Bush ordered 'contingency' plan for confronting Iraq during Afghan war

Then it is time to get Clarke face to face with Condi on an open forum.

I noticed two things while watching the hearing today:

One, the commission is a farce for public consumption in the hopes that it will provide "closure" for the people and prevent them from suing. But given Clarke's reception by the "victims" afterward it doesn't look likely.

Two, Condi Rice is the most powerful black woman in the world. Look for her on the cover of Ebony and Jet soon.

The ONLY thing I miss about graduate school is access to Lexis/Nexis...LOL!

Start working on a PhD by taking one class a semester.

It would take you years to complete it. :-)

I wonder if I start using cuss words, will I get banned?

I don't know, but you could launch your career as a Dem presidential candidate depending on your choice of words.

I couldn't believe the overtly partisan questioning of the September 11 Commission and those jerks waving Clarke's book around as if they had finally cracked the case. Why not wave Lt. Col. Robert Patterson's book around and ask where Clinton was in the fall of 1998 when Sandy Berger tried to reach him to tell him that bin Laden was within striking distance. Berger couldn't reach Clinton for an hour, according to Patterson, and when he finally did Clinton was indecisive and the opportunity passed.

See post 96.

Look who is speaking up now

Bush's war -- against Richard Clarke
The White House's furious response to Richard Clarke only underscores the truth of his testimony.
By Sidney Blumenthal

(snip)

The controversy raging around Richard Clarke's book -- and his testimony before the 9/11 Commission that Bush ignored warnings about terrorism that might have prevented the attacks -- revolves around his singularly unimpeachable credibility. In response, the Bush administration has launched a full-scale offensive against him: impugning his personal motives, claiming he is a disappointed job-hunter, that he is publicity mad, a political partisan (Clarke, in fact, voted for Republican Sen. John McCain for president in the Republican primaries in 2000) -- as well as ignorant, irrelevant and a liar.

After he found where Clinton was (golf course), Berger called him THREE times, each time more urgently. Planes and pilots were ready to go, but the 2-hour window of opportunity passed w/out action.

The 2nd airing of LKL with Clarke is on now

He reminds me of Joe Wilson

The White House's furious response to Richard Clarke only underscores the truth of his testimony.

I'm sure he thought the same thing about the Clinton's response to Kathleen Willey.

bump to mark

So when that passed in 1998, the Democrats all voted for it? And it was still in effect under Bush? I just want to get the facts before I start spreading the facts.

I've never read that before. Thanks. That's exactly the approach Bush took. Clinton was too worried about his "legacy".

Clarke is a POS.

I don't think anything has infuriated me much more than the credibility Clarke got today. He should have been laughed out of the room. I think it stunned a lot of people, and may have opened some eyes.

Kerry's been on his B&B vacation (Botox and Book-reading). I can only hope that the Clarke book is the manual, playbook, that Kerry is going to go by.

If Clarke is the best they've got, bring it on.

The military makes contingency plans for all kinds of hypotheticals, always has, always should.

Of course they do. The point being here that President Bush asked for plans concerning Iraq because of the war in Afghanistan, in the event Iraq interfered. Much different than Clarke's testimony.

And in the Clarke interview, he states that the Bush administration mentioned various terrorist organizations who might possibly have been involved in 9/11. According to Clarke's own words then, Iraq was not mentioned, contrary to the claims he's making now.

Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

August 11, 1999

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the principal proponents of last year's Iraq Liberation Art, we are writing to express our dismay over the continued drift in U.S. Policy toward Iraq.

We were greatly encouraged by your decision last October to sign the Iraq Liberation Act, which established as an objective of U.S . foreign policy the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, and we welcomed your pledge last November 15th to work with Congress to implement the Act. We were also pleased with the execution of Operation Desert Fox last December, and the continued commitment of your Administration following the conclusion of that Operation to fully enforce the no- fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.

Since the beginning of this year, however, we have noted signs of a reduced priority in U.S. policy toward Iraq. The last six months have been notable more for what has not happened rather than for what has been achieved. In particular, we are dismayed by the following:

International inspections no longer constrain Saddam's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. Up to and during Operation Desert Fox, Administration officials expended considerable energy explaining to the international community, Congress, and the American people why it was necessary to use force to compel Saddam to submit to comprehensive international inspections. Without inspections, we were told, Saddam could begin to reconstitute his WMD capability within a matter of weeks. Operation Desert Fox was necessary to compel him to stop obstructing inspections. Since Operation Desert Fox, however, there have been no inspections at all. Now, rather than emphasize the danger that Iraq's WMD programs may be reconstituted, Administration officials apparently claim that they have "no evidence" that Saddam is reconstituting his capabilities. In fact, there is considerable evidence that Iraq continues to seek to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction. The whole point of Operation Desert Fox was that we could not afford to wait until Saddam reconstituted his WMD capabilities. If international security could be assured by waiting until we find evidence that Saddam- has developed weapons of mass destruction and responding to the threat at that time, there would have been no need for Operation Desert Fox.
The President
August 11, 1999
Page Two

