Overplaying Sistani A Western media giant.

National Review ^ | 3/11/04 | Abu Ayad

[Valin]

One year ago, the name Ali Sistani was forbidden in Iraqi newspapers. Today, a whisper from the grand ayatollah's house sends Western journalists scrambling, their Iraqi stringers ordered into action. To journalists, and armchair pundits, the reality of Sistani's influence is irrelevant. What matters is what thousands of Americans living isolated in their cocoon beyond the walls of the Green Zone believe, or what is believed by the CNN and BBC reporters who seldom venture out from their luxury hotels. English-speaking Iraqis cringe at the simplistic generalizations we see on Western television.

The Sistani you see and the Sistani we see are, in many ways, two different people.

Let me be clear: Sistani has always been a peaceful spiritual figure. He treaded carefully during Saddam Hussein's reign. Saddam's ego was immense; he was wary of anyone who might challenge his iconoclastic presence. Would-be political leaders had three choices: They could flee Iraq, they could distance themselves from politics, or they could be co-opted by the regime. Some did all three. Indeed, most Iraqis believe that the murder last April of Sayyid Majid al-Khoie — the son of the late Grand Ayatollah al-Khoie — transpired, in part, because he twice met Saddam prior to his 1991 flight to exile.

Many Iraqis besides Sistani have called for direct elections. But it would be a mistake to assume that all Iraqis — let alone all Shia — support the grand ayatollah, or see democracy as simplistically as he does. I represent a mixed Sunni-Shia area in Baghdad. My constituents understand that fair elections are impossible without safety and security. No one will wait in a line to vote if he fears being mowed down by Shia militias like the Badr Corps, which, far from disarming, Ambassador Paul Bremer has actually encouraged. The American decision to fill the ranks of the new Iraqi police force with Badr Corps members — more loyal to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq than to the idea of Iraqi democracy — is one sign of this. The same thugs who sought to impose an Iranian dress code on Iraqi women now have U.S.-issued weapons and roam streets and university campuses harassing women and girls. As long as the Badr Corps move uncontrolled, elections will not be possible. Democracy is about tolerance and compromise, not enforcing pro-Iranian dictates from the barrel of a gun.

Iraqi professionals are acutely aware of the lack of any law that would govern elections for any level of government. It is one of the reasons that Iraqis joke that "CPA," the acronym for the Coalition Provisional Authority, really stands for "Can't Provide Anything." I'd guess that most of the crowds for hire, paid by some Shia political parties to rally around Sistani's beck and call, are also aware that elections are impossible at this juncture. I am not too pessimistic, because Iraq does have an atavistic memory of a more democratic period. Unfortunately, it has been 60 years since we have experienced and practiced such free expression.

Sistani's statements have done little good for Iraqi democracy. Rather, his calls appear timed to bolster his own image above those of competing populists. I do not deny Sistani's religious importance; there is no doubt that religiously, the Shia are better organized. But such organization does not necessarily translate into a powerful voting block. Iraq has the most educated population of any Arab country: Iraqi Shia doctors, dentists, and engineers may be respectful to Sistani because of his age and learning, but would laugh at the idea that they should take political advice from a man who was born in Iran and hasn't been out of his house in decades. When John F. Kennedy was campaigning to be president of the United States, some in the media suggested that a Catholic president would take orders from the pope. The reality is far different: Such a thing would never happen in America, and Iraqis resent the implication from Western journalists that it will happen here. We also resent the implication — from so-called experts in the U.S. State Department and British Foreign Office — that the only "legitimate" Shia are those wearing turbans, just as we resent the view that "legitimate" Sunnis are those who set off bombs and explosives.

There are other reasons why Iraqis resent the implication that as Sistani says, so Iraq will do. First of all, Iraqi Sunnis question the assumption that the Shia are the majority in Iraq. The Shia sparsely populate the south, while the Sunnis live in concentrated clusters. Anyone who has visited the environs of Baquba, Tikrit, Mosul, or Fallujah, and compared them to the suburbs of Karbala, Najaf, or Kut, will notice the difference immediately. If there is one lesson for the West, it should be to not trust the estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Sistani may have the bully pulpit, but opponents seek to undermine his base daily. Iranian agents have free run of Iraq, thanks to Ambassador Bremer's failure to close the borders. The Islamic Republic of Iran bases its legitimacy on the fallacy that its unelected Supreme Leader has religious legitimacy. The United States has made many mistakes in Iraq, but they have given us freedom of speech. This frightens the Iranian mullahs, who fear that Sistani will muck around in Iranian politics, just as he now does in Iraq. The irony is that Sistani may even have a greater following in his home country, Iran, than in Iraq. These Iranian agents — from the Qods Force, Revolutionary Guards, and Iranian intelligence service — seek to muzzle Sistani, just as the Iranian regime has muzzled Grand Ayatollah Montazeri and dissident voices from Qom. Iraqis want real democracy, not the farce that is Iranian democracy.

Sistani may have trouble translating his calls into action. Most Iraqis do not take the old man literally, but rather see him as a symbol. Shut tight within the walls of Saddam's palace, Ambassador Bremer has failed to translate American promises into reality. Sunnis and Shia alike may be grateful for Iraq's liberation, but that does not mean we want to give the Americans a carte blanche. If American policy continues to move aimlessly, Iraqi nationalism will grow. By kowtowing to his beck and call, the Americans have bolstered Sistani's prestige. Sistani has tasted power and likes it. He will use his bully pulpit to voice Iraq's frustration. It would be a mistake, however, for America to overestimate Sistani: He is a barometer, nothing more. To treat Sistani with anything more than polite respect will only antagonize the vast majority of Iraqis — Sunnis and Shia alike — upon whom the new Iraq will be built.

— Abu Ayad is the pseudonym for an Iraqi Arab Sunni who sits on a Baghdad district council.

[Zeppo]

Sounds to me like the Al Sharpton effect. The white, liberal New York media annointed him as one of a handful of "goto" black "leaders" whenever there was some black news to report, and Sharpton's rise to prominence has been largely due to that mistake.

[McGavin999]

The only Americans afraid of Sistani are the American media. Anyone who has read anything about Sistani knows that the man wants a secular democracy for Iraq. He's got his own battles going with Moqtada Sadar for the souls of the Iraqi Shiia (old Moqtada is the pawn of the Iranian mad mullahs).

I read a translated letter from an Sunni cleric the other day who visited Al Sistani and was shocked and surprised at just how knowledgable and pro democracy Sistani actually is. His greatest fear is the corruption of the clergy by power politics.

[Valin]

Abu Ayad is the pseudonym for an Iraqi Arab Sunni who sits on a Baghdad district council.

More politics. I think we are going to be seeing mre of this kind of back and forth for a while.