The meaning of Fallujah

On some cable networks, they were comparing it to the Battle of Stalingrad, which is absurd. At Stalingrad, 500,000 Red Army soldiers died along with 147,000 Germans. Another 91,000 Germans surrendered, few of them ever to be seen again.

No, Fallujah was no Stalingrad. It was not even like Bull Run in 1861, where society matrons rode out to see the rebels routed and saw instead a Union Army streaming in panic back up the road to Washington. Union and Confederate dead at Bull Run were nearly 900.

Yet, as Stalingrad was the turning point of the war and Bull Run meant Lincoln must fight a long war or let the Confederacy go, Fallujah may prove a decisive battle in Bush's war, and presidency.

For after the killing of the contractors and the desecration of their bodies, we were told punishment was certain and coming. And should Fallujah refuse to give up the killers, it would be taken. When a superpower gives an ultimatum, it must make good on it.

Yet when the insurgents defied the Marines, and the Marines prepared to fight their way in and finish off the 1,500 fighters, U.S. commanders ordered them to withdraw. Last week, a Republican Guard general was sent in to Fallujah to work things out.

The insurgents had mocked a truce offer by sending out a small truckload of worthless weapons. They had mounted nightly assaults on the Marines. And after the Marines pulled out, photos of their jubilant enemies were flashed across the Middle East. Message to the Islamic world: The superpower can be defied.

Fallujah belongs to the insurgents. The enemy has established a sanctuary, a base camp in U.S.-occupied territory in a war zone, as has radical Shiite Sheik Moqtada al-Sadr in Najaf.

The message from Fallujah is that either the Americans are afraid to take casualties or they are afraid to inflict heavy casualties in an urban battleground for fear that pictures of smashed mosques and dead women and children could convert any tactical Marine victory into a strategic U.S. defeat in the battle for hearts and minds.

But if that is the call the president has made, how do we win the war? How do we stop provocations out of Fallujah? How do we answer attacks mounted out of the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala?

If the Americans with all their firepower are unwilling to kill or disarm the insurgents, militias and foreign fighters in the cities, how do we expect an Iraqi regime set up by the United Nations to do the job?

"April is the cruelest month," said T.S. Eliot, "breeding lilacs out of the dead land." April summons up hope and promise when neither may be justified. Consider what April brought for us in Iraq:

As many U.S. dead and wounded as we suffered in the initial invasion and occupation.

Perceived U.S. defeats in Fallujah and Najaf, where the enemy holed up after launching murderous assaults on U.S. troops.

Surveys among Iraqis that found that, outside the Kurdish north, 81 percent of Sunnis and Shia look upon us as occupiers, two-thirds want us out of their country, and half think there are occasions when Americans deserve to be killed.

U.S. polls that show one-third of Americans now believe Iraq was never a threat. Half of us now believe the war was a mistake, 41 percent believe Bush's policies have increased the threat of terrorism, and 71 percent say his policies have damaged our image in the Arab world.

This soaring hostility to the U.S. presence in Iraq and falling support for the war at home were recorded before the awful stories and graphic photos appeared of U.S. troops abusing Iraqi prisoners of war in the most depraved and humiliating fashion.

The president of Egypt says the United States has never been more hated in his part of the world. The King of Jordan has refused to come to the White House to protest what Arabs see as Bush's betrayal of the Palestinians to Sharon.

The questions raised by the events of April are far-reaching, even historic. Is the United States about to lose Iraq? Is America's Middle East-policy collapsing?

With hatred of America and hostility to us pandemic, how long can we remain in Iraq? What now are the chances that Bush can build a government that is free, democratic, pro-American and willing to allow the permanent presence of U.S. bases on Iraqi soil? Who is winning the battle now for the Middle East: Bush or bin Laden?

One wonders if the president ever asks himself: Why did no one in my war cabinet warn me it could turn out like this?

Your view that monday morning quarterbacking should at least wait until the game is over is well taken. But we are in a short attention span news cycle and the final report might very well never catch up to the half time conclusions.

I am in the camp which believes that, even if the Marines are conducting the Fallujah campaign competently, we have suffered a propaganda disaster eclipsed only by the fallout from the prison pics. Buchannon is absolutely correct that we commenced the seige of Fallujah to avenge our four murdered and desecrated Americans. We have utterly failed in that mission and we must suffer the public relations set back as a result.

