Could USS Cole tragedy have been avoided?

World Tribune.com ^ | October 18, 2000 | John Metler

[detch]

October 18, 2000

UNITED NATIONS — The terrorist attack on the USS Cole, refueling in the port of Aden again sharply focuses the stark vulnerability of American interests in the Middle East. While it's easy to play "Monday morning quarterback" after such a tragedy, its equally prudent to question the set of circumstances which witnessed a planned suicide attack on the destroyer Cole tragically sending seventeen American sailors to their untimely deaths.

All the pieces were in place; An overextended fleet--today 325 ships down from 600 in Ronald Reagan's fleet--a mandate patrolling the Persian Gulf enforcing sanctions on Iraq, a lack of oilier vessels because of cutbacks, thus prompting the fatal choice to make a questionable port call in a place like Yemen.

Allowing the USS Cole, a modern guided missile destroyer go unescorted into Aden was possibly safe, but probably better avoided given regional tensions, emotions and threat profiles, especially in the wake of renewed Palestinian /Israeli fighting.

One must not underestimate the visceral anti-American hysteria, emanating from the Palestinian uprising on the West Bank, Gaza and Israel. An American ship is like a red flag to a bull during such times throughout the Islamic world, even far from the political epicenter; whether one is in Yemen or Pakistan.

The small boat suicide attack on the Cole, impacted hundreds of pounds of high explosives against the ship's hull causing a gaping 40 hole in the vessel. FBI investigators, soon to be backed up by 1,200 Marines for security, are searching for the culprits likely to be the Osama Bin Laden organization or some of the other terrorists who Yemen home.

Why were we operating in such a dangerous environment? Where's our planning? While its common knowledge that US ships have gone into Aden for refueling since early 1999, bunkering was not done in times of violent upheaval and high octane hate. Furthermore, the US Embassy in Yemen has prudently warned about the risks of American ships visiting Aden.

General Anthony Zinni, recently retired Pentagon Chief for Middle East operations defended his original decision to use Aden as a refueling port and the desirability of bringing Yemen closer to American interests. General Zinni told the New York Times that several ship visits had been vetoed by the American Ambassador to Yemen, Barbara Bodine, who worried about the threat of terrorism.

Importantly National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Defense Secretary William Cohen, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright were not opposed to the Yemeni port calls for US Navy ships. "Mr. Berger, Mr. Cohen, and Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, defended the decision to use Aden as a refueling point despite concerns about security in a country the State Department itself called `a safe haven for terrorists,' earlier this year," cites the New York Times .

Thus we again ask the painfully poignant question? Why would a US Navy vessel be in Aden in the first place? Mountainous Yemen has a well earned reputation as a wild and woolly place for friend and foe alike, kind of an Afghanistan by the Red Sea. It seems that Yemen rarely enters the media except when hapless foreign tourists, usually Europeans, stumble into kidnaps, ambushes, and afoul of some local militia.

Moreover as a old Soviet client state, there are more than enough people who don't quite welcome an American presence even if it means needed revenues for the Port of Aden.

Though Aden and its famous Steamer Point was woven into the strategic planning and lore of the British Royal Navy until 1967, modern Yemen has suffered the vicissitudes of civil war, national division with South Yemen, the former the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, being an classic Soviet client.

Washington has worked on improving relations with the current regime of Field Marshall Ali Abdullah Saleh. Clearly there's a case for better ties with strategic Yemen . Yet, a seeming nonchalance about credible threats underscores a larger problem. Sadly the Clinton/Gore Administration's usual sloppy planning, Alice in Wonderland worldview, and "it can't happen here" mindset, creates such a glaring vulnerability.

John J. Metzler is a U.N. correspondent covering diplomatic and defense issues. He writes weekly for World Tribune.com.

October 18, 2000

[detch]

Wasn't this a job Richard Clarke could have been doing - advising Pres. Clinton that a port visit to Aden was not wise, particulary since the Ambassador at the time, Barbara Bodine, thought it was not good judgment in view of the terrorist threat in the country?

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[OldEagle]

Short answer...YES!

[Inyokern]

Great find!

[kabar]

Zinni fancied himself as some sort of proconsul. He is a self-described expert on foreign policy. Zinni screwed up big time and was never held accountable.

