MEMRI:Iranian paper The U.S. & 'Zionists' have Bribed the IAEA to Lie About Iran's Nuclear Progress

Iranian Government Daily: The U.S. & 'Zionists' have Bribed the IAEA to Fabricate Lies About Iran's Nuclear Progress

A column in the Iranian English-language government daily Tehran Times criticized the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for allegedly breaching agreements between Iran and the IAEA, and called on the government to consider ending cooperation with the IAEA. The following are excerpts from the article:(1) Iran Must Consider Suspending Cooperation Rather than Suspending Enriching Uranium

"Pressured by U.S. officials and supported by the Zionists, some officials from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its official website have started fabricating lies about the Iranian nuclear program, and even allowing some secret news about the Iranian nuclear program to leak to Western media. Such moves show the Iranian officials should have considered suspending cooperation with the IAEA rather than suspending enriching uranium.

"Recently, diplomats from the Vienna-based IAEA have warned about the increasing U.S. pressure on the IAEA top officials, including its director Muhammad El-Baradei and some inspectors, in order to egg on them [sic] to give a negative report on Iran's cooperation with the IAEA. Even an expert from the IAEA told the Mehr News Agency about secret meetings between the IAEA senior officials and some envoys from the U.S. and Israeli intelligence services in recent weeks. The expert even didn't rule out the possibility of bribing or threatening IAEA officials by these secret services.

"Some observers in Vienna have evaluated the U.S. pressure on El-Baradei as so high that he has become depressed and passive. Even a Western diplomat from the UN nuclear watchdog has said there is no certainty the statements aired inside the IAEA headquarters are not eavesdropped. Some evidences including recent statements by El-Baradei, stressing the necessity of tough inspection of the members' nuclear sites, especially after unfounded allegations by the U.S. officials over Iran's nuclear program and a wide coverage of these rumors by the Western media despite a close cooperation between Tehran and the IAEA would clearly show that the agency has been degenerated into an international political tool for pushing forward the U.S. unilateral policies in the world. There are some other indications to substantiate the point."

'The IAEA Official Website has Started Spreading False Reports about Iran's Nuclear Program'

"Instead of releasing official and reliable reports, the IAEA official website has started spreading false reports about Iran's nuclear program in recent days, which is quite unexpected...

"According to the NPT, Iran's agreement with the agency, the agency's bylaw, safeguards agreements and even the contents of the Additional Protocol, the IAEA officials have been obliged to consider any information obtained during the inspections or coming through cooperation of member states as quite secret.

"Even formerly secret information about the Iranian nuclear program were released to Western media and those publications ran counter to the Islamic republic [i.e. Iran] to the extent that the secret reports by El-Baradei were leaked to the media before they were delivered to Iran or the IAEA board of governors.

"Therefore, it seems that a clear-cut and definite decision by Iranian officials is necessary in order to force the IAEA officials to end such actions and El-Baradei should be officially questioned why Iran's secret nuclear information has been released by his diplomats and inspectors and thereby creating [sic] an unhealthy atmosphere against Iran. If such a move is going to persist and if only Iran has to abide by its commitments and take no benefit from this unilateral cooperation, is it not better for Iranian officials to mull suspending cooperation with the IAEA?"

Another Iran Nuclear Program Uncovered, Report Says (2-24-04)

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.N inspectors in Iran have discovered more nuclear experiments not previously disclosed by Tehran, The Washington Post reported on Tuesday, citing sources familiar with an account inspectors were expected to submit to the United Nations (news - web sites) this week.

According to the newspaper, the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found that Iran produced and experimented with polonium, an element useful in initiating the chain reaction that produces a nuclear explosion.

In the article from Tehran, the newspaper said Iran reportedly acknowledged the experiments but offered an explanation involving another of polonium's other possible uses, which include power generation.

Experts said research on polonium would be done early in a weapons program, the Post reported.

"It's quite clear they were trying to make an explosive device," one person with knowledge of the polonium discovery was quoted as saying. "But they hadn't gotten far enough. No one will find a smoking gun, because they weren't able to make a gun."

Last week, diplomats on the nuclear agency's governing board and a U.S. official said that U.N. inspectors in Iran had discovered components which were usable in advanced centrifuges for extracting enriched uranium.