The Administration is not giving the Iraqi opposition the political support it needs to seriously challenge Saddam. While Administration spokesmen sometimes have expressed support for the Iraq Liberation Act, all too often they distanced themselves from, if not ridiculed, the policy you endorsed last November 15th. In this regard, the views of General Zinni, Commander-in-Chief of the Central Command, are well-known. More recently, a senior State Department official was quoted in the Washington Post saying of the opposition "these are the day-after guys. These are not the guys who are going to put a bullet in the head of Saddam Hussein." In fact, the members of the democratic opposition need to be supported as the "today" guys -- unless it is the intention of the Clinton Administration to send U.S. ground troops in to achieve the U.S. policy objective of removing the Saddam Hussein regime from power. Instead of permitting senior officials to denigrate the opposition, the Administration should be seeking to enhance the opposition's political legitimacy by receiving its officials at the highest level and supporting its efforts to convene meetings inside Iraq, in the United States and elsewhere.
The Administration is not giving the Iraqi opposition the material support it needs to seriously challenge Saddam. To achieve the objective of removing Saddam, the opposition will require not only more political support from the United States than it has received so far, but also more material support. To date, of the $8 million appropriated in last year's omnibus appropriations act to assist the opposition, less than $500,000 has been used to support activities carried out by the opposition. Most of the rest of this money is being spent on such things as academic conferences, community outreach projects, and conflict management programs that will do little or nothing to expedite the demise of Saddam's regime. Notwithstanding these expenditures, we understand that as much as $1 million of this aid may be returned to the Treasury at the end of this fiscal year. Further, the opposition has received no assistance whatsoever from the $97 million in military assistance made available under the Iraq Liberation Act. The Administration has begun to plan an initial drawdown under the Iraq Liberation Act, but has signaled Saddam that he has nothing to fear by emphasizing that the drawdown will be "nonlethal" in nature. Reportedly it will include photocopiers, computers, and fax machines, as well as training in such areas as accounting and flood management. In providing authority for military drawdown, it was our intention to train and equip a force dedicated to bringing democracy to Iraq.
The Administration is not willing to deliver assistance to the opposition inside Iraq. In addition to withholding from the Opposition the most useful forms of assistance, the Administration has ruled out delivering assistance to the opposition inside Iraq. Delivering such assistance inside Iraq might violate U.N. sanctions, we are told. U.N. sanctions cannot present a legal problem under U.S. law, inasmuch as the Iraq Liberation Act authorizes the provision of assistance under the act "notwithstanding any other
The President
August 11, 1999
Page Three

provision of law." To find a legal problem under international law, it is necessary to overlook the fact that the purpose of U.N. sanctions is to weaken Saddam. It is further necessary to ignore the U.N. Security Council resolutions, including 688 and 949, that authorize action to protect the Kurdish and other minorities in Iraq and provide the foundation under international law for our continued enforcement of no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. If it does not violate U.N. sanctions for coalition aircraft to bomb targets inside Iraq, it should not violate UN. sanctions to deliver munitions and other assistance to the opposition for use against targets inside Iraq. And certainly the delivery of non-lethal forms of assistance inside Iraq, especially humanitarian assistance, should not violate U.N. sanctions.

The Administration is, not willing. to give appropriate security assurances to anti-Saddam Iraqis, including the Kurds and Shi'a. The Kurdish and Shi'a population of Iraq has paid a horrible price for resisting Saddam's rule. To provide a measure of protection to these groups, the northern and southern no-fly zones were established in 1991 and 1992. More recently, Secretary Albright extended U.S. security assurances to the Kurds last September in order to facilitate the reconciliation agreement between Kurdish groups. On July 7th of this year, the Executive Council of the Iraqi National Congress asked the Administration for additional security assurances in order to make possible an Iraqi National Assembly meeting in northern Iraq. The opposition did not ask for a commitment of U.S. ground forces or other specific guarantees. Nevertheless, in a letter dated July 29th, Acting Secretary of State Strobe Talbott rejected this request. We believe this decision should be reconsidered. The United States already is committed to providing security for the Kurds and Shi'a of Iraq. To specifically deny a request from the opposition for assurances that would, in their words, "show that the United States is committed to a change of government in Iraq, " sends a dangerous signal. . This sign of irresolution can only tempt Saddam to once again move against the Kurds and Shia.
We are dismayed by these developments. We do not believe, however, that it is too late to reverse the drift in U.S. policy and regain the momentum that our nation had last year. We respectfully propose an action plan consisting of the following four key elements:

1. Set a deadline for the reinstitution of meaningful international inspections of Saddam's WMD programs in the near future, while ensuring that Saddam is not rewarded for complying with his international obligations. Make clear that serious consequences will ensue if the deadline is not met. This could mean, among other things, further military action against WMD-related facilities and other targets central to Saddam's hold on power, or expansion of the existing no-fly zones into no-drive

zones. The President
August 11, 1999
Page Four

2. Provide enhanced security assurances to anti-Saddam Iraqis along the lines proposed in the letter of July 7, 1999, from the Executive Council of the Iraqi National Congress. Not only is this the right thing to do, but it will reverse the dangerous signal that was sent by the Administration's initial response to the July 7th letter from the opposition.

3. Support the effort of the Iraqi National Congress to hold a National Assembly meeting in the near future at the location of their choice, including northern Iraq or Washington, D.C. Urge other countries to send observers as a sign of support, and facilitate their attendance.

4. Immediately begin a program of meaningful assistance to the designated opposition groups. This must include both material assistance and training under the Iraq Liberation Act. The opposition has an immediate need for such items as communications equipment, uniforms, boots, and bivouac gear. In addition, the necessary equipment should be provided for direct broadcasting into Baghdad of FM radio and television signals from opposition-controlled sites in northern Iraq. Training may best be provided outside Iraq, but there is no reason not to deliver material assistance inside Iraq. Over time, we must be prepared to deliver both lethal military training and lethal material assistance.

With these steps, we believe that our nation can begin to recover the ground that has been lost since last year. We stand prepared to offer whatever legislative support you require in order to achieve our shared objective of promoting the emergence of a peaceful, democratic government in Iraq.

