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Sorry about the delay in replying, it's been quiet a busy last few days. Your last question is very valid, as the Army (both the US and Israeli) have found out with the Patriot/PAC-III (US) and the Arrow II (Israeli) anti-ballistic missile systems. It seems that in a non-war environment (such as a first-strike or random, small, terrorist attacks), the authority to fire/engage targets must be approved at a fairly high level (two- or three-star level for US military, case-in-point is the CAOC in UAE and Saudi Arabia). The military, and the civilians who control the military, must decide who will approve launching these missiles (for PAC-III and Arrow II) or firing these lasers (in the case of this article). The technology for tracking, targeting, and firing against multiple incoming targets is already available, and employed in a lot of systems (all modern jets, PAC-III, Arrow II, and others). Acquistion shouldn't be a problem because almost all missles used would have to get fairly high (unless it's a cruise missile that skims the surface) to get enough range on the reentry/return side of a ballistic path. As for the ceramic coatings, the problem is the more weight you add for fairly heavy coatings is less weight for warhead and guidance systems, and smaller ranges. You raise good questions, and a lot of this must be worked out before these systems get operationally deployed (especially in the US).

You raise good questions, and a lot of this must be worked out before these systems get operationally deployed (especially in the US).

I guess you can tell, I was once peripherally involved in the business (I worked at Avantek). I knew about the multiple targeting capability, but IIRC the numbers were ten to fifteen simultaneous targets. One wonders about the ability of the radar to distingush hundreds of simultaneous targets with decent depth of field.

To me those were obvious questions before plunking down the money for a pricey system that will itself be a prime target for terrorist ground attack. One has to ask whether going the route of an expensive and supposedly capable defense is worth the risk compared to the demonstrated willingness to use massive retaliation, ESPECIALLY when it's so easy to smuggle weapons into the US inside cargo containers. My thinking is that we should be concentrating on that problem instead.

I am reminded that somehow Andrews AFB couldn't get a couple of guys with a Stinger deployed in time to stop an incoming passenger jet with over an hour of warning between the time of the first highjacking and the time of the hit on the Pentagon. After spending trillions on defense, that one still burns me.