The generals were scared of their own strength

Politicians and officials from two US administrations traded accusations last week over failures to act against terrorism before and after September 11, 2001. Their claims and counter-claims obscured a crucial weakness in the US military's readiness at the very time when al-Qaeda was at its most vulnerable.

In 1998, when Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda training camps were identified as a serious threat, plans were drawn up to attack both him and them. At that time Afghanistan had no air defence perimeter, so that any aircraft could fly in and out unmolested, and it had no ground patrols along its borders.

The US was maintaining a vast panoply of Special Operations forces - some 29,000 men. These comprised several elite formations including the Delta commandos and three battalions of Ranger assault troops. The Special Operations forces were far larger and better equipped than their British, French, Israeli, or Russian counterparts. But there was a difference.

While the latter employed their commando forces whenever they could, notably for counter-terrorism, the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were, until September 11, most reluctant to allow missions by these forces.

Each time an operation was proposed, the Chiefs demanded impossibly detailed "actionable" intelligence and exhaustive feasibility studies. They imposed the most restrictive preconditions, demanding assurances that no casualties would be suffered - or inflicted - because of extreme concern about collateral damage. Because even the smallest commando attack was treated as if it were another D-Day landing, the result was that almost invariably the operation was cancelled.

An egregious example was Operation Amber Star, initiated in 1996 to capture and deliver for trial Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the political and military wartime chiefs of the Bosnian Serbs, both accused of war crimes. Ostensibly a Nato operation, it was actually controlled by the US Joint Chiefs.

With the support of the National Security Agency (for remote surveillance), a CIA task force, and FBI agents, the Special Operations Command was tasked to prepare a minutely detailed plan, along with the British Director of Special Forces, whose SAS commandos were also to take part. Although Karadzic only had a few bodyguards and Mladic was living in Belgrade, the Joint Chiefs insisted on "overwhelming force" to minimise the risk of casualties. In 1998, after almost two years and many millions of dollars spent on preparations, the Joint Chiefs refused to authorise the mission. Mladic and Karadzic remain free.

In spite of all their impressive hardware, US commando forces had very little combat experience. The tragic irony of excessive prudence was that in the rare event of their employment, as in the 1993 Mogadishu raid, things went wrong, and brave, highly skilled men were killed - ultimately by the collective inexperience of their commanders.

Commando actions are not full-scale wars, campaigns or even offensives and they should not be subject to the same precautions. Unlike the troops engaged in D-Day or Desert Storm, they can usually be recalled along the way if unexpected risks emerge, and casualties are low because the troops engaged are few.

The very purpose of Special Operations forces is to carry out operations which are too complex and demanding for regular line forces. But they cannot serve a useful purpose if they are just retained as a deterrent; they must be sent into action. Action entails both the risk of failure and casualties and both must be accepted as the cost of having useful commando forces. When only zero-defect, zero-casualty operations were considered, none could ever be given the go ahead.

My point is this: it is not Bush or Clinton who should be personally blamed for the failure of US policy before September 11. It was some deeper problem of the military bureaucracy which was only addressed when the Bush administration elevated Special Operations Command, giving it the power to propose war plans directly to the civilian leadership and circumventing the cabal of cautious generals. At last they could use the awesome powers at their disposal.

A final irony: the best opportunity to get Osama bin Laden was in February 1999. Members of the ruling family of the United Arab Emirates had flown into Kahandaron a hunting trip. Bin Laden arrived and set up camp next to them. He was monitored as he socialised with them for several days. The UAE was almost certainly giving him money.

A American attack on the camp was opposed by none other than Richard Clarke, the former White House counter-terrorism adviser, who was concerned about the UAE visitors (even though they were funding bin Laden). This was because Clarke himself had just been to the UAE, where he had received elaborate Arab hospitality and fulsome promises of co-operation. Mr Clarke is in no position to criticise George Bush for his failure to act against terrorism.

• Edward Luttwak is Senior Fellow, Centre for Strategic and International Studies

Disgusting. .....Rendered impotent by thier own timidity and political correctness. But this isn't new --- America is always at it's best when its nose is a bit bloodied, and it hadn't yet been.

Their claims and counter-claims obscured a crucial weakness in the US military's readiness at the very time when al-Qaeda was at its most vulnerable. What a crock. The military was more than ready. It was political correctness that kept Bin Kerry ....ooops, I mean Bin Laden alive.

The only way for President Bush to prevent 911 from happening was to have those 19 hijackers arrested before they could get on those planes but that would've been (GASP!) racial profiling!

Heavens to Betsy! We can't have that! Proof of this came just a couple of weeks after 911 when a Secret Service Agent of Arab descent tried to get on an American Airlines flight with a gun and shoddy paperwork. The pilot told the agent he would not be allowed to board the plane until his paperwork was straightened out and that meant he would have to take a later flight.

Instead of praising the airline pilot for his common sense handling of the matter, President Bush publicly criticized the pilot and bloviated that his administration would not tolerate racial profiling.

Morons.

Ya.. except for the fact that about half of our country seems to consist of peaceniks and appeasers.

Can you imagine the indignant moral pablum we'd of had to endure if we'd blasted the Taliban pre-9/11?

Kind of a pity that the same courtesy wasn't afforded to the Branch Davidians.

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