Improvements in Western Intelligence

Western tensions over the safety of corporate assets in the Middle East -- particularly in Saudi Arabia -- have ratcheted higher during the past month amid a stream of government security warnings and several deadly attacks and militant shootouts.

Though the concerns and the level of violence within Saudi Arabia are hardly unprecedented, the credibility of alerts issued by the United States and other Western governments is on the rise. Consider the following examples:

April 13: The United States issued a Warden Message cautioning Westerners about threats against diplomatic and other official facilities and neighborhoods in Riyadh. Two days later, a U.S. travel warning "strongly urged" Americans to leave the kingdom. On April 19 and 20, Saudi officials announced seizures of vehicles carrying explosives. On April 21, a car bomb was detonated in front of a Saudi intelligence facility in Riyadh, killing several people.

April 27: Jordanian officials claimed to have foiled an al Qaeda chemical bomb plot targeting the country's intelligence services. The plot allegedly involved trucks packed with 20 tons of explosives.

April 29: The U.S. State Department issued a worldwide caution, warning of deep concerns over the safety of U.S. interests abroad -- and noting that government officials have not ruled out a nonconventional al Qaeda attacks in the United States or elsewhere. On May 1, gunmen killed five Westerners -- including two Americans -- at the offices of Swiss oil contractor ABB Lummus in Yanbu. The shooters later were praised in a statement, purportedly from al Qaeda's top official in Saudi Arabia, carried on the Islamist Web site Sawt al-Jihad.

European security services recently have announced several militant roundups and "foiled plots" against specific targets. On April 21, British newspapers reported the discovery of a bombing plot against a football stadium -- possibly the field used by Manchester United -- and the arrest of 10 suspects. A well-placed counterterrorism source later told Stratfor that the sweep -- the second major roundup in Britain in less than a month -- was conducted less to thwart a specific attack than as a very public pre-emptive action to reassure citizens of their safety. On May 4, Turkish police said they detained 16 suspected members of the al Qaeda-linked Ansar al-Islam, accused of planning bombing attacks against the NATO summit that is scheduled to take place in Istanbul in June.

The contrast with past intelligence warnings is stark: In December 2003, the State Department authorized the voluntary departure of diplomats' family members -- but more than a month after the bombing of a Western housing compound in Riyadh killed 17 people. A similar communiqué, which ordered the departure of nonessential U.S. personnel and their dependents, was issued May 13, 2003 -- a day after another housing compound bombing that claimed 34 lives.

Taken together, the recent incidents indicate the United States and its allies are armed with increasingly actionable intelligence from their sources in the Middle East, Pakistan and elsewhere. Although al Qaeda might remain, in the intelligence community's words, a "ghost" or an elusive hydra, the community's failures prior to the Sept. 11 attacks no longer can justify ongoing complacency toward its warnings about the risks of attacks. The government alerts also cannot be dismissed merely as attempts to elicit "chatter" or otherwise improve officials' view into the threat from radical Islam.

These events indicate that at least some parts of the U.S. counterterrorism community have reached a crucial milestone in their operational and analytical capabilities -- which aids their ability to predict al Qaeda's next moves and other emerging threats. It is in light of this assessment that threats issued specifically against the domestic United States, in addition to Western assets overseas, could be viewed as credible.

One of the first questions this assessment raises is whether this same level of intelligence capability exists globally, or merely in a few isolated regions?

While it is clear some weaknesses remain -- for example, Washington had no warning prior to the March 11 train bombings in Madrid -- it appears that U.S. counterterrorism collection has improved greatly in the past few months. Sources in Washington tell Stratfor that both human intelligence and technical collection capabilities -- such as wiretaps and other methods -- significantly have increased in conjunction with coordinated intelligence and law enforcement efforts around the world. Western intelligence services and analytical think tanks -- such as MI6, the Center for Strategic International Studies and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation -- along with the services of "friendly" Middle Eastern nations such as Jordan, specifically have aided Washington's tactical and strategic capabilities and helped in interdicting attacks.

Moreover, foiled attacks and post-op investigations in other countries, such as Britain and Spain, have yielded a flurry of data: Pocket litter from detainees, phone numbers, forensic evidence, fingerprints, travel documents and other items can be shared with allied intelligence services to generate new leads for counterterrorism officials to run down.

