Posted on 06/23/2004 9:02:35 AM PDT by Cannoneer No. 4
June 23, 2004: The Army is transitioning to the new “Units of Action” (UA). This article compares the combat power of the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) used during the 2003 Iraq campaign, to the Heavy UA. The UA is still evolving and can be expected to change further as the 3rd Infantry Division rotates its units through the National Training Center and its forthcoming deployment back to Iraq.
At first glance, the UA’s appear slightly more robust. The table below shows the number of major combat vehicles in each unit: [somebody post these tables for me]
The BCT of two Tank battalions and one Mech infantry battalion, can, alternatively, contain two Mech infantry battalions and one Tank battalion.
Using TacOps’ wargame to compute combat power for these major systems; the BCT scores 17710 to the UA’s score of 17282. The difference is a mere two percent.
What are the ramifications of this change in organization?
On the positive side, it finally forms Combined Arms Battalions (CAB) with two armor and two mechanized infantry companies (an innovation long practiced in Armored Cavalry Squadrons) together with an assigned engineer company.
It has a robust reconnaissance capability, unfortunately without tanks, but does add UAV and NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) reconnaissance units. The UA has eight to 12 UAV’s: 4 in the artillery battalion, 4 in the Recon Squadron, and perhaps 4 in the MI (Military Intelligence) Company.
On the down side, with only two CABs, commanders will have difficulty constituting a reserve. Enhanced information flow and a common operating picture may provide a more nimble organization and allow information to be the reserve much like artillery’s ammunition is its reserve. The recon squadron can be used as a reserve, if needed.
Two assigned artillery batteries prevent each battalion from having a dedicated battery, and there are no long-range fires to support the recon squadron or provide counter-fire support. The commander cannot weight the main effort. The recon squadron will be heavily dependent upon its 6 120mm mortars.
The UA appears to lack air defense and aviation support.
The recon squadron may be handicapped in complex terrain without engineer support.
With four UAs instead of three BCTs, the Division has more combat units as shown below. This provides the division the ability to cover more ground, increases reconnaissance capability, and more flexibility, at a cost of slightly less artillery.
It is difficult to game out these organizations. Part of this is because in a wargame, the player has perfect knowledge and situational awareness of what his units are doing and what they face, thereby actually simulating the modern digital environment, has a shorter decision cycle, and partly because in simulations it is still mostly a force on force battle. On the negative side, since the player controls every unit, he is more pressed than an actual commander who has subordinates and a staff to assist in decision making, but the ability to pause and save the game allows him time to think about what to do in a given situation.
My study with TacOps and other simulations indicates the UA needs an MLRS Battery for long range and counter-battery fires, plus an additional cannon battery and an engineer company for the reconnaissance squadron.
It will be interesting to see what results from NTC rotations will show. Will they be highly effective or will my informal evaluation be more on the mark? And, how will these brigades fare in the Stability and Support Operations now on going in Iraq? -- Michael K. Robel
ping
A reserve is something like inventory for a business. If you have a better view of inputs and outputs, you don't need as much inventory.
I wonder if the Army's decision to not cover long range & counter-battery fire is an indication of a future system they have planned or if it denotes a decision to call on USAF & Navy/Marine air to cover them.
"allow information to be the reserve" "A reserve is something like inventory for a business. If you have a better view of inputs and outputs, you don't need as much inventory."
Hard to kill anyone with information as the sole weapon unless it is paper form and crushed against their skull. Comparing the reserve to inventory implies that running out of inventory kills the business. Running out of a reserve or having none to start with could kill the 'company'
Sometimes, numbers of troops does matter.
Perhaps if you look at as being able to put soldiers where they are needed when they are needed. With today's superior battle field information gathering capabilities a commander has much better ability to purposefully direct their troops. One squad in the right place at the right time can be just as effective as a company arriving later.
To extend the analogy, compare factories today to factories 50 years ago. They used to have to large piles of parts on hand in order to even out inevitable fluctuations in deliveries. Nowadays, just-in-time manufacturing techniques eliminate the need for large on-hand inventories.
A reserve is something like inventory for a business. If you have a better view of inputs and outputs, you don't need as much inventory.
| Equipment | BCT (2Tank/1MECH) |
UA Brigade | Change |
| M1A1/A2 | 88 | 58 | -30 |
| M2A2/A3 | 44 | 58 | +14 |
| M3A2 | 0 | 36 | +36 |
| M1064 | 14 | 14 | -- |
"Perhaps if you look at as being able to put soldiers where they are needed when they are needed. With today's superior battle field information gathering capabilities a commander has much better ability to purposefully direct their troops. One squad in the right place at the right time can be just as effective as a company arriving later."
Don't disagree with this comment, however, that statement presupposes that the commander has all the info at the beginning AND that he has a non-committed force to use at the right time based on new and better info.
"Nowadays, just-in-time manufacturing techniques eliminate the need for large on-hand inventories."
I was hoping you would bring up 'JIT', AARs would indicate that JIT didn't get it during the last war, especially in the ammo department. SOF has a good article re: this subject in their latest issue. Early reports during the war indicated the logisticians had difficulty meeting JIT requirements for H20/chow and ammo during the runup to Baghdad. JIT rarely worked in the squadron, extended the AC downtime. Nothing like a crewchief with a parts bin.
Whatever the results from the National Training Center,
its doubtful the new organizational structure will be
changed much. The Army High Command has too much invested
in the new concept to allow implementation to be derailed
by actual results. Even if results demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that the new system is flawed beyond repair, the results will be fudged or explained away. Divisions will be ordered to make the new system work.
BTTT
Help me out here? Maybe give this to a freeper who's well versed in such or knows where to look?
On June 1942 the Germans landed two U-boats off of America's Eastern Coast, disembarking eight secret agents given the mission of destroying inland factories and industrial plants in the United States. The mission failed when two of the German spies informed the FBI of their plans. What was the name of this mission?
.
Mission =
ALOHA RONNIE's June 10, 1942 Birth
.
I believe at least one (of the landings) was in Florida.
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