The meaning of Fallujah

WorldNet Daily ^ | May 5, 2004 | Pat Buchanan

[epigone73]

I hope you're wrong. G-d, i hope it's a trick and we roll in there and let the air out of that fat s.o.b.'s turban and strangle his followers with their own night-shirts.

[zarf]

Pat is another idiot who can't see the forest from the trees.

Pat would have thrown in the towel after Wake Island.

[DeuceTraveler]

I lost count of how many times I've read something on this site that I disagreed with and then noticed it was written by Buchanan.

[Keith]

That's not TRUE!

Pat would have given up after Manila...he would never have made it to Wake Island.

[thoughtomator]

Ditto... didn't even realize it was Buchanan until I saw the comments afters

[nathanbedford]

Of the six comments posted so far, five have sought to kill the messenger.

[Texasforever]

Ok let's not kill the messenger and just make an observation. The "battle of Fallujia" is not over. It is just that simple. When Pat can point to the Marines pulling out of the perimeter around the town then he may have a point. Until then all he is doing is calling the game at halftime.

[nathanbedford]

Your view that monday morning quarterbacking should at least wait until the game is over is well taken. But we are in a short attention span news cycle and the final report might very well never catch up to the half time conclusions.

I am in the camp which believes that, even if the Marines are conducting the Fallujah campaign competently, we have suffered a propaganda disaster eclipsed only by the fallout from the prison pics. Buchannon is absolutely correct that we commenced the seige of Fallujah to avenge our four murdered and desecrated Americans. We have utterly failed in that mission and we must suffer the public relations set back as a result.

But to believe that the compaign is being conducted according to a plan requires a suspension of critical assesment which approaches gullibility. The Belmont Club, a source which I have grown to regard as quite reasonable, states the case for the Marines about as well as it could be made, I just find it hard to swallow whole,



Behind Enemy Lines

This report from Mitchell Prothero describes what an Iraqi UPI reporter saw in the 'Golan'. Hat tip: Reader WG

While U.S. Marine commanders are hopeful that patrols of local fighters will bring peace to Fallujah, -- a city wracked by anti-coalition activity since the arrival of U.S. forces a year ago -- a situation of even greater concern appears to be lurking; an entire neighborhood seems to be completely under the control of foreign Islamic fighters, mostly from Syria.

An Iraqi employee of United Press International entered Fallujah on Saturday with a source who serves as a mid-level official in the Army of Mohammed, the umbrella group of Iraqi resistance opposing the U.S. occupation. The source had agreed to help arrange a tour of the city and interviews with civilians and resistance fighters by a UPI reporter for the following day.

They entered the city using a route that passed a new Fallujah Protective Army checkpoint, which waved them into the center of the city without even a cursory search. After the local guide liaised with Iraqi fighters in Fallujah, the pair was given permission to travel to the city and was supplied with three armed guards from the Army of Mohammed while they attempted to identify damaged parts of the city and arrange interviews. Upon their arrival in the Golan neighborhood in the northern portion of the city, where much of the fighting has taken place, a group of fighters speaking with Syrian accents approached and ordered the resistance fighters to leave and took the two men into custody. ...

Osama (the UPI reporter) said at least 10 Syrians were in the compound he was held in and estimates that far more were hidden in various fortifications around the area.

This report strongly suggests that 1) a large pocket of the enemy is still inside or contained in Fallujah; 2) this pocket may be called the 'Golan' and is in the nothern section of the city; 3) there may be large numbers of Syrian fighters in the 'Golan'. It is implies that the Fallujah brigade is not very careful in discharging its duties or is complicit to some degree with the enemy. The report continues:

And the top officer for the U.S. Marines in the area used a weekend press conference to dispute reports that the Marines would withdraw from Fallujah and turn local security over to the new unit. The initial reports to that effect came from embedded reporters and eyewitness accounts of Marines pulling back from their positions in Fallujah and turning over several checkpoints to the FPA.

"We have chosen not to commingle U.S. and Iraqi units, and that has prompted some realignment of Marine forces," Lt. Gen. James Conway, commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, said Saturday. "In fact, we have assigned the Iraqi battalion to our least-engaged sector until they can get their feet on deck, absorb the weapons and equipment we are passing their way, and prepare for the next phase of the operation."

This is a categorical denial that the USMC has left Fallujah. General Conway's claim to have turned over "several checkpoints" to the Fallujah Brigade is consistent with the UPI reporters firsthand observation. Conway's assertion that the USMC is still in the city receives implicit support from the fact that the Syrian fighters were still "hidden in fortifications around the area" -- i.e. the 'Golan', something they would not do unless the USMC were present, seeing as they would have little to fear from the Fallujah Brigade in its present condition. The last part of the UPI report is interesting:

Conway said the decision to incorporate local fighters -- some of whom undoubtedly had recently been fighting the U.S. forces -- stemmed from a need to co-opt Iraqis frustrated by the occupation from the most committed anti-coalition fighters.