Sincerely,

Trent Lott

Joseph I. Lieberman

Jesse Helms

J. Robert Kerrey

Richard C. Shelby

Sam Brownback

Benjamin A. Gilman

Howard L. Berman

*******

Clinton Letter RE: Iraq Liberation Act
(January 20, 1999)

Report on the Iraq Liberation Act

In accordance with Section 5 of P.L. 105-338, section 5 (a), the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (hereafter referred to as "the Act") and of Section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, I am notifying the Congress of Iraqi opposition organizations proposed for designation under the Act.

For the last eight years, the United States has led an international coalition that has successfully held in check the threat Iraq posed by Iraq's drive for regional domination in its quest for weapons of mass destruction. We will continue to contain the threat that Iraq poses to its people, the region and the world. But over the long term, the best way to address the challenge Iraq poses is through a new government in Baghdad that will represent and respect its people, not repress them, and that is committed to peace in the region and compliance with Security Council resolutions. The necessity of this approach has been underscored during the past year, as the Iraqi government repeatedly and deliberately failed to live up to its obligations under international conventions and applicable UN resolutions, including those addressing Iraq's WMD programs.

It is in this spirit that I welcome the new array of tools Congress has added to our efforts to work with the Iraqi opposition. These tools will complement our long-standing efforts to encourage greater unity and effectiveness of opposition groups, to foster a reconciliation between the two major Kurdish parties, and to establish Radio Free Iraq—which began broadcasting in late October. Separately, we will also be reporting on the ways in which we are putting ESF funding for the Iraqi opposition to good use.

Change in Iraq will, however, take time. We must approach this problem prudently so as to achieve our goal and not to imperil needlessly the lives of those committed to opposing the regime. What we must do is to strengthen the Iraqi opposition and support the Iraqi people in practical and effective ways in order to help them prepare for the day when they can establish a new leadership. We intend to pursue this policy in close consultation with Congress.

As a first step in implementing the Iraq Liberation Act, we have intensified our contacts with a wide array of Iraqi opposition groups—particularly broad-based groups based primarily inside Iraq with a significant presence or direct control on the ground, and broad-based groups based primarily outside Iraq with a membership open to all Iraqis regardless of ethnic or religious background.

As a result of these initial consultations, I am notifying the specified Congressional committees of my intent to designate the following groups as eligible to receive assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act:

The Iraqi National Accord (INA)
The Iraqi National Congress (INC)
The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK)
The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
The Movement for Constitutional Monarchy (MCM)
The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)

These groups are committed to democratic values, respect for human rights, peaceful relations with Iraq's neighbors, maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and fostering cooperation among democratic opposition groups.

The Iraqi National Accord, which accepts members from all ethnic, religious and ideological backgrounds, has focused it s efforts on encouraging defections from the Iraqi regime. Under the leadership of Ayad Alawi, it maintains close contacts with other opposition groups and has offices in the UK, Jordan, northern Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, the Netherlands and Germany. Its Charter calls for a democratic, pluralistic government for Iraq with multiparty elections and respect for human rights. The INA is amenable to designation under the Act.

The Iraqi National Congress is structured as an umbrella organization open to opposition groups from all ethnic, religious and ideological backgrounds. It works cooperatively within the opposition to establish a united, pluralistic and democratic Iraq. During the past several years, while its umbrella institutions (i.e., General Assembly, Executive Committee, Presidency Council) have been unable to meet, it has carried on its work through its independent members. We are working with Executive Committee Chairman Ahmad Chalabi to encourage this committee to meet. According to Dr. Chalabi, the INC is amenable to designation under the Act.

The Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan, headed by Sheikh Ah Abdel Aziz, is based in Halabja, Iraq, with Sunni and some Shia members throughout the north Iraq region. It supports the continued territorial integrity and unity of Iraq under a democratic, federative government. The citizens of Halabja suffered terribly in the regime's 1988 chemical weapons attack on the city; as a result, IMIK is deeply committed to human rights for all Iraqis and encourages efforts to research and publicize the continuing effects of chemical weapons exposure. The IMIK is amenable to designation under the Act.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party,headed by Massoud Barzani, is open to Iraqi Kurds and other Iraqis of all religions and social classes; there are Sunni, Shia, Assyrian and Yezedi members. In its joint statement with the PUK in Washington in September, 1998, the KDP clearly enunciated its support for the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq under a democratic, federative government with full political and human rights for all the Iraqi people. The KDP affirms that it has ceased any military cooperation with the Saddam Hussein regime. It is amenable to designation under the Act.

The Movement for Constitutional Monarchy supports the return of a Hashemite monarch to Iraq in the person of Sherif Ah. It is committed to establishing a constitutional monarchy in Iraq with a parliament, multi-party elections and representative institutions open to all Iraqis. The MCM acknowledges the recognition other groups accord it by including monarchy as one constitutional option for consideration by the Iraqi people in a referendum; it would participate in such a referendum and accept the results. The MCM is amenable to designation under the Act.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, headed by Jalal Talabani, is open to all Iraqi living in the northern provinces regardless of ethnic, religious or social background. It has Kurdish, Assyrian, Turkomen and Arab members. It maintains a close working relationship with many other opposition groups. In its joint statement with the KDP in Washington in September, 1998, the PUK clearly enunciated its support for the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq under a democratic, federative government with full political and human rights for all the Iraqi people. It is amenable to designation under the Act.

