Posted on 03/16/2004 1:50:04 PM PST by Boot Hill
NEW DELHI, India - Secretary of State Colin Powell said Tuesday he will ask Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf this week whether Pakistani officials aided rogue scientist A.Q. Khan in leaking nuclear weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
On Pakistan, Powell said he would ask Pakistan's president about the black market nuclear network headed by Khan.
"We can't be satisfied until this entire network is gone, branch and root," Powell said. He later met with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
(Excerpt) Read more at washingtonpost.com ...
February 12 -- CIA Director George Tenet travels to Islamabad for secret talks with Musharraf.
March 6-8 -- Musharraf travels to Saudi Arabia for discussions with the Crown Prince, and the heads of Saudi defense and intelligence, regarding, among other things, nuclear weapons. While there, the Saudi government awards Musharraf with a very rare Islamic honor at the Holy Ka'aba.
March 17-18 -- Secretary of State Colin Powell travels to Islamabad for further discussions with Musharraf about the status of Pakistan's clandestine nuclear proliferation.
Unmentioned in the public press regarding the AQ Kahn affair, are the persistent rumors that Pakistan has also been fronting a nuclear weapons development program on behalf of Saudi Arabia. If there is any substance to these rumors, this would mean that (a.)Saudi Arabia currently is in possession of nuclear weapons and that (b.)the U.S. is aware of the details and now has the proof.
This could explain this ongoing series of visits and counter visits between the U.S., Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
--Boot Hill
That epitomizes this AQ Kahn affair, there is always "a little more" to be learned, but it comes only in hints, innuendos and subtle clues. What obscures the deepest secrets is all the public hand wringing and gnashing of teeth over whether Mushi knew of or profited from the affair. But that is probably the least important aspect of this whole sordid business. I suspect that both the U.S. and Pakistan promote that part of the controversy just to keep the media and public from focusing on the heart of the matter, so that it can be handled with less difficulty, privately.
Most people are unaware that virtually all the important details of the AQ Kahn affair were public knowledge (in books and on the internet) long before the story became a page one issue. The same is true regarding the Saudi involvement in the Paki nuclear weapons program, but that aspect of the Paki nuclear proliferation is just not part of page one news....at least not yet.
--Boot Hill
How long after this occurence will we be forced to destroy them?
HRAWH asks: "How long will it be before all of Pakistan's nuclear weapons fall into the hands of an radical fundamentalist government?"This was a major question for all of us that have been following the War on Terror in this region. It became obvious, some time back, that part of our strategy in Afghanistan was not only to kill and capture what we could of al-Qa'ida and the Taliban, but to drive the rest of them into Pakistan in order to destabilize that country enough that Musharraf would be forced to call us in to clean up his own mess. No War on Terror could claim any real measure of success without cleaning out the rats nest of terrorists in Pakistan.
Despite Pakistan's public protestations to the contrary, U.S. forces have been deployed inside Pakistan for quite some time now. In fact, we occupy six bases there. For his part, Musharref was in desperate straits and had to act. Last September, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's second in command, issued a fatwa calling for Musharraf's assassination. There were two, nearly successful, attempts on his life in December. I've heard rumors that there has been another attempt on his life since then. Musharraf needs us as desperately as we need him. Perhaps not a match made in heaven, but a working relationship of overlapping mutual interests.
But in destabilizing Pakistan, we risked the fall of Musharraf, which would leave Pakistan's radical Islamist (read: Taliban and al-Qa'ida) in control of the country as well as its nuclear stockpile. That would be a monumental catastrophe. Logic dictated then, that our strategy MUST have included some kind of back up plan, in case our grand plans went awry.
About a month or two ago, we began reading reports that Musharraf had placed the security and access to his nuclear weapons stockpile under U.S. control. According to these reports, we have been allowed to install new sophisticated access controls and bomb command codes, so that those not authorized can neither access the devices nor set them off. Not a perfect solution, but at least we have access to the nukes.
My guess is that if we have that kind of access to these devices, that Pakistan's entire nuclear stockpile probably rests in the read end of a U.S. C-130, fueled up and with a fresh crew on board, sitting at the end of some Pakistani runway, along with a flight of fighter escorts, awaiting a "go code" from intel telling us that the worst has happened and Musharraf has fallen and to get those damn nukes the hell out of Dodge NOW!!!.
Is this a risky plan? Heck yes, but I see no other choice that has less risk. Besides, its working (for now, at least!)
--Boot Hill
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