It is conceivable these achievements prompted the allegedly planned or actual attacks against the allied intelligence services in Riyadh and Amman in recent weeks.

For its part, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security also has grown increasingly proactive in the wake of the March 11 attacks in Spain, turning its passenger screening efforts to the nation's rail system -- doubtless armed with intelligence that indicated rail and bus lines were vulnerable to a Madrid-style strike. Trusted law enforcement sources tell Stratfor they are watching for threats to bomb buses during the summer travel season (likely as the result of human intelligence reports or interrogation of al Qaeda suspects), though some commercial bus lines still do not employ luggage-screeners.

Stratfor previously predicted that a terrorist attack is possible, if not likely, within the United States prior to the November presidential elections. Logic reinforces this view from both a geostrategic and tactical standpoint.

Though it has not achieved its goal of ousting any secular governments within the Muslim world, al Qaeda learned in Spain that it is possible, with a well-timed attack, to overturn a sitting government in the Western Hemisphere; in its view, few prizes could be greater than forcing U.S. President George W. Bush out of office. U.S. government officials appear to support this view: National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice recently said the opportunity for terrorists to impact the presidential election would "be too good to pass up," and the April 29 warning issued by the State Department also concludes that al Qaeda might attempt "a catastrophic attack" within the United States.

In light of the recent plots targeting the Jordanian and Saudi intelligence services, it would seem that CIA headquarters in Langley, Va., or Britain's MI6 headquarters could be targets -- though they would not be easily struck. Langley, for example, has an excellent standoff perimeter to protect it from Oklahoma City-style truck bombings. Militants would need some way of getting past those defenses -- such as a fuel-laden aircraft or a Jordan-style tactical operation, using a designated team to eliminate guards and move the truck bomb within striking distance of the buildings.

Much more vulnerable targets, in our view, are likely to be found in Washington, D.C. (a symbolic city, where the brain trust of "Crusader" actions against the Middle East is found); New York City (the nation's economic hub, and home to a large Jewish population); and Texas -- Bush's backyard -- though visible targets are more easily found in major cities such as Houston or Dallas than in the capital city of Austin.

West Coast cities such as Los Angeles -- where several plots reportedly have been foiled -- also cannot be discounted as targets: Al Qaeda has shown a propensity in the past to return time and again to favored fishing holes. Such cities also are home to major corporations, which carry political, symbolic and strategic value: Al Qaeda believes that if the U.S. economy crashes, the war effort overseas could not continue. In one of the most recent tape recordings attributed to him, Osama bin Laden specifically mentioned some American corporations as likely targets.

Though there is no hard evidence, logic argues that the next major attack within the United States or allied countries could just as easily be a "dirty bomb" -- a possibility noted in the April 29 State Department warning as well as by foreign security services -- as a Madrid-style transportation bombing. Trusted U.S. government sources say this is a viable attack scenario; and it is not inconceivable that some type of chemical agent could be dispersed through the use of an improvised explosive device. The Jordanian authorities and the alleged leader of the foiled plot in Amman claimed that attack was to have a chemical component, though that claim is questionable. At any rate, chemicals such as ammonia, chlorine or sodium cyanide are easily obtained when compared to radioactive material or even anthrax, with its proven panic potential.

The "shock and awe" psychological effects of such an attack would ripple throughout the country and resonate as a great success with Islamist radicals around the world -- a credibility coup for which al Qaeda has been searching in order to further its own political goals in the Middle East.

The point is not that al Qaeda could have new means or motives to launch a dirty bomb attack -- this has been a U.S. fear, and perceived risk, since Sept. 11. Rather, it is that the U.S. intelligence community's increasingly proactive track record -- combined with the specificity of targets mentioned in recent warnings and growing consensus about the window of opportunity for a fresh attack -- lend a new aura of credibility and urgency to ongoing warnings.

In the war against militant Islam, it seems the United States no longer is flying completely blind.

