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I called our local Clear Channel station last night and spoke for about 10 minutes describing the procedures used to handle classified information. The following is a basic description of what I said ...

1) A person who wishs to review classified information at a given facility must have his/her clearance on file with the security office that has legal custody of the information.

2) Once they arrive to the facility, they must show their credentials to identify themselves, sign into the facility - maybe issued a badge indicating their clearance and access and escorted to the room where the material will be reviewed.

3) Once in the room, the container (probably a safe i.e. a very heavy duty file cabinet with heavy combination locks with different combinations on each drawer) is opened. This process should be logged by security personnel.

4) The documents are taken from the container. All classified documents are stamped (each page) with items such as a control number, date of creation, level of clearance (top and bottom), program name indicating what access is required and eventual disspensation (i.e. when the material is desiginated to destruction if applicable).

5) If the documents are classified "top secret", each document has a log on the cover sheet. EACH time a person has access to this information, they must sign and date it.

6) The material is not to be removed (ie stuffed in underwear, socks ... etc) without approval of security personnel. If this takes place, the transfer is documented on both ends of the transaction. If the material is top secret or above, it requires at least two cleared people as an escort.

7) If you travel overnight, the material is not to be kept in your hotel/motel room but instead must be taken to an approved facility. Arrangements are usually made in advance. Security people do not like suprise visits. They like to make them but not receive them.

8) No photocopies are to be made or notes copied without the proper security personnel logging this activity and making appropriate markings (mentioned above) on the documents.

9) This material is frequently audited by internal security agents and is subject to "suprise" audits conducted by military, FBI or other external security personnel.

10) People given access to this type of information are briefed and attend classes on how to handle this material - ie. no excuses for "honest mistakes".

11) As the NSA for the clinton administration, I imagine Berger was personally responsible that this protocol was designed, implemented and enforced by his staff - at least in an appropriately managed administration. This would apply to government employees, officials, military personnel and civilians under contract and extended clearances issued by the DoD, DoE or other intel operations.

12) As such, ANYBODY who has worked in this environment and heard Mr. Berger's comments yesterday about being "sloppy" and "an honest mistake" knows beyond any doubt that he was not only lying, but this was a premeditated act.

13) I left the aerospace business(as an engineer) in 1993 so these comments are based upon the security world of that time. Only Lord knows how the clinton adm changed things during his 8 years.

That summarizes what I mentioned to Steve Cannon of WTVN 610 AM (Columbus, Oh) last night.

The latest word I have heard from this morning is that this material was classified "Code Word Access". Folks, if true, this is "Above Top Secret" ie. John Pollard type material.

So the question comes to mind, why would anybody do such a thing under conditions where he knew he stood a huge chance of being caught? The mission must have been extrodinary for such a risk. The presumption is that he wanted to alter or remove and destroy material that implicated either himself, or quite possibly mr. clinton. The fact that some of the material is "lost" implies that regardless of the consequences, the mission has been accomplished with his current situation collateral damage.

Webb Hubbell's infamous quote "I guess I'll have to roll over again for Hillary" comes to mind. Another example of the clinton whirlwind leaving a trail of destruction in its wake.

8) No photocopies are to be made or notes copied without the proper security personnel logging this activity and making appropriate markings (mentioned above) on the documents.

HERE is something very important to consider:

1. from your info, it seems that each document has a cover sheet that states who has viewed the info, dated, etc.

2. Each copy of the document that he took must have had those notations as to who viewed them, and when.

Maybe THIS is what drove him to steal those documents.

Aslo, the docs alledgedly had notations in the margins of from the Clinton people's reviews as the drafts were being created. Those notations would be interesting.