No Evidence of Meeting With Iraqi
By James Risen
Jayson Blair is gone, but his spirit remains.
http://edwardjayepstein.com/2002question/prague.htm
Question:
What is the status of the meeting in Prague between September 11th hijacker Mohamed Atta and Iraqi embassy intelligence officer, Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir Al-Ani?
Answer:
The basic information has not changed: Czech counter intelligence determined that an Iraqi official under its surveillance met Atta in April 2001. The interpretation of it, however, has undergone a number of vacillations. Here is the chronology:
1. October 13, 2001. Based on an apparent leak from the Czech foreign ministry in Prague, Czech newspapers reported that Czech foreign minister Jan Kavan had briefed Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington about a trip Atta had taken to the Czech Republic in April. Kavan said that Czech intelligence had observed Mohamed Atta meeting in Prague with Iraqi Counsel Al-Ani. Since Ani worked as a case officer for Iraqi intelligence, the liaison implied a connection between the hijackers and Iraq.
After the leaked story was confirmed by the State Department, the Wall Street Journal and other newspapers published the story about the liaison.
2. On October 20th, John Tagliabue wrote in the New York Times that Czech officials had denied such a meeting had ever taken place.
3. On October 26th, Stanislav Gross, the Minister of Interior of the Czech Republic, called a press conference to clarify what was known about the meeting. Gross was in a position to do so because the Czech counterintelligence service, the BIS, reported to him, not to Parliament or the President. He explained that Atta had been in the Czech Republic at least twice: on June 2, 2000 and in early April 2001. During his brief June visit, Gross said Atta was not observed by Czech intelligence, but in April, "We can confirm now that during his trip to the Czech Republic, he did have a contact with an officer of the Iraqi intelligence, Mr. Ahmad Khalil Ibrahim Samir al Ani."
Since Gross had full access to the records of the BIS, which uses both electronic surveillance and visual surveillance, his confirmation sent shock waves around the world.
4. In Baghdad, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz denied that the meeting had taken place. In case he was proven wrong, however, he said: "Even if such an incident had taken place, it doesn't mean anything. Any diplomat in any mission might meet people in a restaurant here or there and talk to them, which is meaningless. If that person turned out to be something else, that doesn't mean he had a connection with what that person did later."
5. On October 27th, the New York Times published an extraordinary refutation of its October 20th story, co-written by Patrick E. Tyler and John Tagliabue . This piece asserted that, contrary to the prior denial, sources confirmed that the meeting had in fact taken place.
The Times story provided a number of new details, such as a Czech member of parliament, who had been briefed by the Czech intelligence services on this issue, said he “believed the meeting with Atta may have been captured by airport surveillance cameras.” This would imply that the meeting took place at the Prague airport. It also reported that on Friday April 20th, Hynek Kmonicek, the deputy foreign minister of the Czech Republic, had al-Ani expelled from the Czech Republic for activities incompatible with his diplomatic status.
Kmonicek, who was quoted in the Times story, explained Al-Ani’s expulsion was connected to his meeting with Atta. "It's not a common thing for an Iraqi diplomat to meet a student from a neighboring country.” Atta had been a student in Hamburg. If al-Ani’s expulsion proceeded from his meeting with Atta, then clearly Czech intelligence had identified Atta some four months before the September 11th attack.
The New York Times did not, however, rely solely on Czech sources to publish such a corrective story. Tyler and Tagliabue also confirmed the story with US ‘law enforcement officials’ and the White House. By that time, the FBI had pieced together Atta’s movements from INS files, car rental records, vehicles, airlines reservations data and other documents. These files showed Atta’s entries into the US when he used his passport, when he rented and returned vehicles, and some flights he had booked.
The story stated “Federal law-enforcement officials said the Prague meeting fits into Atta's itinerary this way: On April 4 he was in Virginia Beach. He flew to the Czech Republic on April 8 and met with the Iraqi intelligence officer, who was identified as Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani. By April 11, Atta was back in Florida renting a car.”
The New York Times also said “A senior Bush administration official Friday night indicated the Czech decision to go public with the information about the meeting took Washington by surprise. “As for the meeting itself, the official said, "We are not sure we know exactly the full meaning of this, but we have known about it for some time." So presumably the President had known that one of the September 11 hijackers was observed by the Czech intelligence contacting an Iraqi official in Prague in April 2001.
