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Badeye...

Lee didn't have that view of Jackson. Not during the war and certainly not after the war.

Lee called Gettysburg a defeat and offered to resign. Of course, it was turned down.

Pickett's Charge failed because (and I quote Longstreet) there are no 15,000 men alive that could take that ridge. Lee thought his men were invincible (his words) and he never thought they would be defeated.

Now let's talk the reality of Gettysburg with Jackson in charge of the 2nd Corp.

Eliminates 2 problems right there -- Ewell and AP Hill.

The 2nd Corp under Ewell was to menace or capture Harrisburg. At the same time, they were to gather supplies to help feed and outfit the army. Early went to Gettysburg and cleaned them all out of shoes.

Ewell moved cautiously toward Harrisburg, allowing the Militia to burn the bridges over the river. Jackson, known for his great speed, might not allowed that to happen.

Ewell was called back from Harrisburg to Gettysburg. Gettysburg was never Lee's objective. It became Lee's objective because of the roads.

AP Hill did four things... He ignored reports from Johnston Pettigrew that dismounted Union calvary was in Gettysburg. He told Lee it was militia. He ignored Early's reports that Gettysburg had been cleaned out of shoes. Third, he sent Heth's whole brigade into Gettysburg under the pretext of getting shoes. He did not use the Calvary that he had to check and see if Pettigrew was correct.

Now, suppose that Jackson sat where Hill sat. The whole battle started because of Hill's provoking the fight. Would Jackson provoked the fight in such a slip shod manner when he was under orders not to. No. One thing about Jackson. He was literal on orders.

Lee's army had calvary. The notion that JEB Stuart was skylarking through Pennsylvania while Lee was stumbling blind in enemy territory was wrong. Jackson knew how to use his calvary. There would have been no stumbling into the fight.

But let's say that Jackson did stumble into the battle the same way that Heth did. That first day, things worked out great for Lee. The 1st and 11th Corp were caught between two flanks of the Confederate Army. Reynolds was dead and Oliver Howard was in charge. Hancock would arrive around 4:00, but by then, the Union Army was in route.

What you are suggesting is that Jackson would not have pursued the disorganized and retreating Union Army. What you are suggesting is that Jackson would never have realized that the heights had to be taken. (They were unoccupied until late in the evening... late afternoon, the two round tops had no Union Soldiers. ) That some how Jackson would have forgotten his military training and genius. I don't think so.

What you are asking someone who has studied Jackson to believe that Jackson would have stopped the pursuit, then turned against his very nature, and go cautious...

Trimble and Jackson's staff now assigned to Ewell realized that Ewell had made a mistake that Jackson would have never made it. Trimble told Ewell directly, "General Jackson would have never stopped like that...with the Yankees on the run and the heights open." Sandy Pendleton left Ewell and cried out, "Oh, for the spirit of Jackson for an hour."

But let's say that Jackson, for all intents and purposes, stopped cold like Ewell.

What you are suggesting is that Jackson, the great flanker, who's Valley Campaign was studied by Patton and Rommel, who's Valley Campaign is still studied in the US Army, would have not flanked the Union Army at the Round Tops?

No, the end result of the first day of battle would have been the 2nd Corps on the Round Tops... Cemetary Ridge abandoned by Hancock, who would have realized that he couldn't hold the position with Confederate artillery on his flank.

Meade would have gone ahead with his defensive line at Pipe Creek... If there would have been a battle, it would have been there.

I really enjoyed reading your post.

Couple of points I do dispute. First, the "myth of the shoes". There wasn't any. Period. Its a myth, fostered by many authors, including two that won I believe Pulitzer's.

There was no "shoe factory" in Gettysburg. I strongly believe, with no hard facts to back it up, that this was concocted to allow Heth to "save face" for completely and totally disregarding Lee's orders. Heth was a "favorite" not just of Lee, but within Richmond's society from what I've pieced together. Hence his burial at Hollywood.

