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For those wishing for more information about the planning of the reliability of our electric power grids.

Reliability Assessment 2002–2011
The Reliability of Bulk Electric Systems in North America
Prepared by: North American Electric Reliability Council
October 2002
ftp://www.nerc.com/pub/sys/all_updl/docs/pubs/2002ras.pdf

from the FORWARD
Since 1968, NERC has relied on voluntary efforts and “peer pressure” to ensure compliance with its standards. This voluntary arrangement is no longer adequate. The users and operators of the electric systems who used to cooperate voluntarily on reliability matters are now competitors without the same incentives to cooperate with each other or comply with voluntary reliability standards. Little or no effective recourse exists today under the current voluntary model to correct such behavior — not a single bulk electric system reliability standard can be enforced effectively today by NERC or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).

from the EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Even though transmission systems are expected to operate reliably, some areas of the grid are not adequate to transmit the full output of all new generating units to their desired markets. Although some transmission constraints are recurring and well known, new constraints are appearing as electricity flow patterns change.

From the Regional Highlights:
Current projections indicate that New York State will not meet its 18% installed reserve margin requirement beyond 2004. However, currently about 4,200 MW of new capacity have approved applications under the New York State Article X process that have not been included in the projected reserve margins.

From the Transmission Adequacy and Security Assessment:
The transmission systems are being subjected to flows in magnitudes and directions that were not contemplated when they were designed and for which there is minimal operating experience. New flow patterns result in an increasing number of facilities being identified as limits to transfers, and transmission loading relief (TLR) procedures were required in areas not previously subject to overloads to maintain the transmission facilities within operating limits.

From a previous post on another thread:
"The "power lines" in Ohio are now being discounted as the original cause and grid operators have made statements that as early as noon on Thursday, there were "very strange" fluctuations in the voltage and loads on the grid."

This was reported on the air on Fox News on 18 August, then quickly dropped from any national media that I saw. "Experts" even on this site began discounting these statements and quickly latched on to the "...345 kv powerline failures in Ohio..." theory.

I suppose we all just feel more comfortable with nice neat answers, but have you seen what's beginning to trickle out now?

Joint Task Force's Timeline of Blackout

Transcripts Reveal Blackout May Not Be First Energy's Fault

Task Force Notes Problems Before Blackout

Just a couple of excerpts...
"Voltage shifts, line problems and power plant shutdowns were observed "well before" midday and across several states..." "...many things happened well before 12 p.m. ... across several states" and some of those problems also "may be relevant in a causal sense to the blackout,"

"Midwest utilities were struggling to keep their systems in balance hours before last month's massive blackout,

Personally, I believe the jury is still out on this one, that we may in fact never be told what really happened, and that we should all be a bit more hesitant to jump at convenient answers offered up far too quickly for what is often a very complex situation.

Interesting, no?

I have to wonder how they managed to hush all this talk and gently persuade all major news outlets into believing the simple story of those 3 power line failures that caused it all....