6. In November, Czech Prime Minister Milos Zeman added another element to the story. He said that when Czech intelligence determined Atta had contacted Al-Ani, it raised the “hypothesis” that the purpose of the meeting might be to discuss an attack on the Prague the headquarters for U.S.-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
This hypothesis was based on information provided by Jabir Salim in December 1998. Salim, like Al-Ani, had been the Iraq Consul in Prague, and had defected. When debriefed by western intelligence services, he revealed that Iraq had been planning a car bombing of Radio Free Europe. So when al-Ani took Salim’s place at the Iraq Embassy, Czech intelligence assumed that he might be continuing that mission, which accounted for the surveillance on al-Ani.
Although the hypothesis about the Radio Free Europe target proved wrong on September 11th, it raised another potentially embarrassing intelligence concern: Did the Czechs pass on information about the al-Ani encounter, and the reasons for his expulsion, to other intelligence services prior to September 11th?
Heightened security at Radio Free Europe and the Al-Ani expulsion that April were highly visible moves. Since Radio Free Europe, was a prime US target in the Czech Republic, the Czechs had reason to explain the security precautions to US intelligence. After all, the US they had capabilities for surveillance unavailable to the Czech intelligence. Since al-Ani’s predecessor, Salim, was being handled by the British intelligence service, the Czechs also had reason to brief the British on al-Ani expulsion, if only to get Salim’s views.
7. In December, 2001, Czech newspapers reported that President Havel saying “it was only 70 percent certain” that the identification of Atta was accurate. Havel, who was not privy to BIS reporting, subsequently explained the “70 percent” figure was his personal assessment based on his past experience.
8. On December 17th, Gross, in response to these questions, re-confirmed the meeting. The AP reported: “Interior Minister Stanislav Gross, responding to the report, said he stood by his original statement that Atta and Al-Ani met at least once in Prague and said it was based on a reputable account from BIS, the Czech counterintelligence agency.”
9. On May 1st, 2002, the status of the case changed radically when first Newsweek and then the Washington Post declared the meeting a fictoid. Walter Pincus in the Washington Post (based on a story a few days earlier by Michael Isikoff in Newsweek) stated “There is no evidence that the alleged leader of the Sept. 11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta, met in April 2001 with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague, a finding that eliminates a once-suggested link between the terrorist attacks and the government of President Saddam Hussein, according to a senior administration official.”
Without giving a further source, Pincus explained that false reports that such a meeting had taken place were based not on BIS surveillance but a claim by “a Middle East informant” after September 11th that “he had seen the hijacker five months earlier meeting with al-Ani.” Pincus thus dates the identification as Atta to after the September 11th attack (which is inconsistent with the deputy foreign minister’s assertion that he had ordered al-Ani expelled in April 2001 because of his inappropriate contact with Atta.)
According to the anonymous “senior administration official,” Pincus writes “the Czechs said they were no longer certain that Atta was the person who met al-Ani.”
The same “senior administration official” was also quoted as saying that FBI and CIA analysts concluded that "there was no evidence Atta left or returned to the U.S." at the time he was supposed to be in Prague. (Neither the FBI, the New York Times nor anyone else had claimed that there was evidence Atta had used his own passport to travel to the Czech Republic in April 2001. The assumption was that, if Atta was in Prague in April, he traveled there under a false identity.)
Neither Pincus nor Isikoff identified the deep-throated “senior administration official,” nor specified which “Czechs,” according to this anonymous source, doubted the identification of Atta.
10. Czech intelligence responds. In, fact there never was a retraction, or even modification, from the relevant officials in and supervising the Czech intelligence service. On December 17th, 2001 Gabriela Bartikova, the spokeswomen for the Minister of the Interior, had said "Minister Gross had the information from BIS, and BIS guarantees the information, So we stick by that information." On May 3rd, 2002 referring to the Washington Post-Newsweek allegation, Interior Minister Stanislav Gross stated "I believe the counterintelligence services more than journalists. I draw on the Security Information Service [BIS] information and I see no reason why I should not believe it." He further explained that he had consulted with BIS chief Jiri Ruzek on May 2nd in order to find out whether the Czech intelligence service had any new information that would cast doubt on the meeting. "The answer was that they did not. Therefore, I consider the matter closed,” Gross concluded.
