Stop Iran's nukes

Jerusalem Post ^ | Feb. 15, 2004

[yonif]

The latest revelation from the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding Iran proves what Western governments know well: Iran has neither stopped developing a bomb nor lying about its nuclear program. There is no real argument about the deceptions and intentions, only what to do about them.

Last week, the IAEA announced that it discovered plans for a P2 uranium enrichment facility. Iran had admitted last fall to having a much less sophisticated enrichment capability, and had agreed to suspend enrichment in exchange for European promises of closer civilian nuclear cooperation.

According to The Guardian, "The Americans, the Europeans, and officials at the Vienna agency are convinced that the Iranians have reneged on the deal." As US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage put it, "There is no doubt in our mind that Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program."

On June 25, 2003, President George W. Bush and the presidents of the European Community and European Council issued a joint statement:

"We pledge to use all means available to avert WMD proliferation and the calamities that would follow." Unlike the case of Iraq, there seems to be a real meeting of the minds between the US and Europe that the prospect of Iranian nukes is unacceptable.

Also unlike Iraq, the Europeans have taken the diplomatic lead on the issue. With the stick of their joint statement with the US hanging in the air, France and Germany wrangled Teheran's agreement to a tighter inspection regime.

Last week's IAEA revelation shows, however, that if diplomacy is to work, it must be ratcheted up a few notches. Iran has so far reacted defiantly. "As a country that is capable of producing nuclear fuel," Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi told the state news agency IRNA, "the Islamic Republic of Iran is ready to sell it on the international market." So have the Russians, who continue to refuse US requests not to supply Iran with nuclear fuel.

Part of the problem here is a loophole in the non-proliferation regime that Iran is playing to the hilt. That regime does not prohibit members from enriching uranium, so Iran is, according to IAEA chief Muhammad el-Baradei, claiming the right to build centrifuges.

Also last week, Bush proposed closing precisely this loophole as part of a comprehensive proposal to toughen the non-proliferation regime. Bush said the nuclear exporting countries should provide "reliable access" to fuel for civilian reactors in exchange for states renouncing enrichment and reprocessing, which are "not necessary for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes."

This standard should be employed in the case of Iran immediately, outside of any timetable for renegotiating the non-proliferation regime as a whole. Moreover, the Libyan model should be adopted, both in terms of the goal and the means.

Libya has renounced its nuclear ambitions and invited the international community in to verify compliance. This startling turnabout was achieved both by the sobering example of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and by years of punishing economic sanctions following Libya's downing of American and French civilian aircraft.

Sanctions against Libya took many years to bear fruit, and only after the capture of Saddam Hussein did Muammar Gaddafi decide it was time to capitulate. In Iran's case, the West cannot afford to wait so long. At the same time, however, Iran is much more susceptible to Western sanctions than was Libya.

Europe is Iran's major trading partner. Europe has tried valiantly to block Iran's nuclear program without harming its own trade relations, but this attempt has evidently run its course. There is no choice but to link specific and severe sanctions to Iran verifiably ending its nuclear enrichment and weapons programs.

Europeans realize that the non-proliferation regime, as flawed as it is, will cease to exist if Iran is allowed to exploit it and emerge with nuclear weapons.

Some respond by saying that for non-proliferation to work, the US (or Israel) should disarm as well.

Free nations, however, cannot disarm in a world in which rogue nations remain unshackled by ineffective agreements.

The test of the non-proliferation regime must always be whether it fetters rogue states, so that free and peaceful nations will be able safely to disarm.

[yonif]

Israeli intelligence estimates that Iran will have nukes by the end of this year. There is also evidence, both from government officials in Israel, and media in general, that Israel is already in planning stages to destroy the reactors.

[Cronos]

Destroy the source in Pakistan first.