The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, is a mass movement with primarily Shia Arab—but also Sunni Arab and other—supporters. Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir al Hakim, a spiritual guide for millions of Iraqis, is its elected leader. SCIRI espouses the creation of a democratic, constitutional government that respects the rule of law. It advocates free speech, a free press and equal rights for women and members of minority groups. SCIRI has not yet indicated whether it is amenable to designation under the Act, but its position among the Shia of southern Iraq would make this list incomplete without it.

The above groups are representative of the diversity of those opposed to Saddam. We will continue to reach out to groups not currently designated, to determine whether they meet the criteria outlined by the Act and desire to be designated. We will report periodically on any changes to the list.

As part of our effort to implement the Iraq Liberation Act, we will intensify our contacts with designated groups to engage with them how we can help them more effectively oppose Saddam's rule and help Iraqis to achieve the kind of government they deserve and desire. We will evaluate carefully the capabilities of these groups both inside and outside Iraq—their strengths and their weaknesses as well as their goals and desires—giving due consideration to any proposals they may wish to present regarding the possible receipt of assistance under the Act. We will proceed prudently and effectively, in a manner that will not needlessly put at risk the lives of those who share these goals or commit U.S. military forces without a clear understanding of the likelihood of success and the risks associated with such a commitment.

At the same time we will continue to support the international sanctions regime which prohibits Saddam Hussein from using Iraq's oil wealth to rebuild his offensive military capability. We will continue in these efforts as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power and refuses to meet all of his obligations to the international community, as outlined in UN Security Council Resolutions 678, 687, 711, 715 and subsequent resolutions.

I look forward to continuing to work with Congress toward achieving the goal of the Iraq Liberation Act.

Dennis Miller has David Drier on now (CNBC) talking about commission hearings.

Keep selling those books Dick.

I am darn proud Bush did all he did. Clarke can make all the accusations he wants. Even if Bush behaved as liar Clarke said in his book it would not be a bad thing. No one had a clue to 911. That is not the administrations fault. We are dealing with a very fanatic and unpredictable enemy. The thing that keeps standing out in my mind is the report Gore did on Airline Security and what he left out of the report. They could have warned the airlines about every one of the highjackers and I doubt it would have done any good. There was no airline security.

"President Bush told me that on September 9th, 2001, he had a meeting about Iraq in the White House when he discussed “smart” sanctions, changes to the sanctions regime. There was no talk of military action."

(IRAQ) WHY SEP 11 MADE IRAQ'S LIBERATION NECESSARY

Global Terrorism

By British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Saturday, March 6, 2004

No decision I have ever made in politics has been as divisive as the decision to go to war to in Iraq. It remains deeply divisive today. I know a large part of the public want to move on. Rightly they say the government should concentrate on the issues that elected us in 1997: the economy, jobs, living standards, health, education, and crime. I share that view, and we are.

But I know too that the nature of this issue over Iraq, stirring such bitter emotions as it does, can’t just be swept away as ill fitting the preoccupations of the man and woman on the street. This is not simply because of the gravity of war; or the continued engagement of British troops and civilians in Iraq; or even because of reflections made on the integrity of the Prime Minister. It is because it was in March 2003 and remains my fervent view that the nature of the global threat we face in Britain and round the world is real and existential, and it is the task of leadership to expose it and fight it, whatever the political cost; and that the true danger is not to any single politician’s reputation, but to our country if we now ignore this threat or erase it from the agenda in embarrassment at the difficulties it causes.

In truth, the fundamental source of division over Iraq is not over issues of trust or integrity, though some insist on trying to translate it into that. Each week brings a fresh attempt to get a new angle that can prove it was all a gigantic conspiracy. We have had three inquiries, including the one by Lord Hutton conducted over six months, with more openness by government than any such inquiry in history, that have affirmed there was no attempt to falsify intelligence in the dossier of September 2002, but rather that it was indeed an accurate summary of that intelligence.

We have seen one element — intelligence about some WAD being ready for use in 45 minutes — elevated into virtually the one fact that persuaded the nation into war. This intelligence was mentioned by me once in my statement to the House of Commons on 24 September and not mentioned by me again in any debate. It was mentioned by no one in the crucial debate on 18 March 2003. In the period from 24 September to 29 May, the date of the BBC broadcast on it, it was raised twice in almost 40,000 written parliamentary questions in the House of Commons; and not once in almost 5,000 oral questions. Neither was it remotely the basis for the claim that Saddam had strategic as well as battlefield WMD. That was dealt with in a different part of the dossier; and though the Iraq Survey Group have indeed not found stockpiles of weapons, they have uncovered much evidence about Saddam’s program to develop long-range strategic missiles in breach of U.N. rules.

It is said we claimed Iraq was an imminent threat to Britain and was preparing to attack us. In fact this is what I said prior to the war on 24 September 2002: “Why now? People ask. I agree I cannot say that this month or next, even this year or next he will use his weapons.”

Then, for example, in January 2003 in my press conference I said: “And I tell you honestly what my fear is, my fear is that we wake up one day and we find either that one of these dictatorial states has used weapons of mass destruction — and Iraq has done so in the past — and we get sucked into a conflict, with all the devastation that would cause; or alternatively these weapons, which are being traded right round the world at the moment, fall into the hands of these terrorist groups, these fanatics who will stop at absolutely nothing to cause death and destruction on a mass scale. Now that is what I have to worry about. And I understand of course why people think it is a very remote threat and it is far away and why does it bother us. Now I simply say to you, it is a matter of time unless we act and take a stand before terrorism and weapons of mass destruction come together, and I regard them as two sides of the same coin.”

