I Still Owe the Military Nothing

My article on the military drew more emails than I've seen since I wrote a couple of years ago that Sheriff Andy Taylor of Mayberry was a commie rat. Then Paul Craig Roberts wrote this week a few good reasons why it's sometimes no fun to be a columnist. Just because it's enlightening and amusing (and a little informative), I thought it would be interesting to discuss the responses to my military article.

Free Republic was the most fun. As Paul Craig Roberts pointed out, some people will invent things they believe were in your article, and focus on those. One reader acted offended that I considered the rank of major "lowly," which I didn't suggest (I was putting it in relation to 2- and 3-star generals); another assumed my dad retired as a major, which I didn't suggest, and which wasn't the case. Others understood that I retired from the CIA, which I didn't. I was there for a relatively short time, and left in 1990. There was little of substance – mostly empty invective – on Free Republic, though one reader successfully corrected my simplification of US foreign policy in the Middle East to "40 years of bombing." I should have linked this article by Adam Young, and referred to "50 years of ham-handed, violent, dictatorial, capricious intervention" instead of "40 years of bombing." I stand corrected. Freepers, as they're called, are self-selected, and virtually all neocons; almost no libertarians are among them. I counted, just for fun, about 70 different posters, 65 of whom were opposed to my viewpoint (about 60 of those without substance).

My emails, also subject to self-selection, were just the opposite. I counted, just for fun, and heard from 114 different people – so far. 105 were in agreement, nine disagreed. Of those who identified themselves as military veterans, 32 agreed while only three wrote to disagree. None of the three claimed to have been a combat veteran, while many of the 32 mentioned the wars in which they saw combat.

Without exception, those who disagreed simply restated the point I wrote to dispel: That we owe our freedom to the military. A few thought they had me on a legal point: Since I noted that Americans' freedoms have decreased, some readers thought I'd confused the purpose of the military (defense from foreign invasion) with civil government (the enactment of laws, the existence of which limits freedom). No, they didn't have me; they made my point – that the military has little to do with freedom.

The only thing the military can do for our freedom is to repel an attack from an invader who, in occupying, would offer us a less free society than we have now. I mean, we must consider the possibility that an occupying force can increase our freedom, right? Isn't this Bush's point in Iraq? So, for our military to have been effective in protecting our freedom, the enemy must be (1) credible; (2) willing and prepared to attack; (3) likely to reduce our freedom if he wins; and (4) repelled by either the action, or the threat, of our military.

This circumstance has never obtained in our history, and probably never will. The British, in 1812, were the single most credible invading threat we've ever faced, and if the British invaded successfully they still might not have had a tremendous impact on our liberty either way. (Remember the Whiskey Rebellion? Our liberty was threatened by our own government in 1791.) Further, the most effective defense we had in 1812 was privateers – private ships, paid only in captured booty (which gave them incentive to preserve the enemy and his ships). So much for the government's military there.

The next "invasion" was the Union army invading the sovereign CSA, which only established once and for all that there was nothing voluntary about the US government. We have never been in any credible danger of being forced to speak Spanish, Japanese, German, or frankly, Russian. (We were in some danger of being hit by Soviet nuclear weapons, but the only deterrent was our own bombs – not men and women, not command structures, since ICBMs could be launched on Moscow from inside the US.)

The USSR was credible, likely to reduce our freedom, and somewhat hampered, if not repelled, by our military (but really mostly by our under-the-table payments to, for example, Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan; and our placements of missiles in Europe), but the USSR was never prepared to attack us. Hitler and Germany never constituted a credible threat to the US, and Hitler himself made no secret that he thought the new world order should consist of Germany, England, and the United States. Japan was goaded into Pearl Harbor, starving and desperate to break up our blockade of oil, steel, etc. against their island; but Japan never had any wish to invade the US. (Freepers take note: Yes, Germany, Japan, and the USSR were evil. Yes they were. I agree. They were still never a threat to us, with our without our military.)

What has made the US an uninviting target for 200 years is the oceans and our gun ownership. As Iraq and Afghanistan have proven in the last three years, making war halfway around the world is expensive, risky, and difficult even for the US, even today, even when attacking pathetically weaker opponents. Universal gun ownership means an occupying force can never succeed. To occupy, you have to step out of your planes and humvees and move on foot. The more the natives own guns and want to resist, the more ground area you have to occupy continuously. With a nation full of rifle-toting rednecks, a hostile foreign power can never succeed. To obliterate us, they would be forced to nuke us.