But to believe that the compaign is being conducted according to a plan requires a suspension of critical assesment which approaches gullibility. The Belmont Club, a source which I have grown to regard as quite reasonable, states the case for the Marines about as well as it could be made, I just find it hard to swallow whole,

Behind Enemy Lines

This report from Mitchell Prothero describes what an Iraqi UPI reporter saw in the 'Golan'. Hat tip: Reader WG

While U.S. Marine commanders are hopeful that patrols of local fighters will bring peace to Fallujah, -- a city wracked by anti-coalition activity since the arrival of U.S. forces a year ago -- a situation of even greater concern appears to be lurking; an entire neighborhood seems to be completely under the control of foreign Islamic fighters, mostly from Syria.

An Iraqi employee of United Press International entered Fallujah on Saturday with a source who serves as a mid-level official in the Army of Mohammed, the umbrella group of Iraqi resistance opposing the U.S. occupation. The source had agreed to help arrange a tour of the city and interviews with civilians and resistance fighters by a UPI reporter for the following day.

They entered the city using a route that passed a new Fallujah Protective Army checkpoint, which waved them into the center of the city without even a cursory search. After the local guide liaised with Iraqi fighters in Fallujah, the pair was given permission to travel to the city and was supplied with three armed guards from the Army of Mohammed while they attempted to identify damaged parts of the city and arrange interviews. Upon their arrival in the Golan neighborhood in the northern portion of the city, where much of the fighting has taken place, a group of fighters speaking with Syrian accents approached and ordered the resistance fighters to leave and took the two men into custody. ...

Osama (the UPI reporter) said at least 10 Syrians were in the compound he was held in and estimates that far more were hidden in various fortifications around the area.

This report strongly suggests that 1) a large pocket of the enemy is still inside or contained in Fallujah; 2) this pocket may be called the 'Golan' and is in the nothern section of the city; 3) there may be large numbers of Syrian fighters in the 'Golan'. It is implies that the Fallujah brigade is not very careful in discharging its duties or is complicit to some degree with the enemy. The report continues:

And the top officer for the U.S. Marines in the area used a weekend press conference to dispute reports that the Marines would withdraw from Fallujah and turn local security over to the new unit. The initial reports to that effect came from embedded reporters and eyewitness accounts of Marines pulling back from their positions in Fallujah and turning over several checkpoints to the FPA.

"We have chosen not to commingle U.S. and Iraqi units, and that has prompted some realignment of Marine forces," Lt. Gen. James Conway, commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, said Saturday. "In fact, we have assigned the Iraqi battalion to our least-engaged sector until they can get their feet on deck, absorb the weapons and equipment we are passing their way, and prepare for the next phase of the operation."

This is a categorical denial that the USMC has left Fallujah. General Conway's claim to have turned over "several checkpoints" to the Fallujah Brigade is consistent with the UPI reporters firsthand observation. Conway's assertion that the USMC is still in the city receives implicit support from the fact that the Syrian fighters were still "hidden in fortifications around the area" -- i.e. the 'Golan', something they would not do unless the USMC were present, seeing as they would have little to fear from the Fallujah Brigade in its present condition. The last part of the UPI report is interesting:

Conway said the decision to incorporate local fighters -- some of whom undoubtedly had recently been fighting the U.S. forces -- stemmed from a need to co-opt Iraqis frustrated by the occupation from the most committed anti-coalition fighters.

"It got at what was essentially at that point our operational objective, which was to separate out the hard-core insurgents and freedom fighters from the other citizens of the city that may well have taken up weapons against us, based upon the fact that they thought they were defending their city, based upon the call of the imams and those types of things," Conway said.

Taken at its face value, Conway's statement implies that the USMC appreciates that the enemy consists of an alliance -- something also corroborated by the UPI reporter, who speaks of the "Army of Mohammed", described an "umbrella group" -- and that the explicit goal of the Marines is to drive a wedge between the hard-core and peripheral elements. In General Conway's words: "to separate out the hard-core insurgents and freedom fighters from the other citizens of the city that may well have taken up weapons against us, based upon the fact that they thought they were defending their city".

To recapitulate, the main points are:

* the enemy is probably still in the city
* the enemy may consist, in part, of Syrian fighters
* the USMC is probably still bottling them up otherwise how to account for the enemy containment, and is therefore present in the city, contrary to press reports
* the USMC is attempting to drive a wedge, as per General Conway, between the hard core and the peripheral enemy elements

http://www.belmontclub.blogspot.com/

I believe it now almost impossible to launch a full scale attack by the Marines against Fallujah because no commmander or cmmander in chief can sell triple reversals.