Second, I believe Jackson would have charged Cemetary Ridge on the evening of July 1st....and would have been destroyed in the effort. As I noted, even if he had in fact "captured" Cemetary Ridge, his Corps would have been so badly damaged it would have in effect been removed as a viable force for the rest of the campaign. Note the avenues of retreat from the Union perspective. At worst, they would have fallen back, possibly to the creek "line" Meade favored in the first place.

In short, taking Cemetary Ridge, if it was possible on the evening of July 1st, would only have excerbated the primary problem Lee faced....being seriously outnumbered, with long vulnerable supply lines.

Second, Lee did note during the war, according to some historians, his view that Jackson might have been counterproductive in the later stages of the war. I've read this in several books (yep, I can't remember which ones exactly, but will review this weekend to provide titles for you if you desire).

Lee did offer to resign, thats true. But he also NEVER called Gettysburg a "defeat". His view was that while they didn't "acheive all that they desired" they had in fact preempted the Union's planned "campaign" for the summer of 1863, and that "those people" remained quiet for the next six months after the battle, therefore some strategic goals were achieved.

Returning to the primary question concerning July 1st, 1863. You don't mention the distances involved moving Ewell's Corps to Gettysburg. Its not a long drive...but in the heat of July of that year, its a long walk even for troops used to being used as "foot cavalry". Keep in mind, they had been marching for a couple of weeks to this point, the last march being made as fast as humanly possible. There is quite a bit of evidence that the corps coming from the North and Northeast (Ewell and AP Hill's) were in fact exhausted at that point.

I completely agree with the mistake of ignoring Pettigrew's warnings, and the spy Harrison as well, btw, that stated Union Troops, specifically a "tidy bunch of blue bellies" as Harrison put it, were in Gettysburg.

I"m not aware of any Cavalry assigned to Ewell, or Hill, in significant numbers that would allow a recon in force (given its enemy territory, you wouldn't just send a sqaudron up the road under those circumstances).

What "I'm suggesting" is the exact opposite of what you state. I suggest had Jackson been at Gettysburg, and everything played out as it did, specifically Heth running amok seeking "glory" (thats exactly how I view Heth's actions) with Ewell and AP Hill arriving as they did, Jackson would in fact have charged the guns on Cemetary Hill. The only thing Howard did correctly that day was order troops to dig in mid afternoon of July 1st. Add to it the large number of cannon's already in place, it would have been one of the biggest slaughters in a war full of them.

You are correct, Jackson followed his orders to the letter. However, his commanders had a habit of not being that strict, as Jackson's own numerous diciplinary actions against them demonstrated over and over again. (To be fair, many of those actions were due to Jackson being....odd, to be polite....LOL).

As for Picketts Charge, yep thats what Longstreet said. That doesn't change the fact the only person that thought the attack would be sucessful besides Lee was Pickett.

Nobody can look over that ground and come to the same conclusion Lee did on the evening of July 2nd, or the morning of July 3rd. Longstreets staff was correct, the position was indeed "frightening in its strength".

As for Jackson "flanking" the position....given the convergence from all points of the compass to the south and east of the entire Union Army, I think had Jackson attempted one of his famous flanking manuevers, he would have run into the oncoming Corps still arriving during the night of July 1st, and the morning of July 2nd. I have a very hard time looking at the maps, and divining just what the "route" would be, given the terrain, and the locations of the various Union Corps coming up. Had Jackson done so, its very very likely he would find himself "taken in the flank", with no hope of relief given the position of the main body of the CSA to what would have been the far western end of the battlefield. As most have noted, the primary advantage of the Union was strong interior lines, while the CSA had to shift troops over miles and miles of roads, most of which were in clear view of the Union position atop Cemetary Ridge, Culps Hill, etc. Also, on the evening of July 1st, Buford's battered troops were ordered to the flanks....and Buford certainly wasn't Howard when it came to securing the flanks.

(I really enjoyed reading your post)