There is no incentive for any nation to do that to any other: There would be nothing of value to steal afterward, and it would be costly and dangerous for the nation using the nukes. America did it to Japan because we knew Japan was already defeated, and we were the only ones in the world who had nukes. Indeed, to prove the disincentives work: Truman bombed Japan because the Japanese demanded as their only condition of surrender that the emperor remain emperor. They continued to demand this after both bombings, so Truman just gave in. The bombings were for nothing. And with no retaliation for Truman or the US to fear, Truman still stopped, and gave the Japanese what they wanted. They didn't even have rifles.

Heck, I'd be more prone to believe we owed our freedom to the military if they were here, defending our borders (or even their own headquarters). They're not.

And as to my point that the military is just a tool for Congress and the president, you don't have to listen to me. Listen to a retired Marine general, twice winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor, on the subject.

We don't need a standing federal military. If someone invades, militias can pop up, with rifles and perhaps a government commission (while we still have forcible government) to get the job done and then disband until the next invasion. I'll be there, ready to go. Let me know when it happens.

From http://www.ww2pacific.com/downfal0.html

World War II in the Pacific
Operation Downfall
The Invasion of Japan

Operation DOWNFALL, the invasion of Japan, was in two components scheduled for the Fall and Spring of 1945-46:

Operation OLYMPIC, Nov 1, 1945, after the hurricane season, before winter. General Krueger, Sixth Army, with nine divisions (3 more in reserve) was to invade three beaches in southern Kyushu, the southern-most of the four Japanese home islands. This was to became a giant airbase to support the next invasion phase in the Spring of 1946. The Japanese had correctly predicted our invasion point and had reinforced Kyushu threefold over initial US expectations.

Operation CORONET, March 1, 1946, of Honshu, the main island, with 22 divisions in the Spring after air fields on Kyushu allowed landbased air support. There were to be two prongs:
General Hodges, with the 1st Army to land east of Tokyo, clear the peninsula, establish air fields, land tank divisions transferred from European, about 30 days, then charge across the plains to take the capital.
Ten days after the initial landing, LtGen Eichelberger with 8th Army was to attack west of Yokohama, Tokyo's seaport, open Tokyo Bay and block any reinforcement of Tokyo.

U.S. PREPARATIONS
The previous phase of the war had been the capture of the Marshalls --Saipan, Tinian and the US island of Guam during June, July and Aug 1944. These were captured to provide air fields within the effective range of B-29 Superfortress, very heavy bombers. Previous attempts to fly B-29s from inland China could only reach the southern portions of Japan with minimal bomb loads and required an impossible to maintain rate of logistics. B-29 attacks started in November 1944, by March 1945, Tokyo, Osaka and other industrial cities had been bombed
Iwo Jima was taken in Feb-March 1945 to provide an intermediate airstrip for damaged B-29s, for fighter escorts, and for shorter ranged B-24 Liberator heavy bombers. Air attack was ratcheted up to 300 plane raids and the attack method changed from explosives to incendiary in which 15% of Tokyo was destroyed in the first raid.1
Air dropped mining began in March 1945 in the Shimonoseki Straight, separating Kyushu and Honshu, to isolate the invasion island. Over 120 ships succumb to these mines.
Submarine efforts were concentrated in the Sea of Japan, on the northwest coast, while carrier task forces concentrated on the Pacific Ocean side.
Preparation for the invasion began with the Okinawa campaign. This is the largest island in the Ryukuyu Islands, the chain nearest to Japan. The native Okinawans were of Chinese extraction but had been an independent kingdom for 800 years until Japan invaded in 1875. Annexed, they continued a race apart, looked down upon my Japanese.2

Carrier Task Forces. The first strike on Japan's home islands was the period 18-22March 1945 to disrupt attacks on our invasion fleet as it approached Okinawa. Raids by 11 fleet carriers and 6 light carriers destroyed aircraft such that the Japanese air attacks on Okinawa were delayed until 6 days after the landings.
Remnants of the Imperial Navy were destroyed in their yards at Kure (near Hiroshima) on the main island of Honshu during early July.
Two fleets were to participate in Olympic: The Strike fleet with 21 carriers, 10 fast battleships and their train. The Assault fleet had 1,500 transports and 800 warships including 26 carriers and 13 battleships.

Operation Zipper by Lord Mountbatten's southeast Asia command was to take Singapore and the Malay Peninsula about 1Sept45. Also, the US China theater was planning to take the Liuchow Peninsula, west of Hong Kong, in mid-August as a port to supply China.

JAPANESE DEFENSES

Troops. Japan was scrapping the bottom of a big barrel. Two million new recruits were called up and experienced Armies was brought back from China and Manchuria to defend the homeland.