I hate to burden you with such long quotes, but I feel that what Stratford has to say is close to the truth,

STRATFOR: Geopolitical Diary: Tuesday, May 4, 2004
STRATFOR ^ | May 04, 2004 0603 GMT

Posted on 05/04/2004 12:11:30 AM EDT by Axion

As expected, attention today turned away from Al Fallujah and to An Najaf. Representatives of Iran-based Grand Ayatollah Kazem Hossein Haeri, regarded as Muqtada al-Sadr's mentor, were publicly revealed to be engaged in negotiating between al-Sadr and the United States. The report appeared in the Iran Daily, which means that it is what the Iranians want the world to know. That makes it doubly important. There was little doubt that Shia were attempting to mediate between al-Sadr and the Americans. This article makes it clear that the Iranian government wants to see the process go forward. Naturally, both sides sought to improve their bargaining position by increasing their visible ferocity. Thus, clashes -- including some mortar shelling -- were reported around An Najaf. But it is clear that neither side has the stomach for a fight.

If we look at the Al Fallujah model, the United States essentially turned to a general from the previous regime -- having sacked one who was unacceptable to the Shia -- and has turned the problem of the guerrillas over to him. He in turn has a force of mostly local men under him; they will avoid attacking the rebels, who will in turn avoid attacking the Iraqi force. The United States will pretend that the Iraqi force is under its control and that it is an effective force, while the Iraqis will do what is in their own best interest.

The fighting in Al Fallujah will decline. The United States will not have to lose any more troops, nor will it have to level the city to get at the guerrillas. The guerrillas will have to negotiate some sort of accommodation with the Iraqi forces and the elders of the city, which should not be too difficult. Effective control over Al Fallujah will pass to the Iraqis. U.S. forces, however, will provide a frame that contains all of this. We assume this frame includes limits on the ability of the guerrillas to use Al Fallujah as a base for operations against Americans.

The fundamental question will be whether the guerrillas -- or other Iraqis -- will respect this limitation and, if they don't, what the United States will do about it. Put differently, assuming that there is no massive split between Al Fallujah's population, the guerrillas and the new Iraqi security force -- something we are pretty confident is the case -- and a decision is made to launch attacks, will the United States then launch an attack against the security force it sponsored?

The United States is in the process of transferring effective power over Al Fallujah to the citizens of Al Fallujah, the guerrillas and the security force. This transfer is about a hundred times more real and more significant than any transfer of sovereignty on June 30. The problem is this: What understanding, if any, has been reached with the three elements in Al Fallujah? If we are to believe the Coalition Provisional Authority, then the only thing that has been agreed to is that the Iraqi security force will engage and destroy the guerrillas. We flat out don't believe that will happen, and we cannot imagine that the CPA thinks it will happen. That leaves two possibilities. Either the United States simply transferred power and hoped for the best, or a deeper political understanding was reached during the two weeks of negotiation in Al Fallujah, one that neither side wants to publicize right now.

The Al Fallujah model will clearly be used in An Najaf. U.S. forces will pull back. An indigenous force, commanded by someone acceptable to the Shiite leadership, will move into the city and will retain effective control over it. Al-Sadr will be dealt with by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, but that will depend on internal Shiite politics, not on any U.S. decision. In the end, the United States will have to craft a political agreement with the Shiite leadership concerning the details about An Najaf.

An Najaf is easier than Al Fallujah. Al-Sadr is not the Sunni guerrillas. There is a broad, well-organized Shiite leadership that has an interest in a relationship with the United States. Most of all, any agreements reached in An Najaf can be transferred to the rest of Shiite Iraq. The Shia already have a great degree of internal autonomy. They will get more.

Now, let's look at where things are heading. There has been a transfer of power in Al Fallujah and there will be a transfer of power in An Najaf. The June 30 transfer is increasingly meaningless, but the local transfers are increasingly meaningful. The United States is groping toward an interim solution in which local governance goes back to Iraqis -- even former Baathist generals or guerrillas -- who take responsibility for their towns and regions. The United States has a broad presence in Iraq, but little control. It carries out its mission in the region, is present in Iraq, but not really running things.

It could work, if the Sunnis decide to let it work. But when you add it up, it will mean the partition of Iraq into Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish regions on a piecemeal basis. That is something that is neither in Iran's interest nor in the interest of the Shia -- which means that this solution is not ultimately likely to work not only because of the Sunnis, but also because it violates Shiite requirements. It is a creative solution but it doesn't get the United States out of the woods by any means.

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1127739/posts

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