even fighters to Sadr.

If Najaf again becomes the core of Shiism--with Grand Ayatollah Sistani, the Imam Ali mosque, quietist doctrine and the Hawza--the effects could be far-reaching. The drive towards a fledgling democracy in Iraq will be strengthened, a more moderate example of Islamic thought will emerge, and the grip of the Islamo-fascists in Iran will be weakened.