Posted on 10/18/2003 5:23:43 AM PDT by John Jorsett
U.S. Army aviation is in for a shake up because of the success of UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) and the expense of the new Comanche and the older OH-58 Kiowa helicopters the Comanche is to replace. Because new UAVs can be developed and fielded so quickly (mainly because you don’t have to worry about crew safety, since a UAV doesn't have a crew, unless you count the computer, which is not a recognized life form), the army is looking towards using more UAVs for scouting missions. The trend in UAV design is to have them work as wingmen for manned aircraft. Why not for transport and gunship helicopters as well? A UAV weighing several hundred pounds can move fast enough to keep up with helicopters. These UAVs can fly by themselves most of the time, and take general directions from a nearby helicopter pilot (and/or pilots on the ground). In any event, because of their cost, Comanche and Kiowa are at risk from much cheaper UAVs. Since Comanche isn't scheduled to replace the Kiowa's until 2009, there is plenty of time to develop and try out several generations of UAVs.
Lots of links from there.
If you can fly a model airplane to take pictures of the enemy, you can also fly that model airplane, laden with mini CBUs into the enemy. Imagine entire platoons of goggle clad video game geeks fighting wars from darkened vans with nothing but their paddles.
And from there is is a very small step to flying one which can fire air-to-air missiles and make 15-G turns that would knock out a pilot on board. The Air Force better increase its lobbying budge it if wants to keep its pilot slots.
"Off we go into the wild blue screen, climing high into the van"
Its true that the Comanche program is in peril, due primarily to mismanagement, cost overruns, production delays and becoming overshadowed by Future Combat Systems (FCS), including UAVs. Prior to this past year, Comanche was touted and being hyped as the deep reconnaissance, deep attack, C4ISR platform that would essentially quarterback the battle. It has now been relegated to a "complimentary" system to FCS, rather than the central C4ISR platform it has been sold as. $600 million in UAV funding has been transferred from Comanche to FCS as well, in effect, Comanche has lost "ownership" of UAV development and control. Based on the logic of dollars spent vs. return on investment, reality of the aircraft capabilities, realities of the threat and how we need to fight, I'd give the Comanche program less than a 50-50 chance of surviving. However, I also know that the industry and political influences of such a program will, no doubt, push it through to at least the first Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)process.
The sad fact is that the Comanche doesn't live up to the hype that's being marketed in its sexy powerpoint presentations and glossy brochures. Design engineers are obsessed with weight of the airframe. Major components have been re-engineered to bring down the weight. This has had negative effects on the weapons systems, fuel carryig capacity and crew survivability. There is no active Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE)Package (no flares, no chaff, no IR jammer) on the aircraft as it relys soley on it's stealth design characteristics, yet it's almost the same size as a Longbow and much more vulnerable to small arms ground fire at low altitude, low airspeed environments that reconnaissance/attack helicopters operate in. The hard fact is that with just a few modifications (at a lot less cost)the Longbow can do anything now that the Comanche is supposed to be able to do five years from now and survive.
Frankly, it would be money better spent to field the Army with MD 530F little birds for replacing the underpowered, over grossed OH-58Ds. They can be equipped with the same digital comms, radar, etc.. that Comanche has. You could buy more for your money, they're simple and relatively cheap to maintain, designed for armed reconnaissance/light attack with a proven track record and have great in flight and post crash survivability for the crews.
The Aquila UAV program in 1980 was cancelled by the army (after finally meeting all requirements). The final nail in the coffin was that fact that there were no slots for pilotless planes. Recon did not want them, they had pilots. Artilary did not want them, to designate targets, they were very expensive. But every infantry officer wanted to see over the next hill.
It took time and proof of effectiveness in warfare but the army has become a believer. The Air Force is digging in to hold their spots, perhaps eventually a UAV to fly on the wing of a piloted plane and go into seriously protected airspace may find a home.
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