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With this kind of printout, many forms of vote fraud can be caught by comparing the number of votes with the record of voters signing in at the polls.

However, no amount of printing out and data screening can guarantee that the candidate you voted for is actually the candidate the machine recorded your vote for. A receipt doesn't help because there's no guarantee that the receipt matches what the machine tallied. Ultimately, the only way to assure that the vote the voter cast is what's really tallied is for the machine to print out a ballot, which the voter reviews, then seals in an envelope and deposits in a sealed box. Essentially, that would reduce the multi-thousand dollar machine to being a computerized version of a two dollar "X" stamp.

Of course, there WAS this system where you could see how you voted, confirm it was what you wanted, then deposit the ballot. It was simple, as close to idiot proof as anything operated by humans will ever be, and had a long and honored history of producing consistently repeatable results in elections all over the country for the last fifty years.

Unfortunately, Al Gore needed to invent some flaws in that system in an attempt to steal an election. Now that his supporters have gotten the new system they demanded, they're whining about it.... never happy.... what else is new?

I agree with your points.

I don't actually see a problem with using the electronic system to just print out the ballot that then goes into a box and is then counted later.

I do have a problem with giving voters a "receipt" to take out of the polling center with them. Thugs/employers could demand that the voter show them their receipt. "Knock and drag" drivers could demand to see the ballot (in exchange for payment).

What precautions would there be for voters to prevent forged "receipts" in the case of a recall?

Meanwhile, what can we do to get every voter to show picture ID (like is used to buy alcohol, drive a car, or write a check)?

A receipt doesn't help because there's no guarantee that the receipt matches what the machine tallied.

Actually -- if the receipt has a random but unique ID on it, then simply requiring the precinct to publish the full voting results, by ID, will allow each individual to double-check his/her receipt against the tally roster to ensure that the two match. The tally sheets could be posted at the polling location, online, or in newspapers.

Combine that with the previous comment about catching "spikes" of votes, and it has considerably better validation of results than traditional methods.