"It got at what was essentially at that point our operational objective, which was to separate out the hard-core insurgents and freedom fighters from the other citizens of the city that may well have taken up weapons against us, based upon the fact that they thought they were defending their city, based upon the call of the imams and those types of things," Conway said.

Taken at its face value, Conway's statement implies that the USMC appreciates that the enemy consists of an alliance -- something also corroborated by the UPI reporter, who speaks of the "Army of Mohammed", described an "umbrella group" -- and that the explicit goal of the Marines is to drive a wedge between the hard-core and peripheral elements. In General Conway's words: "to separate out the hard-core insurgents and freedom fighters from the other citizens of the city that may well have taken up weapons against us, based upon the fact that they thought they were defending their city".

To recapitulate, the main points are:

* the enemy is probably still in the city
* the enemy may consist, in part, of Syrian fighters
* the USMC is probably still bottling them up otherwise how to account for the enemy containment, and is therefore present in the city, contrary to press reports
* the USMC is attempting to drive a wedge, as per General Conway, between the hard core and the peripheral enemy elements

http://www.belmontclub.blogspot.com/

[Texasforever]

We have utterly failed in that mission and we must suffer the public relations set back as a result.

What "PR setback"? So a few ragheads are proclaiming victory so what? Look, if the "mission" was to take revenge on Falujia for the 4 contractors then that could have been accomplished in 15 minutes without a Marine even crossing the city limits. However if the mission is to actually leave Iraq better than we found it then the only reasonable tactic would be to attempt to get Iraqis involved in their own fight for independence. Someone in the civilian command structure recognized that and it is worth the try. If it doesn't work then we can immediately go in guns blazing and clean them out. I for one do not want Marines fighting street to street, if we have to clean out the rat's nest ourselves then I want it done with hell from above collateral damage be damned. We won't do that of course so my preference is that we give Iraqis a chance to spill a little blood for their own cause.

[jaykay]

Former Iraqi army general Mohammed Latif escorted about three dozen soldiers into positions next to marines at the railway station, which was rocked by heavy fighting last week.

The move comes ahead of a possible US withdrawal from the city's northern front, which includes the Jolan district, considered the den of local insurgents.

The marines have already pulled out of the city's southern industrial zone, where they had their biggest toe-hold in Fallujah after launching an all-out invasion on April 5 following the brutal murder of four US contractors days earlier. - http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1129610/posts

We have given Fallujah back to the terrorists

Even if the leash was taken off of the Marines now, they would have to fight and die to retake ground they already fought and died for.

[Texasforever]

We have given Fallujah back to the terrorists

Baloney.

[My Dog Likes Me]

Great article in this week's Time Magazine on Marines in Fallujah. Man, are they pissed! And the language! The reporter did a good job of capturing just what it's like.

[texasflower]

As usual, a rational and well thought out post from you!

Your posts are always a pleasure to read.

[jaykay]

Latif said he doubted any foreign fighters were left in the city, although the marines have demanded the Fallujah Brigade hand over foreigners they blame for leading the fight against them last month that left hundreds of Iraqis dead.

"There are no foreign fighters in Fallujah. Maybe there were some a month ago. Now there are none," Latif said. - http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1129610/posts


"..an entire neighborhood seems to be completely under the control of foreign Islamic fighters, mostly from Syria..." - http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1129258/posts

[nathanbedford]

I believe it now almost impossible to launch a full scale attack by the Marines against Fallujah because no commmander or cmmander in chief can sell triple reversals.

I hate to burden you with such long quotes, but I feel that what Stratford has to say is close to the truth,


STRATFOR: Geopolitical Diary: Tuesday, May 4, 2004
STRATFOR ^ | May 04, 2004 0603 GMT

Posted on 05/04/2004 12:11:30 AM EDT by Axion

As expected, attention today turned away from Al Fallujah and to An Najaf. Representatives of Iran-based Grand Ayatollah Kazem Hossein Haeri, regarded as Muqtada al-Sadr's mentor, were publicly revealed to be engaged in negotiating between al-Sadr and the United States. The report appeared in the Iran Daily, which means that it is what the Iranians want the world to know. That makes it doubly important. There was little doubt that Shia were attempting to mediate between al-Sadr and the Americans. This article makes it clear that the Iranian government wants to see the process go forward. Naturally, both sides sought to improve their bargaining position by increasing their visible ferocity. Thus, clashes -- including some mortar shelling -- were reported around An Najaf. But it is clear that neither side has the stomach for a fight.