Tehran maintains that it had no such equipment and denies that it had any intention of developing a nuclear weapons program.

"There was a report that they found (advanced P2 enrichment centrifuge) parts in some military base, which was not true," Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi told Reuters on Friday.

"What we have is a research project that hasn't been implemented yet. There are no (P2 centrifuge) parts in any place in Iran. They are just trying to create a fuss about this."

Iran admitted late last year to an 18-year cover-up of sensitive nuclear research and signed up to snap inspections of its nuclear facilities.

This might be what the Tehran times is talking about.

http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2004/ebFT20040203.html

Time is Ripe to Act on Middle East Weapons
by IAEA Director General Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei and Sir Joseph Rotblat
The writing is on the wall: the Middle East is fertile ground for proliferation concerns. Despite progress in obtaining greater transparency on the nuclear programmes of Iran, Iraq and Libya, a deep sense of insecurity remains. The symptoms are everywhere in the region: the Arab-Israeli conflict continues to fester. Regime change is talked of as the most efficient route to democracy. The situation in Iraq, and its regional security implications, remains far from certain. Tensions with the west have increasingly become subtly - and not so subtly - associated with Muslim culture.

More countries in the Middle East have refused to sign global treaties banning nuclear, biological and chemical weapons than in any other region. In the absence of a comprehensive settlement, Israel refuses to discuss its purportedly sizeable nuclear arsenal and shrugs off repeated requests to join the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This and the accompanying sense of insecurity have served as an incentive for countries to arm themselves with equal or similar weapons capacity. A recent poll by the Arabic-language Al-Jazeera website showed that more than 80 per cent of respondents favoured acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Arab world. But this mini arms-race has made no one feel more secure. In addition, the increasing sophistication of clandestine programmes, greater access to nuclear and other weapons technology and the increasingly evident black market for illicit acquisition of designs, components and expertise increase the prospect that extremist groups will acquire weapons of mass destruction.

If we had any doubts before, it should be clear now that the Middle East situation is unsustainable. If we do nothing, catastrophe is only a matter of time. A great deal of rhetoric has emerged over the idea of making the Middle East a WMD-free region. The establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone has been the topic of UN resolutions for 30 years, with support from all parties, including Arab states and Israel. In 1991, the Security Council decided to disarm Iraq's WMD programmes as a first step "towards the goal of establishing in the Middle East a zone free from WMD..." In the 1995 decision to extend the NPT indefinitely, a key ingredient to reaching consensus was the agreement to pursue a nuclear-free Middle East. A similar commitment was made in the recent declaration in which France, Germany and the UK facilitated greater transparency in Iran. Yet little meaningful work has been done. The creation of a WMD-free Middle East was not even discussed in the Camp David agreement, nor was it mentioned in Israel's peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan. The only time that Middle Eastern countries sat together to discuss the issue was in the arms control working group that emerged from the Madrid peace process - and even then, early disagreements aborted that effort.

The current situation, though complex, represents a window of opportunity. The WMD programmes of several countries are being neutralised. The time is ripe for countries of the region, and the international community, to begin a serious dialogue towards creating a WMD-free Middle East zone. Such a zone would need several elements: a clear definition of the geographic zone of application; universal membership by countries in the region; an international system of verification and control to monitor compliance; a regional mechanism for mutual verification and co-operation; and security assurances from the UN Security Council to assist any country in the region whose security is threatened.

Creating the blueprint for such a structure would almost certainly bolster the ailing peace process. In the end, any enduring peace in the Middle East will only be achieved through an inclusive and comprehensive approach to security, which should include a ban on WMD, limitations on conventional armaments and appropriate security and confidence building measures. Any attempt to achieve security for one country at the expense of insecurity for others will ultimately fail. Progress on arms control and security arrangements need not occur in perfect symmetry or phasing with the peace process, but they should be pursued in parallel, where and as possible. Progress on either front will reinforce progress on the other. Carpe diem! -- Mohamed ElBaradei is Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency; Sir Joseph Rotblat, a nuclear physicist, was the Nobel Peace Prize laureate in 1995.

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