Replies

I would see it as a deterrent. Iran and the DPRK, and to some extent Pakistan -- have learned from Saddam's experience that a despot should either develop and be prepared to use WMD or else convince the world that they are already available. I think KJI's goal has and will be to fill in time windows of fear. This is an investment in the future. Earlier, he had us persuaded that he had developed "several" nuclear devices. (Had he?) Now he's "developing" something secret that "will be" ready "soon." (Will it?) Later, after "soon" has expired, we will have to consider the possibility that this secret thing is done. (Must we?) Sun Tsu is afoot in this battle of wits, of that we can be sure.

12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy. --Sun Tsu, The Art of War

We are students of Sun Tsu, as well.

Re #11

The information above is not specific enough to qualify as an effective disinformation of the kind suggested by you. Besides, N. Koreans usually achieve the same effects through open dramatic public display, such as missile test or diverting plutonium, which triggers the whole range of worst-case speculation from their adversaries.

I agree. Saddam tried to bluff his way out of war by hinting at his WMDs and it failed. Pakistan has tested them. Libya figured out it would lose the race and quit.