Iraq Pre-War Intelligence Report: Additional Views of Chairman Pat Roberts ... (on Wilson, Plame)

Below are the "Additional Comments" of Sens. Roberts, Hatch and Bond that were appended at the very long Senate Intelligence report, along with other Senator's comments.

I've excerpted those that deal with the Niger uranium issue because of the popularity of the topic.

...Despite our hard and successful work to deliver a unanimous report, however, there were two issues on which the Republicans and Democrats could not agree: 1) whether the Committee should conclude that former Ambassador Joseph Wilson’s public statements were not based on knowledge he actually possessed, and 2) whether the Committee should conclude that it was the former ambassador’s wife who recommended him for his trip to Niger.

The Committee began its review of prewar intelligence on Iraq by examining the Intelligence Community’s sharing of intelligence information with the UNMOVIC inspection teams. (The Committee’s findings on that topic can be found in the section of the report titled, “The Intelligence Community’s Sharing of Intelligence on Iraqi Suspect WMD Sites with UN Inspectors.”) Shortly thereafter, we expanded the review when former Ambassador Joseph Wilson began speaking publicly about his role in exploring the possibility that Iraq was seeking or may have acquired uranium yellowcake from Africa. Ambassador Wilson’s emergence was precipitated by a passage in President Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union address which is now referred to as “the sixteen words.” President Bush stated, “. . . the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa.” The details of the Committee’s findings and conclusions on this issue can be found in the Niger section of the report. What cannot be found, however, are two conclusions upon which the Committee’s Democrats would not agree. While there was no dispute with the underlying facts, my Democrat colleagues refused to allow the following conclusions to appear in the report:

"Conclusion: The plan to send the former ambassador to Niger was suggested by the former ambassador’s wife, a CIA employee."

The former ambassador’s wife suggested her husband for the trip to Niger in February 2002. The former ambassador had traveled previously to Niger on behalf of the CIA, also at the suggestion of his wife, to look into another matter not related to Iraq. On February 12, 2002, the former ambassador’s wife sent a memorandum to a Deputy Chief of a division in the CIA’s Directorate of Operations which said, “[m]y husband has good relations with both the PM [prime minister] and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity.” This was just one day before the same Directorate of Operations division sent a cable to one of its overseas stations requesting concurrence with the division’s idea to send the former ambassador to Niger.

"Conclusion: Rather than speaking publicly about his actual experiences during his inquiry of the Niger issue, the former ambassador seems to have included information he learned from press accounts and from his beliefs about how the Intelligence Community would have or should have handled the information he provided."

At the time the former ambassador traveled to Niger, the Intelligence Community did not have in its possession any actual documents on the alleged Niger-Iraq uranium deal, only second hand reporting of the deal. The former ambassador’s comments to reporters that the Niger-Iraq uranium documents “may have been forged because ‘the dates were wrong and the names were wrong,’” could not have been based on the former ambassador’s actual experiences because the Intelligence Community did not have the documents at the time of the ambassador’s trip. In addition, nothing in the report from the former ambassador’s trip said anything about documents having been forged or the names or dates in the reports having been incorrect. The former ambassador told Committee staff that he, in fact, did not have access to any of the names and dates in the CIA’s reports and said he may have become confused about his own recollection after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in March 2003 that the names and dates on the documents were not correct. Of note, the names and dates in the documents that the IAEA found to be incorrect were not names or dates included in the CIA reports.

Following the Vice President’s review of an intelligence report regarding a possible uranium deal, he asked his briefer for the CIA’s analysis of the issue. It was this request which generated Mr. Wilson’s trip to Niger. The former ambassador’s public comments suggesting that the Vice President had been briefed on the information gathered during his trip is not correct, however. While the CIA responded to the Vice President’s request for the Agency’s analysis, they never provided the information gathered by the former Ambassador. The former ambassador, in an NBC Meet the Press interview on July 6, 2003, said, “The office of the Vice President, I am absolutely convinced, received a very specific response to the question it asked and that response was based upon my trip out there.” The former ambassador was speaking on the basis of what he believed should have happened based on his former government experience, but he had no knowledge that this did happen.

These and other public comments from the former ambassador, such as comments that his report “debunked” the Niger-Iraq uranium story, were incorrect and have led to a distortion in the press and in the public’s understanding of the facts surrounding the Niger-Iraq uranium story. The Committee found that, for most analysts, the former ambassador’s report lent more credibility, not less, to the reported Niger-Iraq uranium deal.