If we look at the Al Fallujah model, the United States essentially turned to a general from the previous regime -- having sacked one who was unacceptable to the Shia -- and has turned the problem of the guerrillas over to him. He in turn has a force of mostly local men under him; they will avoid attacking the rebels, who will in turn avoid attacking the Iraqi force. The United States will pretend that the Iraqi force is under its control and that it is an effective force, while the Iraqis will do what is in their own best interest.

The fighting in Al Fallujah will decline. The United States will not have to lose any more troops, nor will it have to level the city to get at the guerrillas. The guerrillas will have to negotiate some sort of accommodation with the Iraqi forces and the elders of the city, which should not be too difficult. Effective control over Al Fallujah will pass to the Iraqis. U.S. forces, however, will provide a frame that contains all of this. We assume this frame includes limits on the ability of the guerrillas to use Al Fallujah as a base for operations against Americans.

The fundamental question will be whether the guerrillas -- or other Iraqis -- will respect this limitation and, if they don't, what the United States will do about it. Put differently, assuming that there is no massive split between Al Fallujah's population, the guerrillas and the new Iraqi security force -- something we are pretty confident is the case -- and a decision is made to launch attacks, will the United States then launch an attack against the security force it sponsored?

The United States is in the process of transferring effective power over Al Fallujah to the citizens of Al Fallujah, the guerrillas and the security force. This transfer is about a hundred times more real and more significant than any transfer of sovereignty on June 30. The problem is this: What understanding, if any, has been reached with the three elements in Al Fallujah? If we are to believe the Coalition Provisional Authority, then the only thing that has been agreed to is that the Iraqi security force will engage and destroy the guerrillas. We flat out don't believe that will happen, and we cannot imagine that the CPA thinks it will happen. That leaves two possibilities. Either the United States simply transferred power and hoped for the best, or a deeper political understanding was reached during the two weeks of negotiation in Al Fallujah, one that neither side wants to publicize right now.

The Al Fallujah model will clearly be used in An Najaf. U.S. forces will pull back. An indigenous force, commanded by someone acceptable to the Shiite leadership, will move into the city and will retain effective control over it. Al-Sadr will be dealt with by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, but that will depend on internal Shiite politics, not on any U.S. decision. In the end, the United States will have to craft a political agreement with the Shiite leadership concerning the details about An Najaf.

An Najaf is easier than Al Fallujah. Al-Sadr is not the Sunni guerrillas. There is a broad, well-organized Shiite leadership that has an interest in a relationship with the United States. Most of all, any agreements reached in An Najaf can be transferred to the rest of Shiite Iraq. The Shia already have a great degree of internal autonomy. They will get more.

Now, let's look at where things are heading. There has been a transfer of power in Al Fallujah and there will be a transfer of power in An Najaf. The June 30 transfer is increasingly meaningless, but the local transfers are increasingly meaningful. The United States is groping toward an interim solution in which local governance goes back to Iraqis -- even former Baathist generals or guerrillas -- who take responsibility for their towns and regions. The United States has a broad presence in Iraq, but little control. It carries out its mission in the region, is present in Iraq, but not really running things.

It could work, if the Sunnis decide to let it work. But when you add it up, it will mean the partition of Iraq into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish regions on a piecemeal basis. That is something that is neither in Iran's interest nor in the interest of the Shia -- which means that this solution is not ultimately likely to work not only because of the Sunnis, but also because it violates Shiite requirements. It is a creative solution but it doesn't get the United States out of the woods by any means.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1127739/posts

[UnbelievingScumOnTheOtherSide]

One wonders if the president ever asks himself: Why did no one in my war cabinet warn me it could turn out like this?

I don't think so. This outcome was not forced. It was chosen as an expedient way to get out before the election. Karl Rove is running this war and handover. But it will be a terrorist government that will be shooting at us all the way out. Everything we built will be turned against us. Everything since digging Saddam out of his hole has been a waste of time and money.

[Allegra]

Yeah, Pat takes any opportunity he can to pour icewater on guys named "Bush." This is just another one of those shots.

Bitter...table for one?

[Sam the Sham]

But to assume that this Iraqi Security Force has any interest whatsoever in fighting the insurgents is completely and utterly wrong. It's just a fig leaf to enable us to avoid a Grozny.

[ex-snook]

"One wonders if the president ever asks himself: Why did no one in my war cabinet warn me it could turn out like this? "

Maybe he relied on the Blues Brothers?