"The Iraq War" John Keegan (A book Review)

Far more than an account of the battles and strategies during 2003, this compact history of the Iraq war manages to span the ages from ancient Mesopotamia to the recent excavation of Saddam Hussein from his "spider hole." Highly readable, "The Iraq War," by military historian John Keegan, contains both plenty of tactical detail for war buffs and ample historical insight for a general audience. Above all, Keegan has a knack for crystallizing the motivations and mind-sets of key players and how they clash. For example, he notes, "Saddam was never a soldier." Poor and uneducated, Hussein's early exclusion from Iraq's class-based officer corps bred in him a deep jealousy that later led to repeated purges of Iraqi generals, whom he saw as potential rivals. Keegan argues that this weakened Hussein's support within the Army and the Iraqi public, especially as he instigated years of conflict beginning with the Iran-Iraq War in 1980.

This helps explain one of Keegan's central points: The Iraq war "was not, by any conventional measure, really a war at all."

When Hussein once again led his conflict-weary country to the brink, much of the Iraqi military refused to fight and melted away. "By the time the coalition forces actually appeared, the Iraqi soldiers were gone, to disappear into the civilian population and not to be seen again."

With "few episodes of organized resistance" by Iraqi conventional forces, Keegan says, irregulars such as the fedayeen proved the most dedicated fighters. Yet they, too, were poorly coordinated. In one of the costliest such encounters for US forces - the unexpected and chaotic battle of Nasiriyah in which the Jessica Lynch convoy was ambushed and a company of marines was hit by friendly fire - Iraqis merely profited from US missteps, he says.

America's campaign in Iraq thus defied the classical military theory that predicted a country's defenders would resist attack. Keegan claims that theory now applies only to the advanced Western countries where it originated.

The US-led coalition achieved a lighting-fast victory, but in what Keegan calls a bewildering war: Iraqi soldiers abandoned their tanks, artillery, and even their uniforms, while Iraqi civilians "drove about" either "disoriented or in denial" about the war, leading to numerous civilian deaths.

With few complex engagements to detail, Keegan spends two-thirds of the book analyzing the background and causes for the war, both in Iraq and the West, and, to a lesser extent, its consequences.

His perspective on the split between the United States and key European allies such as France and Germany leading up to the war is particularly interesting. Sept. 11 provoked what he calls "a revolution" in American policy: It shifted the US world outlook from one of benevolence to one of suspicion and allowed the rise of a doctrine of preemptive military action backed by a belief in Washington's right to act unilaterally.

In contrast, European powers such as France and Germany were increasingly rejecting the idea of military action for state purposes, while embracing the ideal of a supranational order exemplified by the European Union.

"The crisis of 2002-03 revealed a fundamental breach in foreign policy," he writes. "The United States ... had been hardened by 50 years of cold war to settle for nothing less than bringing transgressors of international order to compliance by military action.... The Europeans, once so militarist, had by contrast espoused a philosophy of international action that ... took refuge in the belief that all conflicts of interest were to be settled by consultation, conciliation, and the intervention of international agencies."

Keegan leaves little doubt as to which side he favors in this debate, calling "illusory" the idea that laws will be obeyed without the threat of force. "Covenants without swords are but words," he writes, quoting 17th-century philosopher Thomas Hobbes.

However, Keegan does offer some criticism of the US-led campaign in Iraq - particularly in the postwar phase. The United States government, given its lack of Arabic speakers, is, he says, "ill-equipped" to address militant Islam and the Arab world generally. It lacks the European colonial experience of ruling Arab countries and has a comparatively small Muslim community.

This inexperience contributed to severe mistakes in the war's immediate aftermath, he says, such as the US decision to disband the Iraqi Army and exclude Baath Party members from the new government. Motivated by an ideological desire to nudge Iraq immediately toward democracy, these decisions ignored lessons from the de-Nazification drive after World War II and contributed to America's current difficulties with the transition of power.

Ultimately, however, Keegan stands as a staunch supporter of the war, which he says has made the world "undoubtedly a safer place," although, he acknowledges, "even more divided."

