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last 2 articles . . .

"According to some accounts Iraq established a major expeditionary force in Sudan in order to strike Egypt and western Saudi Arabia. In late August 1990, the Iraqi deployment was said to include 14 SCUD-B launchers with several missiles each that were originally deployed along the Red Sea coast across from Yanbu and Jeddah. In early January 1991, the Iraqis were said to have delivered additional SCUD launchers to the armed forces of Sudan, which deployed these launchers in northern Sudan. These SCUDs targeted southern Egypt, including the Aswan High Dam. . . .

According to some accounts, in March/April 1991, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz requested and was granted permission from Sudan's President Umar al-Bashir to move Iraqi chemical weapons and additional SCUD missiles to Sudan in order to circumvent their destruction by the UN. Thus, in the Summer of 1991, as UN inspections became inevitable, Iraq was said to have transferred a large number of SCUDs, estimated at about 400 missiles, and chemical weapons, for "safekeeping" in Yemen and Sudan. . . .

In the later part of 1995 it is claimed that Iraq deployed to Sudan some 50 "advanced SCUD launchers" and a similar number of al-Hussayn missiles. In October 1995, Iranian and Iraqi engineers, including some missile experts, were said to be upgrading an old airfield in East Sudan for the arrival and storage of additional strategic weapons from Iraq. . . .

In late 1999 it was reported that a US intelligence agency reported that North Korea had offered to sell Sudan a factory for assembling Scud missiles. Other reports suggest that in early 2000 a delegation of North Korean technical experts and a military research mission from Baghdad met in Khartoum. With $475 million in Iraqi financing, North Korea is said to be building a missile plant near Khartoum. Although most of this sum would go to North Korea for turnkey construction and facility staffing, Sudan would receive some payment for supporting and hosting the operation. The facility would enable Iraq to refurbish the old missiles stored in Sudan, and to build new longer-range missiles."

(globalsecurity.org)

(and 4 years ago . . .)

Saddam's Sudan?
New York Times; New York; Mar 23, 2000; William Safire

What do you do with a disturbing national security tip from a usually
reliable source? You check it out, of course, with intelligence operatives
who have no ax to grind.

But what do you do when those analysts say that they pondered the report at
interagency meetings and doubt its accuracy -- but it could be true and
bears watching? All I can do is pass along the disputed report with
appropriate caveats.

It was first hinted at six months ago in a paragraph by the well-connected
Bill Gertz of The Washington Times: ''A Pentagon intelligence agency
reported earlier this month that North Korea offered to sell the government
of Sudan an entire factory for assembling Scud missiles.''

That didn't seem to add up, because Sudan is nearly broke and doesn't need
long-range missiles to fight its civil war. Where would the money be found
to finance the missile factory, and who in that area wants the Scuds?

Enter Amir Rashid, Iraq's oil minister and Saddam Hussein's chief procurer
of ballistic missiles.

Two years ago, I'm told, Rashid paid a secret visit to Pyongyang and saw
North Korea's missile marketer, Chon Byong-Ho. Saddam's man also visited the
Chang Gwang Sinyong Corporation, a key world source of illicit arms.

Topic A was Scuds, many of which were secreted by Iraq in Sudan to escape
U.N. detection. A year later, Iraq's chief engineer, Ra'ad Ismail Jamil,
received a North Korean delegation in Baghdad.

Only five weeks ago, says my informant, two delegations arrived in Khartoum,
capital of Sudan. One was a group of North Korean technical experts; the
other was a military research mission from Baghdad.

Their project? The Koreans are said to be working on building a
ballistic-missile plant near Khartoum, with Iraqi financing of $475 million.
Pyongyang gets a big chunk of that for turnkey construction and expert
staffing; Khartoum a smaller percentage for acting as cutout, site protector
and smuggler; and Baghdad gets its old missiles refurbished and new,
longer-range missiles built.

If true, such conspiracy among three rogue nations would spell big trouble.
So I rattled some American intelligence cages; had they heard of this
three-pariah missile deal?

All had. The story (without the recent Khartoum meeting) has been bruited
about for months, including the $475 million figure. It was the subject of
two interagency meetings; the White House was briefed.

The current U.S. assessment is that any Iraqi-financed missile factory
''cannot be confirmed,'' although there is no doubt that North Korea has
been peddling arms in Sudan. ''The report is impossible to stamp out,'' says
a frustrated doubter. Another derogates the story that won't go away as
''rumint'' -- merely rumored intelligence.

Their logical reason for skepticism is that Sudan is heavily infiltrated by
Iranian operatives, who might sabotage or publicize any Iraqi plant. Another
is that newly secure Pyongyang is now in the midst of a charm offensive,
which will soon include the first visit to Washington by a high-level
diplomat since the end of the Korean War. This huge weapons deal would run
counter to that opening.

On the other hand, there is reason for skepticism about the spookery's
skepticism. Eighteen months ago, on indirect evidence later questioned,
President Clinton ordered a cruise missile attack at the Al Shifa
pharmaceutical plant. Our spies may now be super-cautious.

On the third hand, I am inclined to take the rumint seriously because this
method of outsourcing his secret weapons development to a rogue-state
neighbor so neatly fits Saddam Hussein's interest. Also, if true, a secret
Sudanese missile plant financed by Iraqi oil sales would argue cogently
against efforts to appease Saddam by lifting economic sanctions, so avidly
desired by the Jiang-Putin-Chirac cabal at the U.N.

Wait -- this just in. Porter Goss, chairman of the Permanent House Select
Committee on Intelligence, is willing to go on the record: ''We have been
concerned with the development of weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems in Sudan, as well as Sudan's ties with North Korea. The
matter is receiving our attention.''

Yemen . . .Sudan . . . Afghanistan . . .

AQ bases in 1990s and offsite facilities for axis regimes . . . AQ is tied to the *axis* not just Iraq

"follow the weapons" (proxy for a proxy)

North Korea . . . Iran . . .Iraq . . .

connect the dots . . .