The truth is, as was abundantly plain in the motion before the House of Commons on 18 March, we went to war to enforce compliance with U.N. resolutions. Had we believed Iraq was an imminent direct threat to Britain, we would have taken action in September 2002; we would not have gone to the U.N. Instead, we spent October and November in the U.N. negotiating U.N. Resolution 1441. We then spent almost four months trying to implement it.

Actually, it is now apparent from the Survey Group that Iraq was indeed in breach of U.N. Resolution 1441. It did not disclose laboratories and facilities it should have; nor the teams of scientists kept together to retain their WMD, including nuclear expertise; nor its continuing research relevant to CW and BW [chemical and biological weapons]. As Dr Kay, the former head of the ISG [International Survey Group] who is now quoted as a critic of the war, has said: “Iraq was in clear violation of the terms of Resolution 1441”. And “I actually think this [Iraq] may be one of those cases where it was even more dangerous than we thought.”

Then, most recently is the attempt to cast doubt on the attorney general’s legal opinion. He said the war was lawful. He published a statement on the legal advice. It is said this opinion is disputed. Of course it is. It was disputed in March 2003. It is today. The lawyers continue to divide over it — with their legal opinions bearing a remarkable similarity to their political view of the war.

But let’s be clear. Once this row dies down, another will take its place and then another and then another.

All of it in the end is an elaborate smokescreen to prevent us seeing the real issue: which is not a matter of trust but of judgment.

The real point is that those who disagree with the war disagree fundamentally with the judgment that led to war. What is more, their alternative judgment is both entirely rational and arguable. Kosovo, with ethnic cleansing of ethnic Albanians, was not a hard decision for most people; nor was Afghanistan after the shock of September 11; nor was Sierra Leone.

Iraq in March 2003 was an immensely difficult judgment. It was divisive because it was difficult. I have never disrespected those who disagreed with the decision. Sure, some were anti-American; some against all wars. But there was a core of sensible people who faced with this decision would have gone the other way, for sensible reasons. Their argument is one I understand totally. It is that Iraq posed no direct, immediate threat to Britain; and that Iraq’s WMD, even on our own case, was not serious enough to warrant war, certainly without a specific U.N. resolution mandating military action. And they argue: Saddam could, in any event, be contained.

In other words, they disagreed then and disagree now fundamentally with the characterization of the threat. We were saying this is urgent; we have to act; the opponents of war thought it wasn’t. And I accept, incidentally, that however abhorrent and foul the regime and however relevant that was for the reasons I set out before the war, for example in Glasgow in February 2003, regime change alone could not be and was not our justification for war. Our primary purpose was to enforce U.N. resolutions over Iraq and WMD.

Of course the opponents are boosted by the fact that though we know Saddam had WMD, we haven’t found the physical evidence of them in the 11 months since the war. But in fact, everyone thought he had them. That was the basis of U.N. Resolution 1441.

It’s just worth pointing out that the search is being conducted in a country twice the land mass of the U.K., which David Kay’s interim report in October 2003 noted, contains 130 ammunition storage areas, some covering an area of 50 square miles, including some 600,000 tons of artillery shells, rockets and other ordnance, of which only a small proportion have as yet been searched in the difficult security environment that exists.

But the key point is that it is the threat that is the issue.

The characterization of the threat is where the difference lies. Here is where I feel so passionately that we are in mortal danger of mistaking the nature of the new world in which we live. Everything about our world is changing: its economy, its technology, its culture, and its way of living. If the 20th century scripted our conventional way of thinking, the 21st century is unconventional in almost every respect.

This is true also of our security.

The threat we face is not conventional. It is a challenge of a different nature from anything the world has faced before. It is to the world’s security, what globalization is to the world’s economy.

It was defined not by Iraq but by September 11th. September 11th did not create the threat Saddam posed. But it altered crucially the balance of risk as to whether to deal with it or simply carry on, however imperfectly, trying to contain it.

Let me attempt an explanation of how my own thinking, as a political leader, has evolved during these past few years. Already, before September 11th the world’s view of the justification of military action had been changing. The only clear case in international relations for armed intervention had been self-defense, response to aggression. But the notion of intervening on humanitarian grounds had been gaining currency. I set this out, following the Kosovo war, in a speech in Chicago in 1999, where I called for a doctrine of international community, where in certain clear circumstances we do intervene, even though we are not directly threatened. I said this was not just to correct injustice, but also because in an increasingly interdependent world, our self-interest was allied to the interests of others; and seldom did conflict in one region of the world not contaminate another. We acted in Sierra Leone for similar reasons, though frankly even if that country had become run by gangsters and murderers and its democracy crushed, it would have been a long time before it impacted on us. But we were able to act to help them and we did.

So, for me, before September 11th, I was already reaching for a different philosophy in international relations from a traditional one that has held sway since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648; namely that a country’s internal affairs are for it and you don’t interfere unless it threatens you, or breaches a treaty, or triggers an obligation of alliance. I did not consider Iraq fitted into this philosophy, though I could see the horrible injustice done to its people by Saddam.

However, I had started to become concerned about two other phenomena.

The first was the increasing amount of information about Islamic extremism and terrorism that was crossing my desk. Chechnya was blighted by it. So was Kashmir. Afghanistan was its training ground. Some 300 people had been killed in the attacks on the U.S.S Cole and U.S. embassies in East Africa.

The extremism seemed remarkably well financed. It was very active. And it was driven not by a set of negotiable political demands, but by religious fanaticism.

The second was the attempts by states — some of them highly unstable and repressive — to develop nuclear weapons programs, CW and BW materiel and long-range missiles. What is more, it was obvious that there was a considerable network of individuals and companies with expertise in this area, prepared to sell it.