During Mr. Wilson’s media blitz, he appeared on more than thirty television shows including entertainment venues. Time and again, Joe Wilson told anyone who would listen that the President had lied to the American people, that the Vice President had lied, and that he had “debunked” the claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Africa. As discussed in the Niger section of the report, not only did he NOT “debunk” the claim, he actually gave some intelligence analysts even more reason to believe that it may be true. I believed very strongly that it was important for the Committee to conclude publicly that many of the statements made by Ambassador Wilson were not only incorrect, but had no basis in fact.

In an interview with Committee staff, Mr. Wilson was asked how he knew some of the things he was stating publicly with such confidence. On at least two occasions he admitted that he had no direct knowledge to support some of his claims and that he was drawing on either unrelated past experiences or no information at all. For example, when asked how he “knew” that the Intelligence Community had rejected the possibility of a Niger-Iraq uranium deal, as he wrote in his book, he told Committee staff that his assertion may have involved “a little literary flair.”

The former Ambassador, either by design or through ignorance, gave the American people and, for that matter, the world a version of events that was inaccurate, unsubstantiated, and misleading. Surely, the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has unique access to all of the facts, should have been able to agree on a conclusion that would correct the public record. Unfortunately, we were unable to do so.

I think Joe was just making some retroactive opinion he learned from elsewhere...then started to talk as if he independently knew this.

Upon reflection, I suspect you're right. Ol' Joe has a serious case of the bigmouth knowitalls and becoming a "celebrity" only exacerbated the symptoms.

Still, I have no doubt that Ms. Secret Agent wasn't sharing sensitive classified information with Mr. Ambassador. Especially when it came to what the CIA didn't know about the intelligence the Brits wouldn't share...

"Still, I have no doubt that Ms. Secret Agent wasn't sharing sensitive classified information with Mr. Ambassador. Especially when it came to what the CIA didn't know about the intelligence the Brits wouldn't share..."

Absolutely. He sounded like her, citing the appropriate arcane laws.

I haven't read the whole report

But has anyone from the committee asked or addressed as to why Valarie Plume would suggest sending her husband ... a man who has no experience in CIA investigations?

Ping

Wonder if Hannity, or perhaps even O'Reilly (eyes rolling here), could be persuaded to air this on Fox news. For that matter, Joe Scarboro on MSNBC might also be a likely candidate. --Love Scarboro, but he too often lets his guests get away with voicing the dems lying talking points without challenge.

Senator Roberts did a horrible job representing the republicans and defending the President on TV. He was a disgrace.

Somebody needs to get this posted permanently on the right side of the site in extended news.

or keep posting and bumping tot he top

Isn't it funny how Wilson *knew* they were fakes without seeing them?

Follow those "French contacts" that Wilson's wife said he had and we're liable to find out who planted the forgery.

Follow those "French contacts" that Wilson's wife said he had and we're liable to find out who planted the forgery.

A definite possibility. France had MOM alright.

Method = They've done every other sneaky underhanded thing they could to stop/impede the war

Opportunity = France is very close to Niger, especially French Intelligence. It is wholly within their ability to create a seemy persuasive fake that will immidately fall apart once made public. Also, French Intelligence knew that Hussein had irrespective of the fake tried to buy uranium in Niger.

Motive = The list here is almost endless. Bribes to French countries. Close personal relationship between Chirac and Hussein. Political advantages of weakening the US for France. Semilegitimate business ties to Iraq. Etc Etc Etc.

51 posted on 07/16/2004 11:49:30 AM PDT by swilhelm73 (We always have been, we are, and I hope that we always shall be detested in France. -Duke Wellington)

But has anyone from the committee asked or addressed as to why Valarie Plume would suggest sending her husband ... a man who has no experience in CIA investigations?

And a man close to the opposition party and the government of Saudi Arabia who was very publicly antiwar.

52 posted on 07/16/2004 11:51:17 AM PDT by swilhelm73 (We always have been, we are, and I hope that we always shall be detested in France. -Duke Wellington)

France is very close to Niger, especially French Intelligence.

I checked out the CIA World Fact Book. France is not only the biggest trading partner with Niger, but several thousand French live in the country and basically run the economy. With world uranium sales down, there was definately incentive to sell yellowcake regardless of the buyer.

The Democrats are counting on Media allies to ignore this "smoking gun" memo.

And I'm sure they will get their wish.

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