In other words, to date, Czech intelligence, the only agency anywhere that claimed to monitor the meeting, stood by its guarantee that the atta-al-Ani had taken place.
What changed in this ping-pong journalism therefore was not any new revelations— or retractions— but the introduction of an anonymous “senior administration source” with an unknown agenda, whose claim that “the Czechs” doubted the meeting took place, has now been directly denied by the relevant officials.
With her on that Commission it's probably the case that the evidence, however weak, coming from each agency was evaluated separately and independently, and never allowed to "contaminate" the other.
Like I said, with that woman on the Commission there's really nothing coming out that anyone can or should trust.
Gee, the truth is found full in their report by simple process of taking the negative of it.
This looks like a defense lawyer's angle - trying to get the guy off (rather than trying to find the facts).
I'd be willing to bet that Atta could have made the trip from Virginia to Prague in 5 days or less.
He could have loaned his phone out while he was gone, as well.
I wonder if the commission thought of that.
"In its report on the Sept. 11 plot, the commission staff disclosed for the first time F.B.I. evidence that strongly suggested that Mr. Atta was in the United States at the time of the supposed Prague meeting." A Spanish Judge also has evidence that Atta was in two place simultaneously, but it is known for certain that he was in one particular place the Spanish were staked out on, while the other location was likely an imposter creating cover or using the ID's for terrorist purposes. Risen is getting wet but the NYT is a DNC propaganda tool anyway so what would we expect from its 'journalists'? Seditious B******!
And we're supposed to believe either one? I don't think so!
If George Bush Sr. could fly from a NY Hotel to Paris, negotiate the nonrelease of American hostages, and return to NY unseen, all in one day, then surely Atta could get from a bank in Fla. to Prague in 5 days. The fact that his telephone was used in Fla. proves nothing.
Dissimulation - Taqija Islam's attitude towards lying and honoring agreements with non-Muslims. This conclusion is taken from "The 4th Conference of Islamic Research" at Al Azar University in Cairo, 1970. The teachings at Al Azar University is normative for all Sunni Muslims. For Shiites it is Qum in Iran. Taqija The expression taquija means to dissimulate and is used when serving the propagation of Islam or benefitting a Muslim compared to 'infidels'. Lying to 'infidels' is officially acknowledged and is religiously motivated. Lying is okay In essence taqija means that a Muslim is allowed to hide his or her intentions in a difficult situation. For instance in regard to Koran interpretations, the more mellow verses are emphasized towards people with no thorough knowledge of the matter, and threatening, harsh verses are hidden. Muhammed did it Taqija was practised by the Prophet, Mohammed, himself; in negotiations where he fooled his opponents. For that very reason Muslims often enter into agreements intending to break them when they have assumed control of the situation. Denial Active Muslims in the West deny the use of taqija. This emphatic denial of using taqija towards us and the authorities is part of the method used in taqija. Often it leads to confusion on behalf of us and negotiating authorities e.g. the Ministry of the Interior. Common claim A common example of taqija is the claim that Islam does not do missionary work in the West. At the same time Arab states spend four to five billions of Kroners to missionary work in Europe per year. In Germany 1000 of mosques have been built over the last 15 years. Fraud is legitimate Fraud and lies are religiously permitted means in Islam. A negotiated settlement or an agreement with a Muslim is never final.
In the first report, we get five pages of Al Qaeda history, including the statement that AQ approached Iraq, but Iraq wasn't interested. Then we're told:
"Whether Bin Ladin and his organization had roles in the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the thwarted Manila plot to blow up a dozen U.S. commercial aircraft in 1995 remains a matter of substantial uncertainty."
Let's remember - 9/11 is nothing but these two plots combined. 9/11 is WTC1993+Bojinka, brought to fruition. This is a report, from the Commission named after that attack, on the nature of the enemy. And they can't even say whether Al Qaeda was involved in 9/11's immediate forerunners! Instead, they have this to say on page 6:
"What is clear is that these plots were major benchmarks in the evolving Islamist threat to the United States and foreshadowed later attacks that were indisputably carried out by al Qaeda under bin Ladin's direction."