All this was before September 11th. I discussed the issue of WMD with President Bush at our first meeting in Camp David in February 2001. But it’s in the nature of things that other issues intervene — I was about to fight for re-election — and though it was raised, it was a troubling specter in the background, not something to arrest our whole attention.

President Bush told me that on September 9th, 2001, he had a meeting about Iraq in the White House when he discussed “smart” sanctions, changes to the sanctions regime. There was no talk of military action.

September 11th was for me a revelation. What had seemed inchoate came together. The point about September 11th was not its detailed planning; not its devilish execution; not even, simply, that it happened in America, on the streets of New York. All of this made it an astonishing, terrible and wicked tragedy, a barbaric murder of innocent people. But what galvanized me was that it was a declaration of war by religious fanatics who were prepared to wage that war without limit. They killed 3,000. But if they could have killed 30,000 or 300,000, they would have rejoiced in it. The purpose was to cause such hatred between Muslims and the West that a religious jihad became reality; and the world engulfed by it.

When I spoke to the House of Commons on 14 September 2001 I said: “We know, that they [the terrorists] would, if they could, go further and use chemical, biological, or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We know, also, that there are groups of people, occasionally states, who will trade the technology and capability of such weapons. It is time that this trade was exposed, disrupted, and stamped out. We have been warned by the events of 11 September, and we should act on the warning.”

From September 11th on, I could see the threat plainly. Here were terrorists prepared to bring about Armageddon. Here were states whose leadership cared for no one but themselves; were often cruel and tyrannical towards their own people; and who saw WMD as a means of defending themselves against any attempt external or internal to remove them and who, in their chaotic and corrupt state, were in any event porous and irresponsible with neither the will nor capability to prevent terrorists who also hated the West, from exploiting their chaos and corruption.

I became aware of the activities of A.Q, Khan, former Pakistani nuclear scientist, and of an organization developing nuclear weapons technology to sell secretly to states wanting to acquire it. I started to hear of plants to manufacture nuclear weapons equipment in Malaysia, in the Near East and Africa, companies in the Gulf and Europe to finance it; training and know-how provided — all without any or much international action to stop it. It was a murky, dangerous trade, done with much sophistication and it was rapidly shortening the timeframe of countries like North Korea and Iran in acquiring serviceable nuclear weapons capability.

I asked for more intelligence on the issue not just of terrorism but also of WMD. The scale of it became clear. It didn’t matter that the Islamic extremists often hated some of these regimes. Their mutual enmity toward the West would in the end triumph over any scruples of that nature, as we see graphically in Iraq today.

We knew that al Qaeda sought the capability to use WMD in their attacks. Bin Laden has called it a “duty” to obtain nuclear weapons. His networks have experimented with chemicals and toxins for use in attacks. He received advice from at least two Pakistani scientists on the design of nuclear weapons. In Afghanistan al Qaeda trained its recruits in the use of poisons and chemicals. An al Qaeda terrorist ran a training camp developing these techniques. Terrorist training manuals giving step-by-step instructions for the manufacture of deadly substances such as botulinum and ricin were widely distributed in Afghanistan and elsewhere and via the Internet. Terrorists in Russia have actually deployed radiological material. The sarin attack on the Tokyo Metro showed how serious an impact even a relatively small attack can have.

The global threat to our security was clear. So was our duty: to act to eliminate it.

First we dealt with al Qaeda in Afghanistan, removing the Taliban that succored them.

But then we had to confront the states with WMD. We had to take a stand. We had to force conformity with international obligations that for years had been breached with the world turning a blind eye. For 12 years Saddam had defied calls to disarm. In 1998, he had effectively driven out the U.N. inspectors and we had bombed his military infrastructure; but we had only weakened him, not removed the threat. Saddam alone had used CW against Iran and against his own people.

We had had an international coalition blessed by the U.N. in Afghanistan. I wanted the same now. President Bush agreed to go the U.N. route. We secured U.N. Resolution 1441. Saddam had one final chance to comply fully. Compliance had to start with a full and honest declaration of WMD programs and activities.

The truth is disarming a country, other than with its consent, is a perilous exercise. On 8 December 2002, Saddam sent his declaration. It was obviously false. The U.N. inspectors were in Iraq, but progress was slow and the vital cooperation of Iraqi scientists withheld. In March we went back to the U.N. to make a final ultimatum. We strove hard for agreement. We very nearly achieved it.

So we came to the point of decision. Prime ministers don’t have the luxury of maintaining both sides of the argument. They can see both sides. But ultimately, leadership is about deciding. My view was and is that if the U.N. had come together and delivered a tough ultimatum to Saddam, listing clearly what he had to do, benchmarking it, he may have folded and events set in train that might just and eventually have led to his departure from power.

But the Security Council didn’t agree.

Suppose at that point we had backed away. Inspectors would have stayed but only the utterly naive would believe that following such a public climb-down by the U.S. and its partners, Saddam would have cooperated more. He would have strung the inspectors out and returned emboldened to his plans. The will to act on the issue of rogue states and WMD would have been shown to be hollow. The terrorists, watching and analyzing every move in our psychology as they do, would have taken heart. All this without counting the fact that the appalling brutalization of the Iraqi people would have continued unabated and reinforced.

Here is the crux. It is possible that even with all of this, nothing would have happened. Possible that Saddam would change his ambitions; possible he would develop the WMD but never use it; possible that the terrorists would never get their hands on WMD, whether from Iraq or elsewhere. We cannot be certain. Perhaps we would have found different ways of reducing it. Perhaps this Islamic terrorism would ebb of its own accord.

