Posted on 07/16/2004 1:16:10 PM PDT by bikepacker67
While the intelligence on Iraq's weapons capabilities was seriously flawed, the arguments for going to war were sound, writes Tony Parkinson.
Many months of investigation into the pre-war intelligence assessments of Iraq's weapons programs, helped along by large dollops of hindsight, have established beyond doubt that lamentable failures occurred.
The reports of two exhaustive official inquiries in the United States and Britain have exposed the paucity of hard-and-fast knowledge among Western intelligence agencies about Saddam Hussein's biological and chemical weapons capabilities at the time of invasion in March 2003.
On this basis, it is clear that the intelligence community, in their advice to governments, over-stated the case. With the important caveat that the final reports of the Iraq Survey Group are still to come, what can be stated with some degree of certainty is that Saddam's Iraq did not have WMD stockpiles ready to deploy.
Does this invalidate the arguments for war? No.
Under United Nations Security Council resolutions, the burden of proof was on Saddam's regime, not the US-led allies, to establish beyond doubt Iraq had dismantled his weapons programs.
Iraq did not comply throughout the 1990s. It did not comply in 2002-03. Under Saddam, it was never going to comply. That he is no longer in power removes the main source of doubt.
However, as Lord Butler concluded in his report to the British Government, it would still be "incredibly rash", even today, to assume that WMD would never be found in Iraq.
Saddam Hussein, to the last, had strategic intent. We know this from the findings of illegal and undeclared missile programs. We know this from confirmation that Iraq had indeed been on shopping expeditions to Africa for uranium.
When, if ever, will purveyors of the Big Lie conspiracy admit it is a big furphy?In the past fortnight the US Senate intelligence committee and the Butler inquiry have found that British claims of Iraq's interest in African uranium were reliable and substantive.
So much for the discredited testimony of retired US ambassador Joe Wilson. So much for the flap over a forged document on the Niger connection. So much for those who paraded this episode as proof positive of the Big Lie.
Indeed, this leads to another important and indisputable fact to emerge from these inquiries. Whatever the intelligence failings, these investigations have found no basis whatsoever to the sordid conspiracy theory that the Iraq threat was a hoax cooked up the US, Britain and Australia.
In January this year I wrote the following: "Hands up those who overestimated the capacity of Saddam's Iraq to produce and deploy weapons of mass destruction. I, for one, plead guilty. Now, hands up those who accused the US, British and Australian governments of lying their way to war, by manufacturing or manipulating evidence of Iraq's weapons stocks... anyone ready to confess they got that one wrong?"
Not wishing to harp on it but, six months later, the wait continues. Given accountability is at the heart of the matter, when, if ever, will purveyors of the Big Lie conspiracy admit it is a big furphy?
It would be naive to expect the likes of arthouse fabulist Michael Moore to retract. The filmmaker is onto a nice little earner, and has a luxury lifestyle to show for his obese imagination.
As for an otherwise reasonable person in the habit of peddling this fiction, Labor's foreign affairs spokesman, Kevin Rudd, he at least has the excuse of being in the business of seeking partisan advantage wherever opportunities arise.
There is nothing new or original about politicians calling each other liars, and if politicians decide by their words and actions to devalue their own currency, that is entirely a choice for them.
The same excuse does not extend to those who fill newspaper columns or radio airwaves. Here there is an expectation - indeed, a responsibility - to go beyond the cheap shot, the glib assumption, the weird and wacky conspiracy.
In this debate, the media has been exemplary in chasing down flaws in prewar intelligence, but not so vigilant in holding to account those making sweeping accusations of dishonesty.
One reason perhaps is that some in the media might have a personal problem in confronting those promoting these shabby misrepresentations - for, in some instances, it would almost certainly involve the awkward if purgative experience of taking a long, hard look in the mirror.
Thank You John Howard!
Bump!
Hey AUBoy, maybe you can tell me what a "furphy" is?
Why is everyone so down on the intelligence agencies. We knew he had chemical weapons. He used them. And he never demonstrated that he had gotten rid of them. The intelligence agencies would have been idiots not to conclude he still had them, absent proof to the contrary.
Not me!
Under United Nations Security Council resolutions, the burden of proof was on Saddam's regime, not the US-led allies, to establish beyond doubt Iraq had dismantled his weapons programs.
June 2003 - The head of Iraq's pre-1991 centrifuge uranium enrichment program, Dr. Mahdi Shukur Ubaydi, approached U.S. officials in Baghdad and turned over a volume of centrifuge documents and components he had hidden in his garden from inspectors since 1991. Dr. Ubaydi said he was interviewed by IAEA inspectors - most recently in 2002 - but did not reveal any of this. · Dr. Ubaydi told us that these items, blue prints and key centrifuge pieces, represented a complete template for what would be needed to rebuild a centrifuge uranium enrichment program. He also claimed this concealment was part of a secret, high-level plan to reconstitute the nuclear weapons program once sanctions ended. · This case illustrates the extreme challenge we face in Iraq as we search for evidence of WMD programs that were designed to elude detection by international inspectors. · We are working with Dr. Ubaydi to evaluate the equipment and documents he provided us. · We are hopeful that Dr. Ubaydi's example will encourage other Iraqis with knowledge of Saddam's WMD programs to come forward.
Also see:
Libya Expected To Announce in September Report That Iraqi WMD DID Exist And Were Developed THERE
Senate Intel Report: Saddam's Nuke Scientists Active Till War
"Furphy" sounds like one of Whoopi's terms of endearment.
From reading in context, I wonder if it means a prevailing mania or craze (not based on logic or fact, but on conjecture). MM's F911 might be a "furphymentary".
Any mates out there who can shed some light?
The same excuse does not extend to those who fill newspaper columns or radio airwaves. Here there is an expectation - indeed, a responsibility - to go beyond the cheap shot, the glib assumption, the weird and wacky conspiracy.
The same excuse must indeed be extended to those who fill newspaper columns; the First Amendment assigns to the people alone the power to assign responsibility to newspaper editors, reporters, and publishers. The people can do so only if they do not presume that journalists can be trusted implicitly to "go beyond the cheap shot, the glib assumption, the weird and wacky conspiracy."In this debate, the media has been exemplary in chasing down flaws in prewar intelligence, but not so vigilant in holding to account those making sweeping accusations of dishonesty.
One reason perhaps is that some in the media might have a personal problem in confronting those promoting these shabby misrepresentations - for, in some instances, it would almost certainly involve the awkward if purgative experience of taking a long, hard look in the mirror.
Ii is silly to presume anything else.
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