[Doe Eyes]

Clinton was President. It happened on his watch. Of course he was responsible.

[Long Cut]

Well, here's a few things that might have helped:

1. The deck security force might have been properly briefed NOT to allow ANY unauthorised craft near the ship;

2. Said deck security might have been allowed to LOAD THEIR WEAPONS (they weren't).

3. They might have been authorized to fire on unauthorized craft approaching a Navy ship (they weren't);

4. They might have, Heaven forfend, even have been allowed to POINT their weapons at a potential threat to their vessels (they weren't).

In other words, due to absolutely INSANE Rules Of Engagement promulgated by an "administration" that was terrified of "offending" the locals, seventeen Sailors died, and a Navy ship was nearly sunk.

I wonder, what would Halsey, Nimitz, or Spruance have said? Would they have behaved as the Admirals nowadays did, and say and do NOTHING?

[detch]

I hope that CONDI RICE raises this point to the 9/11 Commission. This is one area where Richard Clarke could have and should have been instrumental in avoiding a tragedy and needless loss of life. In my view this would have been an area where he, in the NSC at the time, would have been directly responsible. The port visit request should have been denied, and he should have been involved in the process of approval/denial.

[WhiteyAppleseed]

Do you think anything has changed? How many boats populate the waters of this nation's naval ports on any given day? For that matter, how many boats are moving about in any port, foreign or domestic, when a US naval vessel, or any ship flying our flag, enters that port and ties off or drops anchor?

[PISANO]

Of course it could have been avoided. If the Navy had sufficient AO's to refuel ships at sea the Cole would never had to go into port to refuel in the first place.

[Cboldt]

If the Navy had sufficient AO's to refuel ships at sea the Cole would never had to go into port to refuel in the first place.

That's another good point. I heard, but haven't followed up to confirm, that she was half full, and the port call was NOT necessary. Rather, the port call was to show some sort of show of goodwill, e.g., "We'll buy YOUR fuel."

[detch]

The DoD Commission reported that there WERE SUFFICIENT refuelling assets to allow refuelling at sea. This port visit to a high threat port was a "show the flag" that CENTCOM wanted to make happen. Can somebody find and confirm that the USS COLE had sufficient fuel GOING INTO the port of Aden to make it to the Northern Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. I had heard that the ship already had plenty of fuel on board.

[archy]

I wonder, what would Halsey, Nimitz, or Spruance have said? Would they have behaved as the Admirals nowadays did, and say and do NOTHING?

You left out Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel and Major General Walter Short, the respective Navy and Army commanders at Pearl Harbor on 07 December, 1941. I expect most would behave as they did, and afterwards, would pay a pretty similar price.

[archy]

This port visit to a high threat port was a "show the flag" that CENTCOM wanted to make happen. Can somebody find and confirm that the USS COLE had sufficient fuel GOING INTO the port of Aden to make it to the Northern Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. I had heard that the ship already had plenty of fuel on board.

Are you aware of which firm the fuel was purchased from, another likely reason the Cole was ordered to top up her tanks in a hostile port.

[Long Cut]

Actually, being in the Navy myself, I can assure you that security forces afloat are quite a bit better prepared.

As for the number of boats around, any getting within the ship's "safe zone" without proper clearance (and only a harbor tug would have this...not a raft or rowboat) would find its day solidly ruined.

[findingtruth]

It could have been avoided by a non-interventionist foreign policy, but nobody wants that except Pat Buchanan and those (sneer!) isolationists.

[Long Cut]

Were there ANY mud-puddles that wretched "administration" didn't wallow in?

I am not surprised in the least.

[detch]

All I can say to you is -- RIMFIRE. A single ship not going into a high threat port against the advice of the Ambassador has NOTHING TO DO with non-interventionism. Gheez...

[WhiteyAppleseed]

Glad to hear it. I was on the Hepburn (and the McCain DDG-36--carried the national ensign during the decommissioning, color guard). We were getting ready to leave Hunter's Point in '78 when a tug backed into us. The tug had moved the Fanning from the quay wall in front of us--why--I don't know. "Flooding, flooding, flooding in the boiler room" took on new meaning. The five foot dent was repaired quickly, unlike the 19 month yard period.