Uncomfortable as the "spectacle of raw military force" is, he concludes that the Iraq war represents "a better guide to what needs to be done to secure the safety of our world than any amount of law-making or treaty-writing can offer."

• Ann Scott Tyson is the Monitor's military reporter. She reported from Iraq in the spring and summer 2003.

It ended up being the kid-glove anti-insurgency police action we see today.

The Greenside
http://www.thegreenside.com/story.asp?ContentID=9366
(snip)
As far as Falluja goes, we have not been allowed to get back in there with any real numbers yet. Initially, it was confounding. However, a very interesting dynamic has developed. Since we have stayed out of Falluja and focused elsewhere, the mujahadeen have had their run of the town. As they have had no one to fight, they have turned their criminal instincts on the citizens. The clerics who once were whipping these idiots into a suicidal frenzy are now having to issue Fatwas (holy decrees) admonishing the muj for extortion, rape, murder and kidnapping. It is unfortunate for the "innocent people" of Falluja but the mujahadeen have betrayed themselves as the thugs that they are by brutalizing the civilians. There are, in fact, reports of rape, etc from inside the town.

While the muj are thugging away inside the town, we are about 1/2 mile away paying claims, entering into dialogue and contracting jobs. The citizens come outside the city for work and money and are treated like human beings. They go back inside and enter a lawless hell. In short, the muj have done more to show the people what hypocrites they are in a few short weeks than we could have hoped for in a year. The result is more and more targetable intelligence. If we are given the green light, we can really go to town on these guys (no pun intended). However, as much as we would like to do just that, the optimal solution is to empower the Iraqis to take care of it themselves. That is precisely what we are doing.

Equally astounding is evidence that these "holy warriors" are taking drugs to get high before attacks. It true, as we pushed into the town in April many Marines came across drug paraphernalia (mostly heroin). Recently, we have gotten evidence of them using another drug BZ that makes them high and very aggressive. Cowards and hypocrites. They don't have the nerve to fight without calming their fear with drugs. Between highs, they are robbing people and raping young girls. Some jihad.

Unfortunately, Al Qaeda is here and they are some of the most brutal beings that you can imagine. I say "beings" because they do not qualify as human beings. They prey upon the "holy warriors" above and are in league with them teaching them tactics and employing them to execute attacks. Money to pay for the attacks comes from neighboring states. Al Qaeda, the same people that espouse creating a Islamic State that is global and living under the "purist form of God's laws", are working with drug addicts and rapists. Someone will have to explain that on to me some day.

For now we are gearing up for the inevitable offensive that the former regime guys, local criminals and Al Qaeda will wage this summer. It will be brutal as they are on a systematic campaign to murder anyone who is even half-way moderate. If any leader gains traction that is not 100% anti-coalition and pro-anarchy, is at immediate risk. Yesterday's positive world media coverage of the naming of the interim government will probably accelerate the mayhem somewhat. It is a fight that is inevitable. So long as we can keep the Iraqi people's nerve up and keep as many leaders alive as possible, we will crush the enemy when he surfaces. We are hopeful to take a little wind out of their sails with some pre-emptive work over the next few days.

Keegan makes the same mistake, IMHO, that many liberal critics make of the Bush Administration. So here is the 2 contradictory statements that he, and every liberal, are making

First, he says:

The US-led coalition achieved a lighting-fast victory, but in what Keegan calls a bewildering war: Iraqi soldiers abandoned their tanks, artillery, and even their uniforms, while Iraqi civilians "drove about" either "disoriented or in denial" about the war, leading to numerous civilian deaths.

...and then a few paragraphs later he says

This inexperience contributed to severe mistakes in the war's immediate aftermath, he says, such as the US decision to disband the Iraqi Army and exclude Baath Party members from the new government. Motivated by an ideological desire to nudge Iraq immediately toward democracy, these decisions ignored lessons from the de-Nazification drive after World War II and contributed to America's current difficulties with the transition of power.

It seems to me that the US decision to "disband the Iraqi army" was merely recognizing the reality that the Iraqi Army had already disbanded itself by deserting the battlefield. Imagine the security problems that we would have right now if we had invited those units to return wholesale, instead of recruiting individuals and forming new battalions.

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.