See how this works. You talk about Al Qaeda for five pages. You say Iraq is not connected to Al Qaeda. Then you note in passing that Al Qaeda might not even have carried out 9/11 versions 1 and 2. But those attacks were "benchmarks" which "foreshadowed" version 3, which *was* carried about by Al Qaeda.
Now given that there's one person involved in all three attacks - Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who took over Al Qaeda's military committee and brought off 9/11 - one might suppose that there was actually continuity of command-and-control between 1, 2 and 3. And that whatever KSM stood for was the real enemy. So let's turn to that second staff report, and see what it says:
"The idea for the September 11 attacks appears to have originated with a veteran jihadist named Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). A Kuwaiti from the Baluchistan region of Pakistan, KSM grew up in a religious family and claims to have joined the Muslim Brotherhood at the age of 16. After attending college in the United States, he went to Afghanistan to participate in the anti-Soviet jihad. Following the war, he helped run a non-governmental organization in Pakistan assisting the Afghan mujahidin."
Now isn't that odd? The trail leads, not to Saudi Arabia, but to Kuwait. Indeed, here is Richard Clarke, speaking in October 2003 (see end of document):
"Several al Qida operatives have allegedly been associated with the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Suliman abu Ghaith, Wadih el Hage and Ramsi Yousef. On January 9, 2003, the Treasury Department designated the Kuwaiti Lajnat al-Dawa as a terrorist entity. Lajnat al-Dawa reportedly spawned out of and is controlled by the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood."
In fact, Lajnat al-Dawa was controlled by KSM's brother Zahid (Zahid Sheikh Mohammed, Zahid al-Sheikh). Zahid is still obscure, but you can find scraps of information about him. He shows up briefly in Yosri Fouda's "Masterminds of Terror", Peter Bergen's "Holy War Inc.", and Jason Burke's "Al Qaeda". He is variously described as running a huge charity for Afghan refugees in Peshawar in the 1980s, or as overseeing Kuwait's support for the mujahideen.
In any case, the trail appears to end here, with the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood. They supplied the masterminds behind the first two attempted mega-attacks which were 9/11's precursors. It's curious that this fact is for all purposes publicly unknown. It's also curious that Laurie Mylroie, who has otherwise led the way in calling for people to focus on the clan of Kuwaiti Baluch at the center of these plots, doesn't mention it. I have brought up the issue of Zahid with her, and she just says, do we really know anything about the background of these people. Well, surely it's not that hard to go to Kuwait and find out if anyone knows about Zahid al-Sheikh. I await the journalistic scramble to file hard-hitting reports from Kuwait City, trying to get to the bottom of this. (Perhaps we could have a Newsweek cover story?)
The 9/11 Commission and the New York Times will purposely ignore that there were more alledged meetings besides the April 9th meeting, four in total, and that all FBI intelligence corroborates them.
The only meeting that gets any media time is the April 9th meeting because its "debunked" because the FBI has contradictory intelligence on his location 5 days before the meeting took place. Everytime I argue with a liberal they think the FBI debunked the Atta/Prague meeting when in fact they provided intelligence that confirmed 3 of the meetings that the Czech Officials alledged.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe U.S. officials have been mute about this and that the original media reports cited "unnamed intelligence agents". It's amusing how the media can always get that "unnamed" source to get the story they want, and after sitting on it for awhile, just report it as "American officials" thereby adding legitamacy to a totally non-legitamate report.
The waters have been muddied beyond belief.
Rudi Dekkers, where are you. Where are your flight school records.
Mr. Risen's first report on the Czechs retracting that claim was dismissed as a fabrication by Vlacav Havel's spokesman.
Folks, he made it up before. Now, he's going to hide behind the 9/11 Commission.
Today on Fox Roundtable Fred Barnes noted the Atta portion of the commission report and said at best it is non-conclusive.
He went on to cite the bank camera documenting Atta there on April 4, the cell phone use that could have been anyone, and his next being actually seen in America on April 11.
Fred did a very good summation of what we all had deduced.
Wasn't this so-called evidence leaked by staff of the 911 Comm? And didn't The Times backtrack a couple of days later when the Iraqui document stating meetings were planned at the highest level, meaning Hussein or sons?
vaudine