Readers interested in the topics discussed in this article may also like to read the latest Stratfor Intelligence Brief, which is a FREE newsletter than anyone can sign up for. Here is the complete article text of the most recent edition:

The Phenomenon of Jihadism

Summary

A leading militant commander in Saudi Arabia has praised the May
1 attacks in the Red Sea port city of Yanbu. Details about the
attack suggest that jihadism might be becoming a grassroots
phenomenon. If so, the likelihood for and frequency of attacks
against Western and government facilities in the kingdom and
elsewhere will rise exponentially.

Analysis

Abdel Aziz al-Muqrin, Saudi Arabia's top jihadist leader, issued
a statement May 6 praising the four Islamists who killed five
Western employees of oil contracting company ABB Lummus in the
Saudi city of Yanbu. Al-Mqurin urged other Saudis to follow their
example and carefully plan, prepare and execute similar attacks.

Stratfor indicated last week that many independent jihadist
groups had surfaced since the Sept. 11 attacks. The attack in
Yanbu indicates that the phenomenon might be entering a new phase
in which individuals acting alone or in small groups carry out
attacks.

If true, the multitude of individuals influenced by al Qaeda and
taking cues from other established groups will multiply, and
Yanbu-style attacks are likely to become much more frequent.

The widespread belief has been that the loss of Afghanistan as a
training ground put a dent into planning, preparation and
execution of operations -- particularly by novices. A successful
operation entails avoiding detection, engaging in surveillance
and training in weapons and explosives.

It appears that those at the helm of the Islamist militant
movement had contingency plans prepared in the event they lost
Afghanistan. Examining the behavior of the non-Afghan fighters
during the U.S. military campaign in fall 2001, there did not
appear to be much of an actual al Qaeda presence. Those who stood
their ground and fought the Americans were either Taliban or non-
Afghans foot soldiers. The veterans of al Qaeda training camps
relocated into other states before and during the war.

There have been reports that hundreds of al Qaeda operatives made
their way to other countries once they reached the Pakistani port
city of Karachi. Those 600 or so in custody at the detention
facility at Guantanamo, Cuba, appear to be mostly Taliban and al
Qaeda rank and file, who are at best foot soldiers and the
occasional seasoned operative. There are a handful of high-
profile al Qaeda members -- such as Abu Zubaydah, Khalid Sheikh
Muhammad and Ramzi bin al Shibh -- who have been nabbed and are
in detention at Bagram Air Base, Diego Garcia or other
undisclosed locations.

Jihadist communiques from the Arabian Peninsula and statements
from the Saudi and Yemeni governments show that many on their
wanted lists are veterans of the Afghan camps. These men safely
arrived at their destinations and might have started their own
groups. They also appear to have improvised tactics by avoiding
formal groups and staying away from training in the traditional
manner.

Despite the loss of the operational hub, the phenomenon of
jihadism is flourishing. In the interest of continued
proliferation, highly trained veterans are trying to disseminate
their tactical knowledge and experience through unorthodox means.
The al Bataar newsletter, released weekly from the Arabian
Peninsula, is one such outlet.

The authors of this publication have tried to simplify training
for the uninitiated so that they gradually develop the knowledge,
skills and abilities they would have acquired in Afghanistan. Al
Bataar offers crash courses on the particulars of planning a
successful operation, training and methods of maintaining
secrecy.

Stratfor sources say that some of the attackers had been employed
inside the company for as many as seven years. They say one of
the assailants during the shootout walked by a Philippine
employee and said, "You are not what we are looking for,"
indicating they were targeting Westerners. Another source says
two militants managed to escape from the scene.

Even a cursory examination of the Yanbu attack demonstrates that
it does not take a lot of training, ability or experience to pull
off such an operation. From the language used by al-Muqrin in his
statement praising the attackers, Yanbu was the work of
volunteers unaffiliated with any group. Three of them were
employed at ABB Lummus -- further reinforcing the notion that the
ideology of jihadism is being taken up by average Saudis, not
just social misfits.

The movement away from formal organizations by making training
lessons available in the public domain has allowed the jihadist
movement to sustain itself and tap into the grassroots of
society. This bodes ill for the security of foreign companies in
the kingdom -- and the future of the Saudi monarchy.

(c) 2004 Strategic Forecasting, Inc. All rights reserved.

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