But do we want to take the risk? That is the judgment. And my judgment then and now is that the risk of this new global terrorism and its interaction with states or organizations or individuals proliferating WMD, is one I simply am not prepared to run.

This is not a time to err on the side of caution; not a time to weigh the risks to an infinite balance; not a time for the cynicism of the worldly wise who favor playing it long. Their worldly-wise cynicism is actually at best naiveté and at worst dereliction.

When they talk, as they do now, of diplomacy coming back into fashion in respect of Iran or North Korea or Libya, do they seriously think that diplomacy alone has brought about this change? Since the war in Iraq, Libya has taken the courageous step of owning up not just to a nuclear weapons program but also to having chemical weapons, which are now being destroyed. Iran is back in the reach of the IAEA. North Korea in talks with China over its WMD. The A.Q. Khan network is being shut down, its trade slowly but surely being eliminated.

Yet it is monstrously premature to think the threat has passed. The risk remains in the balance here and abroad.

These days decisions about it come thick and fast, and while they are not always of the same magnitude they are hardly trivial. Let me give you an example. A short while ago, during the war, we received specific intelligence warning of a major attack on Heathrow. To this day, we don’t know if it was correct and we foiled it or if it was wrong. But we received the intelligence. We immediately heightened the police presence. At the time it was much criticized as political hype or an attempt to frighten the public. Actually at each stage we followed rigidly the advice of the police and Security Service.

But sit in my seat. Here is the intelligence. Here is the advice. Do you ignore it? But, of course intelligence is precisely that: intelligence. It is not hard fact. It has its limitations. On each occasion the most careful judgment has to be made taking account of everything we know and the best assessment and advice available. But in making that judgment, would you prefer us to act, even if it turns out to be wrong? Or not to act and hope it’s OK? And suppose we don’t act and the intelligence turns out to be right, how forgiving will people be?

And to those who think that these things are all disconnected, random acts, disparate threats with no common thread to bind them, look at what is happening in Iraq today. The terrorists pouring into Iraq know full well the importance of destroying not just the nascent progress of Iraq toward stability, prosperity and democracy, but of destroying our confidence, of defeating our will to persevere.

I have no doubt Iraq is better without Saddam; but no doubt either, that as a result of his removal, the dangers of the threat we face will be diminished. That is not to say the terrorists won’t redouble their efforts. They will. This war is not ended. It may only be at the end of its first phase. They are in Iraq, murdering innocent Iraqis who want to worship or join a police force that upholds the law not a brutal dictatorship; they carry on killing in Afghanistan. They do it for a reason. The terrorists know that if Iraq and Afghanistan survive their assault, come through their travails, seize the opportunity the future offers, then those countries will stand not just as nations liberated from oppression, but as a lesson to humankind everywhere and a profound antidote to the poison of religious extremism. That is precisely why the terrorists are trying to foment hatred and division in Iraq. They know full well, a stable democratic Iraq, under the sovereign rule of the Iraqi people, is a mortal blow to their fanaticism.

That is why our duty is to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan as stable and democratic nations.

Here is the irony. For all the fighting, this threat cannot be defeated by security means alone. Taking strong action is a necessary but insufficient condition for defeating. Its final defeat is only assured by the triumph of the values of the human spirit.

Which brings me to the final point. It may well be that under international law as presently constituted, a regime can systematically brutalize and oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do, when dialogue, diplomacy and even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the definition of a humanitarian catastrophe (though the 300,000 remains in mass graves already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be something of a catastrophe). This may be the law, but should it be?

We know now, if we didn’t before, that our own self-interest is ultimately bound up with the fate of other nations. The doctrine of international community is no longer a vision of idealism. It is a practical recognition that just as within a country, citizens who are free, well educated and prosperous tend to be responsible, to feel solidarity with a society in which they have a stake; so do nations that are free, democratic and benefiting from economic progress, tend to be stable and solid partners in the advance of humankind. The best defense of our security lies in the spread of our values.

But we cannot advance these values except within a framework that recognizes their universality. If it is a global threat, it needs a global response, based on global rules.

The essence of a community is common rights and responsibilities. We have obligations in relation to each other. If we are threatened, we have a right to act. And we do not accept in a community that others have a right to oppress and brutalize their people. We value the freedom and dignity of the human race and each individual in it.

Containment will not work in the face of the global threat that confronts us. The terrorists have no intention of being contained. The states that proliferate or acquire WMD illegally are doing so precisely to avoid containment. Emphatically I am not saying that every situation leads to military action. But we surely have a duty and a right to prevent the threat materializing; and we surely have a responsibility to act when a nation’s people are subjected to a regime such as Saddam’s. Otherwise, we are powerless to fight the aggression and injustice — which over time puts at risk our security and way of life.

Which brings us to how you make the rules and how you decide what is right or wrong in enforcing them. The U.N. Universal Declaration on Human Rights is a fine document. But it is strange the United Nations is so reluctant to enforce them.

I understand the worry the international community has over Iraq. It worries that the U.S. and its allies will by sheer force of their military might, do whatever they want, unilaterally and without recourse to any rule-based code or doctrine. But our worry is that if the U.N. — because of a political disagreement in its Councils — is paralyzed, then a threat we believe is real will go unchallenged.

This dilemma is at the heart of many people’s anguished indecision over the wisdom of our action in Iraq. It explains the confusion of normal politics that has part of the right liberating a people from oppression and a part of the left disdaining the action that led to it. It is partly why the conspiracy theories or claims of deceit have such purchase. How much simpler to debate those than to analyze and resolve the conundrum of our world’s present state.

