California Requires Paper Receipts for Electronic Voting Machines

TBO.com ^ | 11/22/03 | Rachel Konrad

[kattracks]

SAN JOSE, Calif. (AP) - California's decision to require all electronic voting machines to provide paper receipts by 2006 promises to set the standard for such balloting nationwide. Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, who announced the new rule Friday, also introduced stricter requirements for testing and auditing software used to record and tabulate votes in the nation's most populous state.

Because California commands a sizable share of the market for voting machines, the move may prompt changes in equipment being adopted nationwide as local governments rush to modernize voting systems.

Shelley wrote in the announcement that he is requiring receipts not because "voting systems are inherently insecure, they are not, but rather because people understandably feel more confident when they can verify that their votes are being recorded as intended."

Diebold Election Systems and Sequoia Voting Systems, two of the nation's largest manufacturers of voting equipment, said they would comply with the new regulations.

Executives at the companies have denied that the integrity of the vote is at risk without paper receipts, and they have been fighting such a requirement for months.

But computer scientists and voting rights advocates have been warning that at least 50,000 paperless terminals nationwide expose the vote to hackers, software bugs and mechanical breakdowns. They say other states will likely adopt regulations similar to California's new standards.

Congress has set aside $3.9 billion for states to overhaul voting systems, and hundreds of counties are considering paperless terminals. Elections experts say as many as 75 percent of voters nationwide will cast ballots electronically by 2010, up from about 10 percent in the 2000 presidential election.

"I think this is going to be a tidal wave from California eastward - it's going to get a lot of attention and may change a lot of minds," said Stanford University computer science professor David Dill. "California is the biggest market for election equipment. No company can blow it off, so they're going to have to accommodate this requirement."

The announcement comes less than three weeks after a state task force on voting began an investigation into allegations that uncertified software was used in California's Oct. 7 gubernatorial recall election.

According to Shelley's nine-page document, all counties that purchase new touch-screen terminals must provide a "voter verified paper audit trail" starting in July 2005.

Voting equipment companies must retrofit systems already being used in at least four California counties with printers by July 2006. This makes California the first state to force equipment vendors to retrofit machines already purchased or installed.

Oregon, New Hampshire and Wisconsin require paper printouts in electronic voting, but they have not deployed touch-screen machines except in small experiments.

Nearly 1.5 million Californians - one in 10 registered voters - cast ballots on touch-screens in the recall election. Four in 10 will likely use electronic systems in California's March 2004 elections.

"This is historic - a huge development and big step toward reliable and transparent voting systems," said Kim Alexander, president of California Voter Foundation.

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On the Net:

California Secretary of State: http://www.ss.ca.gov/

Federal Elections Commission: http://www.fec.gov/

California Voter Foundation: http://www.calvoter.org/

[HiTech RedNeck]

OK so what happens when a voter checks the receipt and "oops that's not who I voted for"? Or forgets to take it?

[giotto]

And what's to prevent a malicious, politically motivated hacker from rigging the software such that the paper receipt reflects how the voter intended to vote, but is not the same as the votes that are sent to be tallied? Unless there is a recount, and people are asked to bring their paper receipt ballots to be retallied, by hand, there is no way to know that the electronic votes are being accurately tallied by the software.

[xzins]

This is a victory for sanity, and for many on Free Republic who have advocated this for years.

Go Freepers!

Go Ohio State Buckeyes....beat Michigan!

[CMailBag]

He who has the best HACKER wins.

[GatekeeperBookman]

I should like a printed copy of my votes. It would begin either 'on line' or in person & the receipt would be comparable to the larger record of all votes, that only I might reference it, but that IT would always be available for me to check! Why not?

"The War does indeed have many facets; http://aztlan.net/ Look at your enemy."

[sam_paine]

Why does a voter having a copy of their supposed vote prove anything about the validity of the vote?

Now, if they print you a copy and you sign it and drop it in a locked precinct box that can be recounted later.....THEN I think you have an effective check and balance on hacking.

[chainsaw]

We here in Illinois still use the punch card machines. Yet to this day we have had no trouble trying to figue out how to use them.

Of course Illinois voters are far more advanced than Florida or California voters. At least that is what the democrats want us to think. By the way, I live in a republican district.

[chainsaw]

Now, if they print you a copy and you sign it and drop it in a locked precinct box that can be recounted later.....THEN I think you have an effective check and balance on hacking.

Almost --- How about a computer that can print out a punch card as well as an electronic tally, with a reader that you insert the card into to check your vote. if that is correct drop the punch card into a lockbox. The electronic tally will record the vote immediately and later the punch card tally would have to balance with the electronic tally.

Of course the democrats would never go for that because it would be very hard for them to falseify the results in their favor.

This sounds complicated but it would be very easy to accomplish by an idiot with two fingers.

[Terridan]

These computer voting machines were created to "throw" the votes. And it is obvious there is no security, and the same security code on locks is used nationwide. The idea that reciepts, or paper reciepts were not given is proof. The hacking possibilities are astronomical. Go back to paper ballots, and Sharpe pens...

[Terridan]

Go Freepers!

Go Ole Miss Rebels!!! Beat the LSU Tigers!

[Timeout]

Another idea:

Make voting machines like ATM's.

I vote and review what shows on the screen. I push the final button and the machine issue me a "receipt" containing a randomly scambled code number: let's use 485763. The receipt reflects (somehow) my vote on each candidate/issue. I'm told to keep the receipt until the election is certified.

After the votes are tabulated, newspapers print a list of votes in each category...in order by code number. If it's a contested election, I can scan down the published list of votes, find #458763 and determine whether my vote was acurately tabulated. If there's an error, I have a receipt to prove the error.

What do you think?

[expatpat]

The way I read it is that each voter gets a receipt saying how he voted AND there is a paper list of all such votes -- much like what happens at the supermarket when you get a receipt but the store also has all the receipts on paper.

[Timeout]

BTW, the voter's ID would NOT be on the receipt. The point of the randomly chosen number would be to avoid any possibility of matching the vote to any particular individual.

[Alamo-Girl]

Thanks for the ping!

[ServesURight]

Go back to paper ballots, and Sharpe pens

Totally agree. Nothing beats good old-fashioned paper and marker. Have the ballot marked in huge fonts with big check marks next to the names.

[Reeses]

So if a vote is close someone can walk up to a table top computer and take out 500 votes with a hammer? A single Florida Democrat could have elected Al Gore.

[eddie willers]

much like what happens at the supermarket when you get a receipt but the store

Hi....I'm Chad.
I'll be your voting machine today.

[xzins]

The checks and balances boggle the mind, But why can't the paper printout be WHAT the reader reads instead of it reading your buttons pushed and then printing a paper printout.

Instead of 1 receipt, there should be 2. One for the voter and one for the precinct that runs the paper printout through a counting machine.

It's a multiple backup system.

[July 4th]

Do you turn in the receipt, or get to keep it? If you get to keep it, there's a real opportunity for voter intimidation. "Go in there, vote Democrat, and show me that you did!"