Posted on 09/10/2004 3:46:54 AM PDT by carton253
I think that Lee understood all those things, like any good general would. But he also knew that there wasn't a damned thing he could do about it. I believe that, like Yamamoto in WWII, Lee in 1863 and later fought because it was his duty to fight, not because he believed the south could win.
That's a very reasonable proposition. "Why did they do that?" is always one of the issues that interests me most. After all, it's not as if any of our discussions changes anything ... they're all still dead, bless their hearts.
And of course, with Civil War and earlier, and even some later engagements, there often a question of "What actually happened?" The facts we thought we knew continually have to be checked against newly-discovered or newly-published information. And then we have to ask whether the new information is any more accurate than the old ... keeps life interesting!
A confederate victory anywhere would have left Lee with the problems I mentioned earlier. He would be hundreds of miles behind Union lines, low on ammunition, and with his supply train loaded with thousands of wounded. Lee couldn't maneuver towards Baltimore or DC or anywhere else without abandoning them. And that doesn't solve the question of munitions. Where were those to come from? Unlike the Union armies in northern Virginia, Lee had no supply line back home. He was on his own. Go North, fight a battle, come home. Those were his only options, and not ones that you win a war on.
When Lee sent his engineers out to reccointer the ground... Sickles hadn't advanced into the Peach Orchard...and Meade hadn't found it necessary to reinforce the line with 20,000 soldiers.
It's obvious that Lee told Longstreet to march up the Emmittsburg Road. He even corrected Longstreet when Longstreet tried to reposition McLaws division. Lee told Longstreet, “No, General, no; I want his position perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Road.”
In all the histories of Gettysburg which I have read nowhere is this movement up the Emmitsburg road mentioned.
Netherless, Lee told Longstreet to march up the Emmittsburg Road. Hood protested and that became the well known event entitled "Hood's Protest." The movie Gettysburg captures the protest very well. That just wasn't movie dramatics...
the peach orchard area is almost equidistant from both the round tops and seminary ridge. I have stood on that ground....and it is not good ground. It is exposed and would be difficult to resupply and defend.
Both General Lee and General Sickles disagree with you.
I am saving your tour. See my 61.
What are the credentials of the author?
Fine. Still an impossible task. 3 corps (one of which was already badly mauled and one division which was not up yet) were not going to take seven corps (even if one or two were damaged). After fighting through the Peach Orchard, his troops would have been under enfilade fire from both the Round Tops and from the Cemetery Hill line.
Agree. I don't think he could have "TAKEN" the ridge, merely occupied a small part long enough to be annihilated.
Lee was screwed. It is a good example of how he is less brilliant a commander than has been argued. No one was going to "roll up" seven corps, and certainly not Meade's corps.
You left out 600,000 dead people. An unbelievable number of permanently disabled and a country that took decades and decades to heal. And whether it was all worth it. That's what's left to know.
Well bless my soul if it isn't my favorite cross-dressing confederate, DorisKearnsGoodwad? I had heard that you were dead, I'm glad to see that the rabies are in remission. Now don't you worry your little heart about me, dearie. Just sit back, wipe the foam off your mouth, take your meds, and relax. I'll be good. I promise.
Food was the least of Lee's problems. The Army of Northern Virginia lived better living off the people of Pennsylvania in the few short weeks of the campaign than they had in the months before in Virginia. But you can't shoot a loaf of bread, and Lee had just shot off most of his munitions at Gettysburg. Lee had thousands of wounded. He wasn't in friendly territory, like he was after Second Bull Run. He couldn't send them to safety, he had to either abandon them or take them with him. WIth his column loaded with wounded, and not enough ammunition for another major engagement, Lee could not continue in the North.
I don't know about that... He had done a pretty fine job up to that point...rolling up the Federal Line and sending them running back to Washington.
Who? Lee? After serious casualties on Day 1 against two brigades of cavalry and, ultimately, a couple of late-arriving divisions. Sorry, there was no way he could win that battle after the morning of July 1.
Longstreet's memoirs discuss Jackson's performance in that battle. Basically, he wore himself and his troops to a frazzle and left something like a third to a half of his strength straggling behind in his lightning march down from the Shenandoah Valley. He achieved his aim of arriving in the field before the opponent discovered his march, but the march destroyed his troops' ability to fight, and his to think: the evening he arrived was the time he fell asleep with food in his mouth (you'll have heard of that incident). He was getting an oral briefing over a plate of chow and just fell asleep sitting up with his fork in his hand.
The next two days in the field, Longstreet comments on the seeming lethargy of Jackson's Corps, which was partly Jackson's being fogged with fatigue and partly his troops' being asleep on their feet and slow in evolutions.
Now, if only Grant and Meade had said that! ;^D
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.