Britain’s role is try to find a way through this: to construct a consensus behind a broad agenda of justice and security and means of enforcing it.

This agenda must be robust in tackling the security threat that this Islamic extremism poses; and fair to all peoples by promoting their human rights, wherever they are. It means tackling poverty in Africa and justice in Palestine as well as being utterly resolute in opposition to terrorism as a way of achieving political goals. It means an entirely different, more just and more modern view of self-interest.

It means reforming the United Nations so its Security Council represents 21st century reality; and giving the U.N. the capability to act effectively as well as debate. It means getting the U.N. to understand that faced with the threats we have, we should do all we can to spread the values of freedom, democracy, the rule of law, religious tolerance and justice for the oppressed, however painful for some nations that may be; but that at the same time, we wage war relentlessly on those who would exploit racial and religious division to bring catastrophe to the world.

But in the meantime, the threat is there and demands our attention.

That is the struggle which engages us. It is a new type of war. It will rest on intelligence to a greater degree than ever before. It demands a difference attitude to our own interests. It forces us to act even when so many comforts seem unaffected, and the threat so far off, if not illusory. In the end, believe your political leaders or not, as you will. But do so, at least having understood their minds.

http://216.239.51.104/search?q=cache:z3mFofDVkzQJ:www.keepingapace.com/blogarchives/war/iraq_why_sep_11_made_iraqs_liberation_necessary.php+The+Iraq+Liberation+Act&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

the report Gore did on Airline Security and what he left out of the report.

Bob Kerrey was screaming about that today; why didn't anybody warn the airlines, why didn't anybody alert the airlines; why didn't anybody put the procedures we have today in place then. Didn't everybody know that they might hijack planes.

Dead silence about Gore. Made me sick.

I lost all my info about the Gore report. There was quite buzz about it at one time. Maybe someone here at FR still has it.

Democrat Wars
Sorting out the hawks and doves in the presidential field.
By William Saletan and Avi Zenilman
Posted Wednesday, March 12, 2003, at 4:42 PM PT

LIEBERMAN
Is it war for oil? No.

Is containment enough? No. "Five years ago, after Saddam ejected the U.N. inspectors, John McCain and I gave up on containment and introduced the Iraqi Liberation Act, which … made a change of regime in Baghdad official U.S. policy." (Speech, Feb. 8, 2003)

Will it disrupt war on terror? No. On Al Gore's claim that attacking Iraq could detract from the war on terror: "I respectfully disagree with that part of it. I am confident the American military can do, and will do, both at once." (Associated Press, Sept. 25, 2002)

If U.N. balks, go it alone? Yes. "If the U.N. doesn't act, we have to put together our own international coalition and change that regime in Baghdad." (Face the Nation, Nov. 24, 2002)

1991 Kuwait force authorization: Voted yes.

1998 Iraq Liberation Act: Co-sponsored it.

2002 Iraq force authorization: Voted yes.

*****

GEPHARDT
Is it war for oil? No.

Is containment enough? No. "[Saddam] continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear devices. … We have an obligation to protect the United States by preventing him from getting these weapons, and either using them himself or passing them or their components on to terrorists who share his destructive intent." (House floor speech, Oct. 10, 2002)

Will it disrupt war on terror? No. "What we're talking about here is keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of terrorists. And the first place you'd have to look if you were worried about that is Iraq. So, I have agreed that we need to reach this goal diplomatically if we can, militarily if we must." (PBS NewsHour, Feb. 24, 2003)

If U.N. balks, go it alone? Yes. Tim Russert: "But if [Bush] doesn't get [a second resolution] and decides to go forward without the U.N., you would support him?" Gephardt: "I've said [we must deal with Iraq] diplomatically if we can, militarily if we must." (Meet the Press, Feb. 23, 2003)

1991 Kuwait force authorization: Voted no but now says he was wrong. (House floor speech, Oct. 10, 2002)

1998 Iraq Liberation Act: Voted yes.

2002 Iraq force authorization: Voted yes.

*****

KERRY
Is it war for oil? No.

Is containment enough? No, because deterrence doesn't work in this case. "We need to disarm Saddam Hussein. … He presents a particularly grievous threat because he is so consistently prone to miscalculation." (Speech, Jan. 23, 2003)

Will it disrupt war on terror? No, if we're careful; yes, if we aren't. "We need to make certain that we have not unnecessarily twisted so many arms, created so many reluctant partners, abused the trust of Congress, or strained so many relations, that the longer term and more immediate vital war on terror is made more difficult." (Speech, Jan. 23, 2003)

If U.N. balks, go it alone? Yes, if we're careful; no, if we aren't. "I would be willing to support the president providing [that] there is an imminent threat that has been shown and that the breach reaches the standard that we all agree on. I will not support the president to proceed unilaterally if it is simply the president's effort to try to do regime change without regard to the legitimacy of the inspection process or the legitimacy of the United Nations process." (Meet the Press, Dec. 1, 2002)

1991 Kuwait force authorization: Voted no but now says, "I was not against using force. I was against moving so precipitously that we didn't have the consent … of the American people." (Meet the Press, Dec. 1, 2002)

1998 Iraq Liberation Act: Passed Senate Oct. 7, 1998, by unanimous consent (no roll call).

2002 Iraq force authorization: Voted yes.

http://216.239.51.104/search?q=cache:ZUf5s-eYRjEJ:slate.msn.com/id/2080039/+The+Iraq+Liberation+Act&hl=en&ie=UTF-8

I found this one today;

http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=30024

I couldn't find the ones we had on here in 2000 either.