Kamikaze. Numbers of about 2000 Navy and 3500 Army airplanes have been cited as available for the defense, and of course, preparations would have continued with 500 mini-subs under construction, specially designed aircraft build, motor boat and manned torpedo stations established. Japanese military was committed to and was convinced they could repel the initial assault. That we might make as second assault was too much to consider. 1,465 Kamikaze had attacked at Okinawa, 400 miles away, had sunk or damaged 250 warships. A ratio of 1 hit per 6 attempts. Troopships sailing into waters adjacent to Japan, they thought, didn't stand a chance. US planners estimated 250 hits; Japanese planners expected 480 ships sunk. See suicide page for a range of special attack (suicide) weapons used by the Japanese.

Expected casualties. By this stage in the war, the overwhelming American material condition had reduced the ratio of American killed vs. enemy. The assault by Pacific trained Army troops from the Philippine Campaign and combat hardened Marines lessened the expected causalities on the American side. Conversely, first rate Japanese troops with pre-war combat experience in China -- which had made the initial conquests in the Pacific against inexperienced Allied troops -- had mostly been killed. The combat trained troops in China had been replaced with secondary troops -- these now experienced troops were recalled to defend the home islands. These troops had never been exposed in China to the massive air attacks that were now normal operations from US land and sea forces. Japan's naval ships had been destroyed. Japan had never had an adequate new pilot training program. Industrial resupply was dramatically weakened with every war facility destroyed as soon as it was discover by American air reconnaissance. Raw materials had been cut off as the merchant marine was destroyed by American submarines and aircraft.

Usually omitted from the statistics, however, because the atomic bomb was a secret, is the 300,000 white slave laborers held by Japan. Most of these were to be executed if the invasion had happened. The appearance of the atomic bomb brought such a sudden end to the war, that these lives were saved, along with the expected military casualties of both sides and massive numbers of Japanese civilian population either participating in the defense or as collateral damage.

Prospects of Operation Olympic. Japan fully expected to be able to repel the first landing with the help of suicide tactics. As shown at Normandy, the Americans expected to overpower all in their way. The U.S. expected to have air superiority, which places an imposition on the defense. The Navy expected to interdict all movements of resupply and reinforcement.
Best guess, the attack would be a repeat of "bloody Omaha beach" with a successful American landing. The plan called for sealing the mountains rather than fighting an Okinawa type campaign. The goal of establishing air bases would proceed as an American specialty. There would be continued casualties, but the goal accomplished.

CORONET . With American aircraft numbers measured in the 5-digits by aircraft type, and Japan's total aircraft numbers measured in the 4-digits, possibly 3-or 2-digits after Olympic, it is inconceivable why Coronet should happen. Japan could be allowed to suffocate under a siege with sea and air attack. No item of military importance would exist within 10 miles of the shore or any item that could be seen from the air. However, if Japan had persisted, it could only be because of great resistance at Kyushu. The momentum of war would have followed the plan. Invasion of Honshu would have been brutal with total destruction of every square yard before the troops and ruthless combat. The atomic bomb not only saved many Japanese lives, it may have saved the nation. With surrender, the occupying troops could be magnanimous in the American manner. If they had to fight fanatical resistance, they would have been compelled to destroy everything in sight as a potential military threat.

They were still never a threat to us, with our without our military.

This isn't even plausible revisionism, based, I presume, upon emotion wrung from 20-20 hindsight. The assertion deprives the article of credibility.

Without deterrent, even clunky Soviet technology would have struck the U.S. The USSR would not have occupied the U.S. since that would have proven too expensive. However, Comintern Marxist theory required only control of all means of production internationally. That in turn required an organized, central bureau, and the natural candidate for such a large enterprise was the USSR Politburo.

To achieve domination of all means of production by the USSR only required neutralization of U.S. influence (and so, power), and that did not require occupation of the U.S., only its actual or virtual disarmament, either by war or intimidation.

The Cuban missile bases made the innaccurate Soviet missile technology a genuine threat. To say the USSR was never a threat is patently irrational.

Interestingly, American liberals of that age wanted to strip the U.S. of its nuclear arsenal. The Venona Papers have revealed that some liberals went further than merely advocating a change in domestic politics, actually spying for the USSR to catalyze change, presumably for the greater good of humanity.

Fortunately for us, liberals (like Kerry, McGovern, and Ted Kennedy) who repeatedly voted to reduce defensive preparedness, were thwarted by hawks in both political parties (and by Ronald Reagan in particular). The result: the collapse of the USSR, international communism, by and large, and nearly complete removal of the danger of nuclear destruction of the world. Why liberals hate this remains to me a mystery, except that in hating our nation's liberty they succeed in expiating some imaginary guilt rising from perceived unnecessary prosperity.

Unfortunately, neurosis is no basis for foreign policy. I hope the general electorate realizes that.

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