excerpt: The changing nature of geopolitics also favored DoD over the State Department. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, civil wars, terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other lower-intensity forms of conflict predominated. In this environment, the White House relied on the military more than it had during the Cold War.
Meanwhile, a series of reforms gave defense civilians and the uniformed military far greater resources than the State Department. Powerful Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) led a successful effort to slash the State Department’s budget. At the same time, military funding remained near Cold War levels, and by the early 2000s the United States spent more on its armed forces than all other industrialized nations combined. In 2001 the State Department requested a budget of $25 billion, which Congress cut to $20 billion; that year Congress gave the Pentagon nearly $311 billion, more than DoD actually had requested.
excerpt: As a result, only DoD—and in particular, the CINCs—had the money and resources to transport people to foreign locales at a moment’s notice, convene large meetings with foreign dignitaries, or even develop a large-scale analysis of a particular policy. If State Department staff or ambassadors in the field wanted to fly to a meeting or transport relief supplies or other materials, they had to rely on CINC planes and logistics. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld … was staking out the Pentagon’s role in policy making, staffing his bureaucracy with neoconservatives who would challenge the State Department on policy matters.
Since President George W. Bush took office, this trend only has accelerated. The Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attack, two wars, and one of the most aggressive secretaries of defense in recent history have combined to strengthen the Pentagon’s headlock on U.S. foreign policy. Even before Sept. 11, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, a skilled bureaucratic in-fighter who previously had served as secretary of defense in the 1970s, was staking out the Pentagon’s role in policy making, staffing his bureaucracy with leading neoconservatives like Wolfowitz who would challenge the State Department on policy matters.
After Sept. 11, Rumsfeld’s power only grew, as he was seen as the primary architect of the quick victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan and was referred to in the media as the most powerful Cabinet member in decades. “A CINC carrying the water for Rumsfeld has a lot of power, especially post-Sept. 11,” says Nash.
But some officials and scholars outside the government worry that DoD’s usurpation of the State Department’s traditional role is leading to more squabbling within the U.S. government, making it harder to produce coherent policy. During the past two years, mid-level State Department and DoD officials have used leaks to the press to scuttle the other department’s plans. As Steven Weisman noted in The New York Times, “the chasm between [Rumsfeld and Powell] is often so wide that to outsiders it can appear they are conducting two entirely different foreign policies.”
If you want the full article FReepmail me. Several political analysts observe that, although in the past the national security advisor refereed disputes between the State Department and DoD, current National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice is not good at mediating these arguments. Without an effective referee, the bullish, empowered, and popular Rumsfeld has the advantage.